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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three independent essays on applied econometrics. The first chapter extends the model
averaging estimator (Hansen, 2007) to the time series scenario. To this end, I propose a Mallows model averaging
autocorrelation corrected (MAC) estimator, in which the tapered estimator (McMurry and Politis, 2010) is employed
as the working covariance matrix. The optimality of the proposed criterion for MAC is proved under mild regularity
conditions. Furthermore, the estimator works for a general family of covariance matrix estimators. Monte Carlo simu-
lations demonstrate the effectiveness of MAC in comparison with the existing counterparts. A significantly improved
paper based on this chapter (Cheng, Ing, Yu, 2015) has been accepted for publication, where model averaging weights
residing in a discrete set are extended to continuous ones. Additionally, the published paper proposes the use of a
modified Cholesky decomposition method, instead of the tapered estimator, for the inverse autocovariance matrix.
The second chapter examines the causality between the odds of winning an election and vote-buying. In Taiwan
in 2010, eight cities and counties accounting for 60% of the entire population were merged and upgraded to five
special municipalities. Along with the merger event, the number of district seats was changed, exogenously shifting
the winning chances of candidates in the 2010 municipal elections. This policy intervention allows us to investigate
whether a candidate is incentivized to buy votes when winning odds deteriorate. For every additional seat cut in
a district, the difference-in-differences estimate suggests that approximately 4% additional incumbents seeking re-
election decided to buy votes.
The third chapter estimates determinants of adolescent romantic matching using a maximum score estimator.
Sorting patterns are suggested from the results. Findings are consistent with the literature, but more detailed results
are revealed. In line with the literature, I find evidence of positive assortative matching along physical traits and grade.
In addition, race is suggested to be the most important determinant of match value in the context of teen romantic
relationships. Finally, adolescent matching seems pleasure-driven, in that past sexual experience plays an active role.
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Chapter 1
A NOTE ON MAC: MALLOWS MODEL
AVERAGING AUTOCORRELATION
CORRECTED ESTIMATOR
1.1. Introduction
This article is concerned with the implementation of model averaging method under the scenario of serial correlation.
Consider the following theme: an investigator collects a set of time series observations {yt ,x1t ,x2t , ...,xMt}, t = 1, ...,n.
She, with the data available, has a class of proposed models in mind, Mn, formed by combinations of observable
covariates, whereas she encounters difficulties in determining the optimal model. Furthermore, serial correlation in
unobserved errors has been suggested from tests or a priori knowledge. We then ask, formally, the question as follows:
given yt = µt + et , where E(et |x1t ,x2t , ...) = 0, t = 1, ...,n, and µt denotes the unknown mean, if yt follows some
stationary time series process in the non-i.i.d. form, on what guideline shall we rely in order to obtain a satisfactory
weighted estimator µˆt = ∑m∈M wmµˆmt , where wm represents the weight assigned to model m and µˆmt is the individual
estimator from model m? Moreover, on what grounds can we assess the performance of selection mechanism? Below
I first briefly review the background of model averaging, then reach the answer to the questions of concern by pointing
out the main contributions of this article in the end of this section.
Model average estimation has been marketed at academic community under various nameplates; e.g. regression
by mixing, model combining (Yang, 2001; Yuan and Yang, 2005), among others. Throughout this paper, I follow the
recently flourishing literature to term by model averaging this family of methods sharing merits in common. Other
than appealingly straightforward and easily implementable, model averaging is also theoretically justified by the fol-
lowing methodological strengths. To begin with, model averaging performs equally well, if not better, in comparison
with model selection in terms of asymptotic loss efficiency. Numerous studies from the recent surge of research on fre-
quentist model averaging suggest that model averaging methods modified from model selection prototype may share
the desired asymptotic properties together. In a seminal paper, Hansen (2007) proposed the Mallows model averaging
(MMA), in which he selects the weights for average estimates over each model by minimizing Mallows Cp criterion.
In his paper, Hansen proves that MMA possesses the asymptotic loss efficiency carried over from the prototype in
model selection problem, and spurs a fruitful avenue of research.
Along this line of research, Hansen (2008) proved the asymptotic equivalence bridging Mallows criteria and the
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mean-squared forecast error (MSFE) when samples {et ,x1t ,x2t , ...} are strictly stationary, and inferred from this link-
age the asymptotic efficiency of MMA in the times series framework. Nonetheless, the proof of asymptotic efficiency
in Hansen (2008) still relies on the i.i.d. assumption as a result of the difficulties that will be explained later in this
section. Justified even in finite sample case, the weight selection criterion developed by Liang, Zou, Wan, and Zhang
(2011) is proposed to be the minimizer among the derived unbiased estimators of mean squared error (MSE) of the
averaged estimators, with the asymptotic efficiency demonstrated as well. Hansen and Racine (2012) considered
the jackknife model averaging (JMA) by minimizing the cross-validation criterion, and showed the weight selection
mechanism is asymptotically efficient in this setting.
Furthermore, ignoring the model uncertainty that emerges during the model selection procedure will cause post-
selection inference invalid. This problem has been widely identified by a large body of research, suggesting that the
coverage probability of the estimate interval is optimistically over-reported. See, for details, Po¨tscher (1991), Kabaila
(1995, 1998), Hjort and Claeskens (2003), Leeb and Po¨tscher (2003, 2005, 2006, 2008), and Danilov and Magnus
(2004), among others. Model averaging, bypassing the selection of the best model, integrates the model uncertainty
from each model into the inference altogether. In this regard, the derived asymptotic distribution for estimates is
unconditional on the post-selection model, and thus retrieves the inference away from the biases.
Two strands of literature from Bayesian and frequentist perspectives lead present model averaging methodologies.
Bayesian model averaging (BMA) is a natural dividend of Bayesian information criterion, from which the posterior
probability of each model of interest can be derived. Bayesian approach puts no restriction on the specification on
dependence structure of data, as long as a reasonable prior on parameters and models is rendered with justifications.
Nevertheless, apart from the computational burden, BMA has been criticized by the nonsensical posterior interpreta-
tion of parameters that occurs when equipped with conflicting priors. This issue arises when the number of assigned
priors increases (Liang, Zou, Wan, and Zhang, 2011), and worsens when all candidate models are misspecified (Yuan
and Yang, 2005). See Hoeting, Madigan, Raftery, and Volinsky (1999), for an overview of BMA.
From the frequentist perspective, achieving an asymptotic loss efficient weight selection method embedding time
series applications is the main goal of this paper. A substantial body of model selection and model averaging lit-
erature favors the i.i.d. samples assumption by virtue of the tractability for asymptotic analyses. Nevertheless, the
validity of asymptotic properties is doubted in the presence of dependent data. For models with heteroskedastic er-
rors, Andrews (1991) showed that the asymptotic efficiency holds with modified model selection criteria: generalized
CL (GCL), cross-validation (CV), and generalized cross-validation (GCV). Following Andrews (1991) and Hansen
(2007), Hansen and Racine (2012) demonstrated that model averaging possesses the asymptotic loss efficiency under
heteroskedastic framework. Both Andrews (1991) and Hansen and Racine (2012) yielded the asymptotic optimality
based on reasoning of Li (1987), which is built on the Theorem 2 of Whittle (1960). Whittle (1960) established a sharp
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pth moment bound for the sum of independent variables of quadratic or linear form. The independence assumption
precludes the current works from extension to times series scenario. Hansen (2010, 2012) noticed that the extension
works are expected to be technically challenging. Inspired by Hansens works, one of primary contributions in this
article is to show that the asymptotic loss efficiency remains valid under some regularity conditions, allowing time
series data while performing the model averaging.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to adapt model averaging to the time series framework, and the
implication to model selection is significant in the sense of the commonality shared by the two methodologies. The
closest attempt to accomplish this extension is Hansen (2008), whereas his extension is not complete since the proof
for the asymptotic optimality is given under i.i.d. assumption, as mentioned earlier.
Serial correlation has been widely observed across disciplines. Decisions from utility-maximizing agents is usually
time dependent, exogenously or endogenously; price and trading volume in securities markets is another example
from the aggregate point of view; A collection of observations from a repeated experiment may be contaminated by
the unobserved idiosyncratic errors; meteorological data is itself a time series by the way it forms, and so on. We can
continue the enumeration, whereas the bottom line is, back to the posed question in the first paragraph: confronted
with the model uncertainty associated with time dependent data, can we develop a model average estimator satisfied
with the desired property, say, asymptotic optimality?
I adopt the model setting in this work from Hansen (2007) by considering the unknown µt linear representation
of countably infinite covariates. It is natural then to refer to selection criterion satisfying the asymptotic efficiency
as being asymptotically optimal, since there exists no correct model but a sequence of linear approximating models
residing in Mn. Aiming to satisfy the asymptotic efficiency, I then present the Mallows model averaging autocorrela-
tion corrected estimator (MMA-ACC, hereafter, MAC) to tackle the underlying dependence in data while conducting
model averaging. The strategy I exploit in this work is to replace Theorem 2 in Whittle (1960) by the first moment
bound theorem in Findley and Wei (1993), where a 2pth moment bound for vector time series of quadratic forms is
established. This class of time series covers any time series that can be written as the linear combination of martingale
difference sequence.
The target of this paper is threefold. Firstly, I slot an important piece into the Mallows model averaging with the
theoretical extension to time series applications, suggesting how it can be implemented appropriately to hurdle the
unknown dependence structure. Secondly, since model selection is included as a special case of model averaging, the
proposed criterion thus sheds light on the research of time series model selection. Lastly, the proof for asymptotic
optimality holds for a general family of covariance matrix estimators, as long as the Assumption 5 satisfies. In other
words, although I only consider the banded estimator in this context, the proof holds for a more general class of
feasible covariance matrix estimators.
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I now close this section by introducing some notation which will be employed in the sequel. For a real column
vector x = (x1, ...,xp)′ ∈ Rp, denotes its Euclidean norm by |x|= (∑pj=1 x2j)1/2. For a real random vector ς, denote its
L p-norm by ‖ς‖p = {E(|ς|p)}1/p, where p > 0. I write ς ∈ L p, if ‖ς‖p < ∞, and write ‖.‖ = ‖.‖2 for simplicity of
notation. For a matrix A with real entries, define the operator norm by ρ(A) =maxx∈R:|x|=1 |Ax|, induced by the vector
norm |x|. A notable property immediately from above is ρ2(A) := λmax(A′A), where λmax(A′A) is the largest eigenvalue
of A′A, and ′ denotes the matrix transpose. In a similar fashion, I write λmin(A′A) as the smallest eigenvalue of A′A. For
any u,v ∈R, define due := min{k ∈ Z : k ≥ u}, buc := max{k ∈ Z : k ≤ u}, u∨v := max(u,v), and u∧v := min(u,v).
Denote by C a generic positive constant independent of the sample size n, and let CN denote a generic positive constant
independent of n, but only depends on some positive real number N. Their values may differ by various displays.
The remaining paper is organized as follows. I present the main theorem in Section 2. Section 3 discusses
conditions that a feasible working covariance matrix required to satisfy in order to be applied to the proposed estimator.
Simulation studies are provided in Section 4, followed by the conclusions. All proofs are provided in the appendix.
1.2. Extending to Serial Correlated Error
1.2.1. The model setup and MMA
Consider a collection of stationary real-valued time series {(yt ,xt) : t = 1, ...,n}, where yt is the observed response
corresponding to xt = {x jt : j ∈ N}. The linear regression model of interest satisfies
yt = µt + et , (1.1)
µt =
∞
∑
j=1
θ jx jt , (1.2)
E(et |xt) = 0, t = 1, ...,n, (1.3)
where et is an unobserved stationary time series component of yt . Assume µt converges in mean square such
that E(µ2t ) exists. In matrix fashion, I write (1.1) as Yn = µn + en, where Yn = (y1, ...,yn)′, µn = (µ1, ...,µn)′, and
en = (e1, ...,en)′. Throughout this paper I denote the conditional mean by Ex(.) = E(.|x1, ...,xn), and the conditional
probability by Px(.) = P(.|x1, ...,xn). For notational convenience, I shall simply write µˆn to denote µˆn(Mn) = MnYn,
the estimate of µn from all estimators discussed in this work; henceforth the definition of µˆn varies with the display
of Mn.
The central focus of this paper, as mentioned, is to explore how and to what extent the model averaging can be
implemented in the time series context, where I attempt to accommodate both serially correlated errors {et} and time
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dependent {xt}. Specifically, it is assumed that
Ex(ene′n) = Σn. (1.4)
Observe that Σn does not depend on {x1, ...,xn}. Moreover, I impose the assumption as follows.
Assumption 1. {et} is independent of {xt}, for all t ∈ N.1
Since µt is countably infinite sum of x jt ’s, empirically, it may only be approximated by data available. As in
Hansen (2007), a sequence of linear models, indexed by m ∈M := {1,2, ...,M}, approximates µt in the following
manner:
µt =
km
∑
j=1
θ jx jt +bmt , (1.5)
where km denotes the number of regressors employed in the model m and is assumed to strictly increase in m; bmt
denotes the approximating error, and note from (1.2) that bmt = ∑∞j=km+1 θ jx jt converges to zero in mean square; M
refers to the index of the largest model being considered.
Hansen (2007, 2008) assumed that the ranking of x jt ’s is observed ex-ante. Under this assumption, M is a
set of nested models, since the best mth approximating model is nothing more than selecting the first km elements
from xt , denoted as xt(km). Hence, the dimension of M shrinks from 2M to M. Representing (1.5) in the matrix
notation for analytical convenience, we have µn = XmΘm+bm, in which Xm = (x1(km), ...,xn(km))
′
, an n×km matrix,
and bm = (bm1, ...,bmn). With a slight abuse of notation, I also write Ex(.) = E(.|x1(km), ...,xn(km)) and Px(.) =
P(.|x1(km), ...,xn(km)).
Provided that X ′MXM is invertible for any given M, the OLS estimator for mth model is Θˆm = (X ′mXm)−1X ′mYn,
under which the estimate of µn is µˆn = XmΘˆm = PmYn, where Pm = Xm(X ′mXm)−1X ′m. Hansen (2007) suggested the
Mallows model averaging estimator (MMA)
Θˆ=
M
∑
m=1
wˆm
 Θˆm
0
 ,
where Wˆ = (wˆ1, ...wˆM)′ is the weight vector in the unit simplex Hn :=
{
W ∈ [0,1]M : ∑Mm=1 wm = 1
}
, selected by
1This assumption can be relaxed to mean independence.
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minimizing the Mallows criterion. That is,
Wˆ = arg min
W∈Hn
(Yn−P(W )Yn)′(Yn−P(W )Yn)+2σ2tr(P(W )), (1.6)
where P(W ) = ∑Mm=1 wmPm with Pm = Xm(X ′mXm)−1X ′m. Thus the MMA estimate for µn is µˆn(W ) = XMΘˆ= P(W )Yn.
Define the loss by the average squared error Ln(W ) = (µˆn(W )−µn)′(µˆn(W )−µn)/n. Based on the results of
Li (1987), Hansen (2007) showed that MMA reaches optimality asymptotically if weights are selected from Hn(N),
the discrete subset of Hn, in which wm ∈ {0, 1N , 2N , ...,1} for all m ∈M . Formally, let WˆN = argminW∈Hn(N)(Yn−
P(W )Yn)′(Yn−P(W )Yn)+2σ2tr(P(W )), Hansen shows
| Ln(WˆN)
infW∈Hn(N)Ln(W )
−1| p→ 0, (1.7)
It is worth noting that N is determined independently of the sample number. This restrictive assumption arises as the
by-product of methodology convenience, although it is possible to select a large N ex ante to alleviate the concern it
may cause, pointed out in Hansen (2008).
When unobserved errors do not satisfy i.i.d. assumption, MMA estimates might be driven away from the optimality
because (1.6) misses to capture the underlying serial correlation. Below I list some of many empirical applications
regarding this issue that motivates this article.
Example 1. Stationary and invertible ARMA(pn,qn)
(1−ψ1L−ψ2L2− ...−ψpnLpn)(yt −µt) = (1+φ1L+φ2L2+ ...+φqnLqn)et , t = 1, ...,n,
where pn and qn increase as sample size n grows.
This paper extends the implementation of model averaging method to any stationary and invertible ARMA(pn,qn),
and provides the guideline on how to conduct it efficiently. Notice that this setup includes the dynamic panel data
model.
Example 2. Panel data with missing (omitted) or unobserved variables
yit = xitβ+ ci+ eit , i = 1, ..., I; t = 1, ...,n,
where xit is again 1× pn observable covariates that are allowed to vary across i and t. There are two unobserved com-
ponents, idiosyncratic errors eit and individual heterogeneity ci, in the model. Assume that eit ’s are strict exogenous.
That is, E(eit |xi1, ...,xin,ci) = 0, t = 1, ...,n. For ci, I shall discuss it by random effect and fixed effect, respectively.
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• Random Effect: if E(ci|xi1, ...,xin) = E(ci) = 0, then we can rewrite vit = ci + eit . Assume that E(viv′i) =
Ω for every 1 ≤ i ≤ I, where vi = (vi1, ...,vin)′. Thus, we have random effect estimator as βˆRE =
(∑Ii=1 X ′i ΩˆXi)−1(∑
I
i=1 X
′
i ΩˆYi) by implementing the feasible generalized least squares estimation (FGLS). We
are especially interested in the case in which Ω is characterized by serially correlated vit ’s.
• Fixed Effect: if Cov(ci,xit) 6= 0 for some 1 ≤ i ≤ I, 1 ≤ t ≤ n, then we can take the first difference for each
individual observations over time in order to obtain the consistent estimates of β as follows.
yit − yit−1 = (xit −xit−1)β+(eit − eit−1).
Alternatively, we can take the within transformation as below to remove the constant unobserved individual
heterogeneity ci.
y¯i = x¯iβ+ ci+ e¯i,
yit − y¯i = (xit − x¯i)β+(eit − e¯i).
Whether taking the first difference or the within transformation, the serial correlation is introduced during the
procedures.
One of the main contributions in this article is to accommodate the dependence structure of {xt ,et}, while showing
the asymptotic optimality can still be achieved under appropriate model averaging criterion. I therefore make the
following assumption on {xt ,et}, borrowed from Findley and Wei (1993), to establish the desired result.
Assumption 2. Assume {et} and {xt} are stationary real-valued time series with autocovariance functions,
γe(.) and {γx j(.)}∞j=1, respectively. Moreover, I assume {et} and {xt} can be represented by linear processes
as below,
et =
∞
∑
k=−∞
akαt−k,
x jt =
∞
∑
k=−∞
b jkζ jt−k, for j = 1,2, ...,
where ak’s and b jk’s, for all j, are assumed to be square summable; αt and ζ jt are measurable with respect to
filtrationFt and satisfy the following properties with probability 1:
(M1) E(αt |Ft−1) = 0; E(ζ jt |Ft−1) = 0.
(M2) E(α2t |Ft−1) = σ2α, E(ζ2jt |Ft−1) = σ2ζ j , E(ζ jtζkt |Ft−1) = σζ jk , for all x j,xk in model M.
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(M3) For some N ≥ 1, there exists a finite positive constant CN such that
sup
−∞<t<∞
E(α4Nt |Ft−1)≤CN , (1.8)
sup
−∞<t<∞
E(ζ4Njt |Ft−1)≤CN for all x j in model M. (1.9)
An abundant class of times series satisfies this assumption; for instance, all short-memory and partial long-memory
processes belong to this class of interest.
1.2.2. MAC
I now reconsider the weight selection problem in Hansen (2007) under serially correlated dependence structure. Along
this line of research, I then propose the Mallows model averaging for autocorrelation correction estimator (MAC) as
Wˆ ∗ = arg min
W∈Hn
nC∗n(W ), (1.10)
where the modified criterion is nC∗n(W ) = (Yn − P∗(W )Yn)′(Yn − P∗(W )Yn) + 2∑Mm=1 wmtr(P∗mΣn), P∗(W ) =
∑Mm=1 wmP∗m, and P∗m = Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ−1n . Observe that the criterion suggested here is just to conduct FGLS
when the working covariance matrix is available, and thus generalizes MMA in the sense that MMA is the special
case of MAC when the i.i.d. assumption holds. The primary goal of this work is to demonstrate how C∗n(W ) serves to
retrieve the asymptotic optimality when potential autocorrelation is suspected. I reach this target by adopting strategy
in Li (1987) and moment bounds in Findley and Wei (1993). To begin with, I first show that the difference between
the proposed criterion and the loss is asymptotically negligible.
Lemma 1. It can be shown that
n{C∗n(W )−L∗n(W )}=e′nen+2e′n(I−P∗(W ))µn
+2{
M
∑
m=1
wmtr(Xm(X ′mΣ
−1
n Xm)
−1X ′m)− e′nP∗(W )en}, (1.11)
where L∗n(W ) = (µˆn(W )−µn)′(µˆn(W )−µn)/n, with µˆn(W ) = P∗(W )Yn.
Proof. See Appendix.
Since e′nen is independent of the choice of weight vector W , in order to show that Wˆ ∗ selected by minimizing C∗n(W )
also minimizes the risk asymptotically, it suffices to prove that the remaining two terms on the right-hand-side of (1.11)
tends to zero relative to L∗n(W ). As in Hansen (2007), the proof relies on two aforementioned assumptions: M being
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the set of nested models and restricting weight vectors to reside in Hn(N). Though restrictive, these assumptions
drastically simplify the complexity of analyses. Wan, Zhang, and Zou (2010) relaxed them by imposing stronger
assumption on the risk as the tradeoff.
Before presenting the main theorem, it is of interest to digress for a moment to discuss the connection between my
criterion and the one proposed by Andrews (1991). It has been well recognized that model averaging and model selec-
tion share a similarity in the assumption of homoskedasticity, which is essential in MMA to asymptotic equivalence
between the risk and the proposed criteria. Therefore, the asymptotic optimality is challenged when homoskedasticity
fails. Andrews (1991) proposed the generalized Cp (CL in his paper) criterion for the heteroskedastic data, and showed
the asymptotic optimality for the generalized Cp criterion based on Li (1987). Even though he does not extend his
works to serially correlated scheme, he conjectures a modified criterion as, for any h ∈ {1, ...,M},
n−1|Yn− µˆn(h)|2Ψn +2tr(ΨnMn(h)Σn)/n, (1.12)
where Ψn is a symmetric positive semi-definite matrix, |Yn− µˆn(h)|2Ψn = (Yn− µˆn(h))′Ψn(Yn− µˆn(h)), and Mn(h) =
Xh(X ′hXh)
−1X ′h.
The connection between C∗(W ) and (1.12) is suggested as follows. Define the loss function Ln(Mn,Ψn) = (µˆn−
µn)
′Ψn(µˆn−µn)/n, where I let µˆn =MnYn; Mn is an n×n matrix, not necessarily positive semi-definite or symmetric.
I then consider the Corrected GCp as follows: CGCp(Mn,Ψn) :=(Yn−µˆn)′Ψn(Yn−µˆn)/n+2tr(ΨnMnΣn)/n. It can be
observed that CGCp(Mn,Ψn) takes the form of C∗(W ) when Ψn = In and µˆn = P∗(W )Yn, whereas CGCp corresponds
to (1.12) if µˆn = Mn(h)Yn. This linkage will be apparent by noting that model selection can be perceived as a special
case of model averaging in the following sense. If we further restrict weight vector W ∈ {W1, ...,WM}, where, for
1 ≤ m ≤ M, Wm denotes the M× 1 vector in which the mth element receives 1, and 0 otherwise, then the model
averaging problem in (1.10) is equivalent to the model selection problem.
I now present assumptions below that are essential to establish asymptotic optimality of MAC, the model averaging
criteria for time series.
Assumption 3. Let Vn(km) = E{xt(km)xt(km)′}. I assume that 0<C1 ≤ λmin(Vn(km))≤ λmax(Vn(km))≤C2 <
∞, for all 1≤ m≤M, where C1 and C2 are independent of n.
Following from this assumption we have sup1≤m≤M ρ{Vn(km)}< ∞ and sup1≤m≤M ρ{V−1n (km)}< ∞.
Assumption 4. Assume that the spectral density of et is bounded from above and below. That is, −∞ < c1 ≤
fe(ω)≤ c2 <∞, for some finite positive constants c1 and c2, where fe(ω) = (2pi)−1∑∞k=−∞ γke−iωk. In a similar
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fashion, assume there exists finite positive constants c3 and c4 such that bound the spectral density of x jt , for
all j.
This assumption implies that λmin(Σn), λmax(Σn), λmin(Σ
(x j)
n ), and λmax(Σ
(x j)
n ) are bounded, where Σ
(x j)
n denotes
the autocovariance matrix of x jt . (Short memory process)
Assumption 5. Define R∗n(W ) = Ex(L∗n(W )), and denote infW∈Hn nR
∗
n(W ) by ξn. Let Σ˜n be any covariance
matrix estimator considered for the MAC implementation. Assume that Σ˜n is consistent in operator norm, with
convergence rate specified as
ρ(Σ˜n−Σn) = Op(cnn−1/2) (1.13)
for some cn→ ∞, where c1+θn /ξ1/2n → 0 almost surely with respect to n for some θ> 0.
It is of interest to notice that (1.13) implies the consistency of Σ˜n for Σn. Nevertheless, not all familiar covari-
ance estimators satisfy (1.13). For example, the entry-wise covariance matrix estimator does not satisfy it. In
fact, it is not even consistent in operator norm since Σ˜n−Σn does not necessarily tend to zero as n grows. In this
sense, MAC requires a stronger convergence result than consistency, whereas it still includes a large class of
easily-implemented covariance matrix estimators. For example, tapered and Cholesky decomposition covari-
ance estimators belong to the family of matrix estimators that MAC is applied. The details will be discussed in
the next section.
Assumption 6. There exists a positive real number G, such that, in probability,
Mξ−G/2n cGn → 0,
where M refers to the maximal number of models allowed for model averaging in this context.
Our goal is to show that under the Assumptions 1-6, we have
Theorem 1. Let L∗n(W ) be defined as in Lemma 1, and define Lˆ∗n(W ) correspondingly as Lˆ∗n(W ) = (µˆn(W )−
µn)
′(µˆn(W ) − µn)/n with µˆn(W ) = Pˆ∗(W )Yn. Suppose Assumptions 1-6 are satisfied. Assume that ξn =
infW∈Hn nR
∗
n(W )→ ∞ almost surely as n→ ∞. Then,
Lˆ∗n(Wˆ ∗N)
infW∈Hn(N)L
∗
n(W )
p→ 1, (1.14)
where Wˆ ∗N denotes the weight selected by minimizing the empirical MAC, Cˆ∗n(W ) = (Yn − Pˆ∗(W )Yn)′(Yn −
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Pˆ∗(W )Yn)/n+ 2tr(Pˆ∗(W )Σ˜n)/n within the discrete set Hn(N), where the sample covariance estimator Σ˜n is imple-
mented.
Proof. See Appendix.
Several points worth elaboration are discussed as follows. This theorem generalizes the model averaging estima-
tor (Hansen, 2007) to a time series context, where temporal dependence in both observed and unobserved data are
allowed. It is of particular interest to notice that the modified criterion remains essentially unchanged in the time
series framework. The intuition for its underlying mechanism is demonstrated in Lemma 1. Nevertheless, the validity
of MAC, indicated by Theorem 1, relies heavily on Assumptions 5 and 6. Assumption 5, especially, where the rate of
convergence of a consistent covariance matrix estimator is characterized, reveals the price incurred due to the adap-
tion to time series analysis. Strong dependence structure imposes a high cost on MAC implementation by means of
covariance matrix estimator’s convergence rate, and eventually fails the MAC optimality when Assumption 5 does not
hold. This fact soon becomes clear in Theorem 3, where I give the convergence rate of the positive definite tapered
estimator.
This theorem also sheds some light on the optimality of CGCp, first considered by Andrews (1991). Starting with
the definition of CGCp introduced earlier, I then have the following result, parallel to Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. Define Ln(Mn,Ψn) = (µˆn − µn)′Ψn(µˆn − µn)/n and CGCp(Mn,Ψn) = (Yn − µˆn)′Ψn(Yn − µˆn)/n +
2tr(ΨnMnΣn)/n, where µˆn = MnYn, we have
n{CGCp(Mn,Ψn)−Ln(Mn,Ψn)}=e′nΨnen+2e′nΨn(I−Mn)µn
+2{tr(ΨnMnΣn)− e′nΨnMnen}. (1.15)
Proof. Analogous to Lemma 1.
Note that Lemma 2 is valid under a general class of settings, where I place no restriction on Mn and only requireΨn
symmetric positive semi-definite. As a consequence, the scope of its application ranges from model selection problem,
model averaging problem, to nonparametric regression estimation where nearest-neighbor estimator is included.
It is straightforward to see that, if we further restrict attention to the class of linear model averaging estimators,
such that Mn = P∗(W ), we can then derive CGCp’s optimality as a corollary of Theorem 1. However, as we have
observed from Theorem 1, the convergence rate of the unknown covariance estimator is the key determinant to achieve
optimality.
Similarly, in a scenario when CGCp is implemented, optimality can be readily carried over from Theorem 1 ifΨn is
provided as a priori; the estimation ofΨn confronted empirically, otherwise, plays a similar role in the optimality result
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as the covariance estimator. This suggests the need to take into consideration the convergence rate of Ψn’s estimator
in order to ensure the optimality result. Therefore, I add the following companion assumption of Assumptions 5 and
6 below.
Assumption 7. (i) Given Ψn employed in the CGCp(P∗(W ),Ψn), assume that there exists some finite positive
constants C1 and C2 such that C1 ≤ λmin(Ψn)≤ λmax(Ψn)≤C2. (ii) Let Ψˆn be the estimator of Ψn considered
in CGCp(P∗(W ),Ψn) implementation. Assume that Ψˆn is consistent in operator norm, with convergence rate
specified as
ρ(Ψˆn−Ψn) = Op(dnn−1/2)
for some dn→∞, where d1+θ′n /ξ1/2n → 0 almost surely with respect to n for some θ′> 0. (iii) Moreover, I assume
that Mξ−G/2n dn→ 0 in probability for some positive real number G, where M is as defined in Assumption 6.
I now state the optimality of CGCp(P∗(W ),Ψn) formally.
Theorem 2. Given Ln(P∗(W ),Ψn) = (µˆn − µn)′Ψn(µˆn − µn)/n and Rn(P∗(W ),Ψn) = Ex(Ln(P∗(W ),Ψn)), where
µˆn = P∗(W )Yn, suppose that ξn(Ψn) = infW∈Hn nRn(P
∗(W ),Ψn) → ∞ almost surely as n → ∞. Likewise, define
Ln(Pˆ∗(W ),Ψˆn) = (µˆn−µn)′Ψˆn(µˆn−µn)/n, where µˆn = Pˆ∗(W )Yn. If, furthermore, Assumptions 1-7 hold, then
Ln(Pˆ∗(WˆCGCN ),Ψˆn)
infW∈Hn(N)Ln(P
∗(W ),Ψn)
p→ 1, (1.16)
where WˆCGCN denotes the weight selected by minimizing empirical CGCp(Pˆ
∗(W ),Ψˆn) = (Yn − Pˆ∗(W )Yn)′Ψˆn(Yn −
Pˆ∗(W )Yn)/n+2tr(ΨˆnPˆ∗(W )Σˆn)/n within the discrete set Hn(N).
Proof. See Appendix.
1.3. Covariance Estimator
1.3.1. Tapered Estimator
In order to apply the proposed criterion, it is necessary to to obtain the inverse autocovariance matrix. McMurry and
Politis (2010) introduced the tapered estimator for the sample autocovariance matrix, which is proved to possess the
same convergence rate as suggested in Wu and Pourahmadi (2009).
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Definition 1. The tapered weight function κ is proposed as
κ(x) =

1 if |x| ≤ 1
g(|x|) if 1 < |x| ≤ cκ
0 if cκ < |x|,
where |g(x)| < 1. The l-scaled κ(.) is κl(x) := κ(x/l). Finally, the tapered estimator is constructed as Σˆκ,l =(
κl(i− j)γˆ|i− j|
)
1≤i, j≤n , where γˆk =
1
n ∑
n−k
t=1 etet+k, k = 0,1, ...,n−1.
Lemma 3. Assume that {et} and {xt} satisfies Assumptions 1-4. Consider 0 ≤ cκl ≤ n−1. Then, for all q > 0, we
have
‖ρ(Σˆκ,l−Σn)‖q ≤Cq(bcκlc+1)n−1/2+ 2n
bcκlc
∑
i=1
i|γi|+2
n
∑
i=l+1
|γi|.
As an immediate result from Lemma 3, we know that ρ(Σˆκ,l −Σn)q = Op{[Cq(bcκlc+ 1)n−1/2 + 2n ∑
bcκlc
i=1 i|γi|+
2∑ni=l+1 |γi|]q} for any q > 0. Notice that in reality, the error term en is not observed. Thus, I estimate the error term by
considering the largest available regression model as eˆn = (I−XM(X ′MXM)−1X
′
M)Yn, I then apply the tapered estimator
to obtain autocovariance matrix, denoted as Σ˜κ,l =
(
κl(i− j)γ˜|i− j|
)
1≤i, j≤n, where γ˜k =
1
n ∑
n−k
t=1 eˆt eˆt+k, k = 0,1, ...,n−1.
Additionally, since Σ˜k,l is not necessarily positive definite under finite samples scenario, McMurry and Politis (2010)
propose a modified estimator maintaining the same convergence rate while being positive definite. In this paper I
adopt the proposed positive definite estimator as below.
Definition 2. Consider the spectral decomposition of Σ˜k,l = QnΛQ′n, where Qn is an orthogonal matrix and Λ
is the diagonal matrix diag(λ1, ...,λn) with diagonal terms being eigenvalues of Σ˜k,l , ordered by the magnitude
such that λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ ...≥ λn. We consider
Σ˜εk,l := QnΛ
εQ′n,
where Λε = diag(λε1, ...,λ
ε
n), and λεi = max{λi,εγ˜0/nβ}. Note that β and ε are positive constants and γ˜0 serves
to scale the estimator equivariant with respect to Σ˜k,l .
Assumption 8. Assume supt |bmt |= Op(k−rm ), where r ≥ 0.
I now present the convergence rate of the positive definite tapered estimator.
Theorem 3. Assume that Assumptions 1-4 and 8 hold. Consider 0≤ cκl ≤ n−1, then, for all q > 0, we have
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(a)
ρ(Σ˜εκ,l−Σn)q =Op([Cq(bcκlc+1)max{
kM
n
,
1
k2rM
,
1√
nk2rM
,
1√
n
}+ 4
n
bcκlc
∑
i=1
i|γi|
+4
n
∑
i=l+1
|γi|+ εγ0nβ ]
q).
(b)
ρ((Σ˜εκ,l)
−1−Σ−1n )q =Op([Cq(bcκlc+1)max{
kM
n
,
1
k2rM
,
1√
nk2rM
,
1√
n
}+ 4
n
bcκlc
∑
i=1
i|γi|
+4
n
∑
i=l+1
|γi|+ εγ0nβ ]
q).
Remark 1. Consider a case in which tapered estimator is employed with ε> 0, β> 1/2, and l = O(log(n)). If |γi|’s,
the autocorrelation coefficients of {et}, decay exponentially fast such that ∑∞i≥l |γi|= O(exp(−l)), and kM = O(n1/2).
Additionally, Assumption 8 holds, with r ≥ 1/2. It follows from Theorem 3 that ρ(Σ˜εk,l − Σn) = O(log(n)n−1/2).
Consequently the desired convergence rate of covariance estimator, specified in Assumption 5, holds.
1.4. Numerical studies
In this section, I conduct the numerical experiments to investigate the relative efficiency of MAC type estimators,
in comparison to other commonly employed estimators in practice. A horse race between seven estimators is thus
performed under various parameterizations and error dependence setups. Of all seven estimators in this study, five
are suggested in Hansen (2007): AIC, Mallows’ Cp, Smoothed-AIC (S-AIC), Smoothed-BIC (S-BIC), and Mallows
model averaging (MMA). I further join MAC, proposed in Section 2, and its modified version for model selection
framework, named MAC-Mallows in this context. Conceptually, estimation from MAC-Mallows shall be more ef-
ficient relative to Mallows’ Cp when the error dependence is present, in the sense that MAC-Mallows estimator is
obtained by applying MAC, but restricts the weight vector to the set of vertices of the unit simplex Hn.
Adopting the simulation design from Hansen (2007), I consider data generating process yt =∑∞j=1 θ jx jt +et , where
x1t = 1, and the remaining x jt ’s are drawn from independent and identically distributed N(0,1). The setup of param-
eters, θ j = c
√
2α j−1/2−α, where α= 0.5, 1, or 1.5, is in the same fashion as Hansen (2007). The scale of α controls
the declining rate of coefficients, θ j, with respect to j; the design of c will be introduced later, before discussing the
numerical results. Note that the estimation of MAC and MAC-Mallows involves an covariance matrix estimator. The
tapered estimator is thus employed as one solution here from a class of covariance estimators satisfying Assumption
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5. For simplicity, a rectangular window κ(x) is specified for the tapered estimator in the numerical study. That is,
cκ = 1; to ensure a positive definite covariance estimator, I consider β= ε= 1; all the aforementioned parameters are
defined in Section 3. Although the bandwidth selection is necessarily confronted when the tapered estimator is imple-
mented, I do not aim to specify the optimal bandwidth selection rule as it is beyond the scope of this study. Instead,
for all error dependent processes considered in the experimental designs, I universally select the bandwidth by round-
ing − logn/ log |γˆ1| to the nearest integer, where γˆ1 is the sample first-order autocorrelation coefficient. One remark
regarding the bandwidth choice are provided as follows. McMurry and Politis (2010) characterized the conditions in
(ii) of Theorem 4 under which the above bandwidth choice is optimal for the tapered estimator, whereas the optimality
may not apply to this numerical study since I naively stick this rule for all generated dependent observations. That
is, this study avoids to provide an ad hoc selection rule, rather, focuses on presentation of relative efficiency of MAC
estimator from an agnostic viewpoint about the underlying dependent structure.2 Along this line of reasoning, when
implemented with the tapered estimator, MAC can only do better than the numerical studies presented in this context
whenever the bandwidth is optimal, which maximizes the performance of covariance matrix estimator.
For all the experimental designs, as in Hansen (2007), I fix the maximal number of models allowed for model
averaging and model selection by M = d3n1/3e. Observe that it coincides the dimension of largest model kM given
the aforementioned experiment setup, and both the choice of bandwidth l and the dimension of largest model kM fit
into theoretical predictions in this context. Refer to Remark 1 for details. I evaluate the risk (mean squared error) of
each estimator by applying to FGLS estimates the best model or weight vector determined by each method, which
allows us to assess the performance on the same ground. Furthermore, the risk from each estimator is obtained from
averages of 5,000 repetitions, then normalized by the risk of the best-fitting model employing FGLS estimator, defined
as the infeasible optimal least squares estimator by Hansen. In order to demonstrate the efficiency gain from MAC, I
examine the performance of MAC under various serially correlated series. Assume νt ∼ i.i.d. N(0,1) throughout this
paper. The design of the data generating processes of error terms is as follows.
DGP1 : AR(1),et = ψet−1+νt .
DGP2 : MA(1),et = φνt−1+νt .
DGP3 : ARMA(1, 1),et = ψet−1+φνt−1+νt .
DGP4: AR(2), et = 0.5et−1−0.8et−2+νt .
DGP1-DGP3 list three typical stationary time series. Wu and Pourahmadi (2009) studied the performance of
banded covariance matrix estimator under linear and nonlinear stationary time series, including DGP1-DGP3. Mc-
Murry and Politis (2010) assessed the effectiveness of tapered covariance estimator under DGP1 and DGP2. I also
add DGP4 to examine the relative efficiency of MAC and MAC-Mallows estimators when the concerned error depen-
2Nevertheless, the i.i.d hypothesis is assumed to be rejected.
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dence becomes more complicated. DGP4 is borrowed from p.16 in Hamilton (1994), and is featured with a damped
oscillating impulse-response function. For each experiment given the data generating process, I vary the parameters
θ j = c
√
2α j−1/2−α by taking advantage of function relationship between the population R2 and the coefficient c.
More specifically, for example, it can be shown that under DGP1, the population R2 = c2/( 11−ψ2 + c
2).3 I then choose
c correspondingly such that the population R2 ranges on the grid from 0.1 to 0.9, as suggested by Hansen (2007).
To investigate how the time series dependence may alter the risk of estimators, three representative parametric setups
for each of DGP1-DGP3 are considered to account for the strength of dependence. They are, in the order of introduc-
tion, ψ∈ {−0.3,−0.6,−0.9}, φ∈ {−0.3,−0.6,−0.9}, and (ψ,φ)∈ {(−0.3,−0.3),(−0.6,−0.6),(−0.9,−0.9)}. The
negative parameters are picked in order to introduce additional disturbance to the error processes by imposing sign
alternating autocorrelation function. In an unreported simulation where the positive parameterization is considered, it
is observed that MAC obtains slightly better but similar performance overall.
Table 1.1-1.3 present the normalized risk for all seven estimators across the parameterizations when the error
processes are generated from DGP1-DGP3, respectively. The numerical experiments are conducted for sample size
n = 50, n = 150, n = 300 and n = 700 each. The case n = 50 is not reported in this context due to limited space,
whereas the insights from this numerical study remain intact. Consistent with Hansen (2007), over all parametric
setups, AIC and Mallows yield similar risk, and nearly coincide as sample size grows large; S-AIC outperforms AIC,
especially when α = 1.5. Nevertheless, the results suggest that the performance of MMA deteriorates when the time
dependence steps in. Differing from findings in Hansen (2007), MMA loses its advantage over S-AIC. In general, S-
AIC performs comparably to MMA in terms of risk, and improves when α and dependence strength increase. S-BIC
typically performs worst for all conducted simulations, but has the edge over all other estimators when n and R2 are
small. This edge disappears when the dependence climbs up.
The highlight of this Monte Carlo study is to contrast the performance of MAC and MMA. Recall that MAC is
equivalent to MMA when there exists no time dependence. It is thus straightforward to observe that, in each table,
both MAC and MMA achieve the lowest risk when the underlying error dependence is weak. That is, ψ = −0.3 for
DGP1; φ = −0.3 for DGP2; (ψ,φ) = (−0.3,−0.3) for DGP3. As the dependence strength is tuned up, MAC stands
out as the best estimator. There is one exception, nonetheless, where MAC is driven away from the dominance: the
increase of α brings up the risk of both MAC and MMA, while MAC performs relatively poor when R2 is small. A
plausible explanation is provided as follows. A high α with small R2 in this setup implies that observations come from
an infinite series with coefficients of small scale but decaying fast. In this scenario, all methods inappropriately select
some parsimonious model. When time dependence enhances, MAC is further plagued by penalizing models of high
dimension more.
3Similarly, the population R2 = c2/(1+φ2 + c2) under DGP2; the population R2 = c2/( 1+φ
2+2ψφ
1−ψ2 + c
2) under DGP3;
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In summary, at some mild level of α, MAC dominates MMA and other estimators when the dependence structure
plays a role, whereas its applicability is undermined if the true model is generated from the infinite sum of insignificant
and fast decaying random variables. Therefore, the tradeoff between the structure of true model and dependence
determines the performance of MAC estimator. As long as the underlying dependence is strong enough, the study
shows that MAC is a reasonable option worth considering, by noting that from all tables, MAC frequently outperforms
the infeasible risk from FGLS, most of which achieves a lower risk than the infeasible risk defined by traditional OLS
method.
Finally, the analysis to contrast the risk of MAC-Mallows and Mallows is skipped since it parallels the discussion
on the performance of MAC and MMA. Figure 1.1-1.3 explicitly illustrate how the relative strength of MAC (and
MAC-Mallows) behaves under two extreme scenarios for each of DGP1−DGP3. In each figure, panel (a) shows
when the time dependence is the weakest and the population coefficient of true model declines fastest, while the
opposite in panel (b). It is of interest to observe that a significant efficiency is regained by the employment of MAC
in panel (b), whereas it has been offset by the inefficiency incurred from the estimation of covariance matrix and the
aforementioned pathology under small R2 in panel (a). Figure 1.4 depicts a notable efficiency gain retrieved by MAC
where it consistently outperforms when I disturb the error processes more.
Although the risk of MAC constitute the performance frontier for MAC-Mallows estimator under mild conditions
imposed in this paper, it is worth mentioning that the dominance of MAC shall drift away when the true model takes
the form favoring the selection of a parsimonious model. Observe from tables that, as α moves up, the risk of both
MAC and MAC-Mallows rises, but its ratio shrinks toward one. Note that MAC-Mallows possesses the superiority
of computing efficiency. MAC-Mallows is thus expected to be a potential alternative for time series model selection
method.
1.5. Conclusion
This paper provides guidance for the model averaging implementation when time series is the central concern. Driven
by the efficiency improvement, the goal is to choose the optimal weight that averages across generalized least squares
(GLS) estimators from a set of approximating models of the true regression function. I propose the Mallows model
averaging autocorrelation corrected estimator (MAC) to tackle the underlying dependence in data while conducting
model averaging. I show that the weight selected from MAC reaches the asymptotic optimality in view of efficiency.
Empirically, the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) estimator is considered as the practical counterpart. As the
consistent estimation of the high-dimensional inverse covariance matrix is necessarily confronted, I then modify the
banded Tapered estimator suggested in McMurry and Politis (2010) as the workhorse to achieve this task.
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The asymptotic efficiency result, however, relies on the assumption requiring approximation models to be strictly
nested, which could pose a considerable computational challenge for the model averaging estimation when a priori
knowledge of the ordering of regressors is not available, particularly in high-dimensional time series. Wan, Zhang, and
Zou (2010) and Zhang, Wan, and Zou (2013) relaxed the nested ordering assumption and showed that the asymptotic
optimality still holds, whereas a stronger convergence condition is placed as the tradeoff. Furthermore, on top of
their positive report, no clear guideline for the optimal averaging across all arbitrary combinations of regressors was
offered.
As a promising strategy, screening regressors before performing model averaging is worth a consideration Yuan
and Yang (2005). This point has also been addressed by Zhang, Wan, and Zou (2013). Alternatively, Ing and Lai
(2011) developed a stepwise model selection procedure using the orthogonal greedy algorithm (OGA), which aims
to tackle the high-dimensional linear regression model selection problem and hence could be applied to the model
averaging problem as well. Recently, also in the context of high-dimensional linear regression, Ando and Li (2014)
proposed grouping regressors by marginal correlation prior to conducting the model averaging, where the delete-one
cross-validation is adopted to determine the optimal weight.
Although this strand of research helps to shed light on the model averaging implementation for the non-nested
model set-up, the time series scenario has been excluded from the current literature. Intuitively, the optimality for time
series non-nested model averaging is not a trivial extension of the i.i.d. framework, as the uncertainty generated from
pre-ordering or grouping regressors complicates the efficiency analyses, and the complexity grows with the dimension.
This remains the time series model averaging as a non-fully explored question and opens up a challenging avenue of
future research.
Proofs
This section outlines proofs of Lemma 1, 3, Theorem 1, 2 and 3.
Proof of Lemma 1. First notice that
nL∗n(W ) =µ
′
n(P
∗(W )− I)′(P∗(W )− I)µn+µ′n(P∗(W )− I)′P∗(W )en
+e′nP
∗(W )′(P∗(W )− I)µn+ e′nP∗(W )′P∗(W )en. (1.17)
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We also know
nC∗n(W ) =(Yn−P∗(W )Yn)′(Yn−P∗(W )Yn)+2
M
∑
m=1
wmtr(Xm(X ′mΣ
−1
n Xm)
−1X ′m)
=µ′n(P
∗(W )− I)′(P∗(W )− I)µn+µ′n(P∗(W )− I)′(P∗(W )− I)en
+e′n(P
∗(W )− I)′(P∗(W )− I)µn+ e′n(P∗(W )− I)′(P∗(W )− I)en
+2
M
∑
m=1
wmtr(Xm(X ′mΣ
−1
n Xm)
−1X ′m)
=µ′n(P
∗(W )− I)′(P∗(W )− I)µn+µ′n(P∗(W )− I)′P∗(W )en
−µ′n(P∗(W )− I)′en+ e′nP∗(W )′(P∗(W )− I)µn
−e′n(P∗(W )− I)µn+ e′nP∗(W )′P∗(W )en+ e′nen
−e′nP∗(W )′en− e′nP∗(W )en+2
M
∑
m=1
wmtr(Xm(X ′mΣ
−1
n Xm)
−1X ′m).
Thus,
n{C∗n(W )−L∗n(W )}= e′nen+2e′n(I−P∗(W ))µn+2{
M
∑
m=1
wmtr(Xm(X ′mΣ
−1Xm)−1X ′m)− e′nP∗(W )en}. (1.18)
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof of Theorem 1 relies on the first moment bound theorem in Findley and Wei (1993).
Our strategy of proof begins with the following claims:
sup
W∈Hn(N)
n−1|e′n(I−P∗(W ))µn|
R∗n(W )
= op(1), (1.19)
sup
W∈Hn(N)
n−1|e′nP∗(W )en−∑Mm=1 wmtr{Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′m}|
R∗n(W )
= op(1), (1.20)
sup
W∈Hn(N)
|L∗n(W )/R∗n(W )−1|= op(1), (1.21)
sup
W∈Hn(N)
|Cˆ∗n(W )−C∗n(W )|
R∗n(W )
= op(1), (1.22)
sup
W∈Hn(N)
|Lˆ∗n(W )−L∗n(W )|
R∗n(W )
= op(1), (1.23)
where nCˆ∗n(W ) = (Yn − Pˆ∗(W )Yn)′(Yn − Pˆ∗(W )Yn) + 2tr(Pˆ∗(W )Σ˜n) is the sample analog of Cn(W ); Pˆ∗(W ) =
∑Mm=1 wmPˆ∗m and Pˆ∗m = Xm(X ′mΣ˜−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ˜−1n .
Observe from (1.18) that e′nen is independent of the selection of weights. Therefore, the validity of (1.19) and
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(1.20) ensures the asymptotic equivalence between the proposed criteria C∗n(W ) and the corresponding average squared
loss L∗n(W ). In the same spirit, L∗n(W ) is asymptotically equivalent to the risk R∗n(W ), implied by (1.21). Since
empirically the sample covariance estimator is implemented, (1.22) presents the validity of Cˆ∗n(W ), where Σ˜n denotes
any covariance matrix estimator satisfying Assumption 5. Lastly, (1.23) pins down the asymptotic efficiency of the
empirical loss with covariance estimator employed.
We prove the theorem by Lemma A1-A3, showing that above claims hold, respectively.
Below we first provide a simple result that will be repeatedly applied throughout this article.
Remark E1. Let S1 and S2 be any real-valued n×n matrices, where n is a natural number. If S1 and S2 are symmetric
and positive semi-definite, then the following result holds.
0≤ λmin(S1)tr(S2)≤ tr(S1S2)≤ λmax(S1)tr(S2).
Proof of Remark A1. First note that S1 can be represented as QΛQ
′
, where Q is the orthogonal matrix corresponding
to S1 and Λ is the diagonal matrix in which the diagonal entries, λ′is, are the eigenvalues of S1.
Thus, we know tr(S1S2) = tr(QΛQ
′
S2) = tr(ΛQ
′
S2Q). Let H = Q
′
S2Q and denote its i-th diagonal terms as hii,
then it can be observed that tr(ΛQ′S2Q)=∑ni=1λihii. In sum, the desired result holds since λmin(S1)∑i hii≤ tr(S1S2)≤
λmax(S1)∑i hii and tr(S2) = tr(H) = ∑i hii.
Lemma E1. Consider L∗n(W ) = (µˆn(W )−µn)′(µˆn(W )−µn)/n and R∗n(W ) = Ex(L∗n(W )), with µˆn(W ) = P∗(W )Yn.
If ξn = infW∈Hn nR∗n(W )→ ∞ almost surely as n→ ∞, then ∑W∈Hn(nR∗n(W ))−(N+1)→ 0 for some natural number N
almost surely.
Proof of Lemma E1. The argument is based on the Theorem 1 in Hansen (2007). Partial argument below is copied
from Hansen’s proof, for the check of correctness of the proof. It can be removed if necessary later.
For integers 1 ≤ j1 ≤ j2 ≤ ... ≤ jN , let Wj1, j2,..., jN be the weight vector that sets w jk = 1/N for k = 1, ...,N, and
zero to the remainder . We can write
Hn(N) = {Wj1, j2,..., jN : 1≤ j1 ≤ j2 ≤ ...≤ jN ≤M}.
Therefore, M is the largest number of models allowed to be considered in the model averaging, while the model m
use km predictors, where km ≥ m for all m = 1,2, ...,M, and k1 ≤ k2 ≤ ...,≤ kM.
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It can be observed that
∑
W∈Hn(N)
(nR∗n(W ))
−(N+1) ≤
∞
∑
jN=1
jN
∑
jN−1=1
...
j2
∑
j1=1
(nR∗n(Wj1, j2,..., jN ))
−(N+1).
Now break the sum into two groups based on whether k jN < ξn or k jN ≥ ξn. For the first group (which has less
than ξNn elements), use the bound nR∗n(W )≥ ξn from the assumption. For the second group, use the simple fact:
nR∗n(W ) =µ
′
n(I−P∗(W ))′(I−P∗(W ))µn+Ex(e′nP∗(W )′P∗(W )en),
where Ex(e′nP∗(W )′P∗(W )en) = tr(P∗(W )′P∗(W )Σn) = ∑Mm=1∑
M
l=1 wmwltr(P
∗′
m P
∗
l Σn).
Notice that tr(P∗(W )′P∗(W )) is not equal to ∑Mm=1∑
M
l=1 wmwl min(km,kl) since P
∗
m(W ) is not symmetric for any
given m. However, if we can show that tr(P∗(W )′P∗(W )Σn) ≥ C∑Mm=1∑Ml=1 wmwl min(km,kl) for some constant C
independent of W , then we can complete this proof by applying Theorem 1 in Hansen (2007).
To see how it works. Notice that if tr(P∗(W )′P∗(W )Σn) ≥ C∑Mm=1∑Ml=1 wmwl min(km,kl), then we have
nR∗n(Wj1, j2,..., jN )≥ CN2 k jN ≥ CN2 jN . Thus,
∞
∑
jN=1
jN
∑
jN−1=1
...
j2
∑
j1=1
(nR∗n(Wj1, j2,..., jN ))
−(N+1)
≤ξ−1n +
∞
∑
jN=ξn
jN
∑
jN−1=1
...
j2
∑
j1=1
(
C
N2
jN)−(N+1)
≤ξ−1n +(
C
N2
)−(N+1)
∞
∑
jN=ξn
j−2N
≤ξ−1n +(
C
N2
)−(N+1)ξ−1n → 0.
Hence, it remains to prove that tr(P∗(W )′P∗(W )Σn)≥C∑Mm=1∑Ml=1 wmwl min(km,kl), but it is true from
tr(P∗
′
m P
∗
l Σn) =tr(Σ
−1/2
n Xm(X ′mΣ
−1
n Xm)
−1X ′mΣ
−1/2
n ΣnΣ
−1/2
n Xl(X ′lΣ
−1
n Xl)
−1X ′lΣ
−1/2
n )
≥λmin(Σn)min{km,kl}> 0,
where the inequality follows as a result of Remark E1, Assumption 4, and nested fashion of candidate models. There-
fore, we reach the desired result tr(P∗m(W )′P∗l (W )Σn)≥C∑Mm=1∑Ml=1 wmwl min(km,kl) by choosing C = λmin(Σn).
Lemma E2. Let L∗n(W ) = (µˆn(W )−µn)′(µˆn(W )−µn)/n and R∗n(W ) = Ex(L∗n(W )), where µˆn(W ) = P∗(W )Yn. Sup-
pose that ξn = infW∈Hn nR
∗
n(W )→ ∞ almost surely. Moreover, if Assumptions 1, 2, and 4 hold, then
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(a)
sup
W∈Hn(N)
n−1|e′n(I−P∗(W ))µn|
R∗n(W )
= op(1).
(b)
sup
W∈Hn(N)
n−1|e′nP∗(W )en−∑Mm=1 wmtr{Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′m}|
R∗n(W )
= op(1).
(c)
sup
W∈Hn(N)
|L∗n(W )/R∗n(W )−1|= op(1).
Proof of Lemma E2. (a) First denote I−P∗(W ) by An(W ). Then, for any given δ > 0, by Markov’s inequality we
have
Px
{
sup
W∈Hn(N)
n−1|e′nAn(W )µn|/R∗n(W )> δ
}
≤ ∑
W∈Hn(N)
n−2(N+1)Ex|e′nAn(W )µn|2(N+1)
R∗n(W )2(N+1)δ2(N+1)
. (1.24)
By the First Moment Bound Theorem of Findley and Wei (1993), there exists a finite constant CN such that
Ex|e′nAn(W )µn|2(N+1) =Ex|e′nBn(W )en|(N+1)
≤CN [{tr(ΣnBn(W )Bn(W )′Σn)}(N+1)/2+ tr{Bn(W )Σn}(N+1)]
≤CN [{λmax(Σn)}2tr{Bn(W )Bn(W )′}](N+1)/2+[λmax(Σn)tr{Bn(W )]N+1
≤CNtr{Bn(W )}(N+1) =CN |An(W )µn|2(N+1).
where Bn(W ) = An(W )µnµ′nAn(W )′ is a symmetric n× n matrix. The first inequality follows from Re-
mark E1, and finite λmax(Σn) due to Assumption 4. Since Bn(W ) is positive semi-definite and tr{Bn(W )} =
tr{An(W )µnµ′nAn(W )′}= tr{µ′nAn(W )′An(W )µn}= |An(W )µn|2.
Note that |An(W )µn|2 ≤ nR∗n(W ) for any given W ∈Hn(N). Thus (1.24) is bounded by
CNδ−2(N+1) ∑
W∈Hn(N)
(nR∗n(W ))
−(N+1),
which tends to zero by Lemma E1.
(b) Observe that Ex{e′nP∗(W )en} = Ex{e′nP∗(W )′en} although P∗(W ) is not symmetric. We again apply the First
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Moment Bound Theorem to obtain
Ex|e′nP∗(W )′en−
M
∑
m=1
wmtr{Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′m}|2(N+1) ≤CN{tr(ΣnP∗(W )′P∗(W )Σn)}(N+1)
≤CN [λmax(Σn)tr{P∗(W )′P∗(W )Σn}](N+1)
≤CN [tr{P∗(W )′P∗(W )Σn}](N+1).
Since tr{P∗(W )′P∗(W )Σn} ≤ nR∗n(W ) for any given W ∈ Hn(N), again by Lemma E1, we have the desired
result.
(c)
sup
W∈Hn(N)
|L∗n(W )/R∗n(W )−1|= sup
W∈Hn(N)
|nL∗n(W )/nR∗n(W )−1|
= sup
W∈Hn(N)
|e′nP∗(W )′P∗(W )en−µ′n(I−P∗(W ))′P∗(W )en− e′nP∗(W )′(I−P∗(W ))µn
− tr(P∗(W )′P∗(W )Σn)|/nR∗n(W )
It suffices to show that
(i)
sup
W∈Hn(N)
|e′nP∗(W )′(I−P∗(W ))µn|/nR∗n(W ) = op(1).
(ii)
sup
W∈Hn(N)
|e′nP∗(W )′P∗(W )en− tr(P∗(W )′P∗(W )Σn)|/nR∗n(W ) = op(1).
Proofs for (i) and (ii) are similar to Lemma A2. For (i), denote I−P∗(W ) by An(W ). By the First Moment
Bound Theorem, there exists a finite constant CN such that
Ex|e′nP∗(W )′An(W )µn|2(N+1) =Ex|e′nB2,n(W )en|(N+1)
≤CN{tr(ΣnB2,n(W )B2,n(W )′Σn)}(N+1)/2+ tr{B2,n(W )Σn}(N+1)
≤CN [{λmax(Σn)}2tr{B2,n(W )B2,n(W )′}](N+1)/2+[λmax(Σn)tr{B2,n(W )]N+1
≤CNtr{B2,n(W )}(N+1) =CN |An(W )µn|2(N+1).
23
where B2,n(W ) = P∗(W )′An(W )µnµ′nAn(W )′P∗(W ) is a symmetric n×n matrix. Note that
tr{B2,n(W )}= tr{P∗(W )′An(W )µnµ′nAn(W )′P∗(W )}
=tr{µ′nAn(W )′P∗(W )P∗(W )′An(W )µn}
=|P∗(W )′An(W )µn|2
≤λmax{P∗(W )P∗(W )′}|An(W )µn|2.
Since |An(W )µn|2 ≤ nR∗n(W ), it remains to verify that, for some constant C, λmax{P∗(W )P∗(W )′} ≤
C. To check the validity of the above claim, note that λmax{P∗(W )P∗(W )′} =
λmax{P∗(W )′P∗(W )} = λmax{∑Mm=1∑Ml=1 wmwlP∗
′
m P
∗
l } = maxx′x=1x′{∑Mm=1∑Ml=1 wmwlP∗
′
m P
∗
l }x ≤
∑Mm=1∑
M
l=1 wmwl maxx′x=1x
′P∗′m P∗l x ≤ C. The last inequality holds since when 1 ≤ m = l ≤ M,
maxx′x=1x′P∗
′
m P
∗
l x = ρ
2(P∗m); otherwise, maxx′x=1x′P∗
′
m P
∗
l x ≤ ρ(P∗m)ρ(P∗l ). Finally, observe that for
any 1≤ m≤M, ρ(P∗m)≤ ρ(Σ1/2n )ρ(Σ−1/2n Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ−1/2n )ρ(Σ−1/2n )≤C.
For (ii),
Ex|e′nP∗(W )′P∗(W )en− tr(P∗(W )′P∗(W )Σn)|2(N+1)
≤C{tr(ΣnP∗(W )′P∗(W )P∗(W )′P∗(W )Σn)}(N+1)
≤C[λmax(Σn)tr{P∗(W )′P∗(W )P∗(W )′P∗(W )Σn}](N+1)
≤C[λmax{P∗(W )′P∗(W )}tr{P∗(W )′P∗(W )Σn}](N+1)
≤C[tr{P∗(W )′P∗(W )Σn}](N+1).
Again observe that tr{P∗(W )′P∗(W )Σn} ≤ nR∗n(W ) for any given W ∈Hn(N).
Lemma E3. Let Σ˜n be any covariance matrix estimator implemented in MAC satisfying Assumption 5. If Assumptions
1-6 hold, and ρ{( 1n X ′MXM)−1}= Op(1), then
(a)
sup
W∈Hn(N)
|Cˆ∗n(W )−C∗n(W )|
R∗n(W )
= op(1),
(b)
sup
W∈Hn(N)
|Lˆ∗n(W )−L∗n(W )|
R∗n(W )
= op(1).
Proof of Lemma E3. (a) First recall that nC∗n(W ) = (Yn−P∗(W )Yn)′(Yn−P∗(W )Yn) + 2tr(P∗(W )Σn), but empiri-
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cally we select the weights by its sample analog, nCˆ∗n(W ) = (Yn− Pˆ∗(W )Yn)′(Yn− Pˆ∗(W )Yn)+2tr(Pˆ∗(W )Σ˜n).
Thus, we still need to show that the difference, n|Cˆ∗n(W )−C∗n(W )|, is asymptotically negligible with respect to
nR∗n(W ). That is,
(iii)
sup
W∈Hn(N)
|(Yn− Pˆ∗(W )Yn)′(Yn− Pˆ∗(W )Yn)− (Yn−P∗(W )Yn)′(Yn−P∗(W )Yn)|/nR∗n(W ) = op(1).
(iv)
sup
W∈Hn(N)
|tr(Pˆ∗(W )Σ˜n)− tr(P∗(W )Σn)|/nR∗n(W ) = op(1).
For (iii), note that
|(Yn− Pˆ∗(W )Yn)′(Yn− Pˆ∗(W )Yn)− (Yn−P∗(W )Yn)′(Yn−P∗(W )Yn)|
≤|Y ′n(P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W ))′(I− Pˆ∗(W ))Yn|+ |Y ′n(I−P∗(W ))′(P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W ))Yn|.
Since |Y ′n(P∗(W ) − Pˆ∗(W ))′(I − Pˆ∗(W ))Yn| ≤ |Y ′n(I − P∗(W ))′(P∗(W ) − Pˆ∗(W ))Yn| + |Y ′n(P∗(W ) −
Pˆ∗(W ))′(P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W ))Yn|, it remains to show that
sup
W∈Hn(N)
|Y ′n(I−P∗(W ))′(P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W ))Yn|/nR∗n(W ) = op(1) (1.25)
and
sup
W∈Hn(N)
|Y ′n(P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W ))′(P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W ))Yn|/nR∗n(W ) = op(1). (1.26)
To prove (1.25), we need to show that
sup
W∈Hn(N)
|µ′n(I−P∗(W ))′(P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W ))µn|/nR∗n(W ) = op(1). (1.27)
sup
W∈Hn(N)
|µ′n(I−P∗(W ))′(P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W ))en|/nR∗n(W ) = op(1). (1.28)
sup
W∈Hn(N)
|e′n(I−P∗(W ))′(P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W ))µn|/nR∗n(W ) = op(1). (1.29)
sup
W∈Hn(N)
|e′n(I−P∗(W ))′(P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W ))en|/nR∗n(W ) = op(1). (1.30)
For (1.27), |µ′n(I−P∗(W ))′(P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W ))µn| ≤ |µ′n(I−P∗(W ))′||(P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W ))µn|. Since, for any
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W ∈Hn(N), we have |(I−P∗(W ))µn| ≤ {nR∗n(W )}1/2, it follows that
|µ′n(I−P∗(W ))′(P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W ))µn|/nR∗n(W )≤|(P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W ))µn|/{nR∗n(W )}1/2
≤ρ{P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W )}|µn|/ξ1/2n
≤
M
∑
m=1
wmρ(P∗m− Pˆ∗m)|µn|/ξ1/2n .
The last inequality follows from ρ(P∗m− Pˆ∗m) since ρ{(P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W ))} ≤ ∑Mm=1 wmρ(P∗m− Pˆ∗m), for any W ∈
Hn(N). It can be observed that
P∗m− Pˆ∗m =Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ−1n −Xm(X ′mΣ˜−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ˜−1n
=Xm{(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1− (X ′mΣ˜−1n Xm)−1}X ′mΣ˜−1n −Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′m(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )
=Xm[(X ′mΣ
−1
n Xm)
−1{X ′m(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )Xm}(X ′mΣ˜−1n Xm)−1]X ′mΣ˜−1n −Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′m(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )
=S1+S2
A little algebra shows that
ρ(S1)≤ρ(Σ1/2n )ρ(Σ−1/2n Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ−1/2n )ρ(Σ1/2n )ρ(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )
ρ(Σ˜1/2n )ρ(Σ˜
−1/2
n Xm(X ′mΣ˜
−1
n Xm)
−1X ′mΣ˜
−1/2
n )ρ(Σ˜
−1/2
n )≤Cρ(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n ),
and the same computation can be applied to S2.
We are now ready to present the proof for (1.27). Let Dn denote the event {ρ(Σ˜n−Σn) < c1+θn n−1/2}, where
c1+θn is defined in Assumption 5. Note that given Dn is true and n is sufficiently large,
ρ(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )≤ρ(Σ˜−1n )ρ(Σ˜n−Σn)ρ(Σ−1n )
≤{ρ(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )+ρ(Σ−1n )}ρ(Σ˜n−Σn)ρ(Σ−1n )
≤Cρ(Σ˜n−Σn)/(1−ρ(Σ˜n−Σn)ρ(Σ−1n ))
≤Cρ(Σ˜n−Σn).
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Altogether, it can be seen that for any δ> 0,
Px{ sup
W∈Hn(N)
|µ′n(I−P∗(W ))′(P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W ))µn|/nR∗n(W )> δ}
≤Px{ sup
W∈Hn(N)
M
∑
m=1
wmρ(P∗m− Pˆ∗m)|µn|/ξ1/2n > δ}
=Px{ max
1≤m≤M
ρ(P∗m− Pˆ∗m)|µn|/ξ1/2n > δ}
≤Px{ max
1≤m≤M
ρ(P∗m− Pˆ∗m)|µn|1Dn/ξ1/2n > δ}+Px{ max1≤m≤Mρ(P
∗
m− Pˆ∗m)|µn|1Dcn/ξ
1/2
n > δ}
≤
M
∑
m=1
Px{ρ(P∗m− Pˆ∗m)|µn|1Dn > δξ1/2n }+op(1)
≤
M
∑
m=1
Px{ρ(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )|µn|1Dn >Cδξ1/2n }+op(1)
≤CGδ−Gξ−G/2n
M
∑
m=1
ρ(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )G|µn|G+op(1)
≤CGMξ−G/2n Op(cGn )+op(1)→ 0,
The next-to-last inequality follows from Assumption 5, and the last inequality holds by Assumption 6 and the
observation that E(|µn|2) = E(∑ni=1 µ2i )≤Cn, under the assumption that E(µ2i )≤C.
It is readily seen that the proof of (1.26) can be obtained via the argument above, by observing that |Yn| =
Op(n1/2) and |(P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W ))Yn|/{nR∗n(W )}1/2 ≤ ρ{P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W )}|Yn|/ξ1/2n .
As for (1.28), likewise, |µ′n(I−P∗(W ))′(P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W ))en| ≤ |µ′n(I−P∗(W ))′||(P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W ))en|. Thus,
for any W ∈Hn(N), we have
|µ′n(I−P∗(W ))′(P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W ))en|/nR∗n(W )≤|(P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W ))en|/{nR∗n(W )}1/2
≤Cρ{P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W )}|en|/ξ1/2n
≤C
M
∑
m=1
wmρ(P∗m− Pˆ∗m)|en|/ξ1/2n .
The proof for (1.28) therefore follows from the reasoning of (1.27), by noting that E{|en|2}1/2 = tr(Σn)1/2 =
O(n1/2).
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The validity of (1.29) and (1.30) can be argued through the following claims.
sup
W∈Hn(N)
n−1|e′n(P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W ))µn|
R∗n(W )
= op(1), (1.31)
sup
W∈Hn(N)
n−1|e′n(P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W ))en|
R∗n(W )
= op(1), (1.32)
sup
W∈Hn(N)
n−1|e′nP∗(W )′(P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W ))µn|
R∗n(W )
= op(1), (1.33)
sup
W∈Hn(N)
n−1|e′nP∗(W )′(P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W ))en|
R∗n(W )
= op(1). (1.34)
where Pˆ∗(W ) = ∑Mm=1 wmPˆ∗m and Pˆ∗m = Xm(X ′mΣ˜−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ˜−1n .
To prove (1.31)-(1.34), we first argue that if each of numerators in (1.31)-(1.34) is bounded by
C∑Mm=1 wmUkmρ(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )|µn|, where we require Ukm/k1/2m to be uniformly bounded in 1≤ m≤M by some
constant C for any W ∈Hn(N), where Ukm = Op(k1/2m ), then the following argument completes the proof.
Recall that Wj1, j2..., jN in Hn(N) is the weight vector that assigns a positive weight 1/N to models 1 ≤ j1 ≤
j2 ≤ ... ≤ jN ≤ M ∈M , and zero to others. Note also that N is determined independent of sample number.
Thus, for any fixed Wj1, j2..., jN , the largest model that receives the positive weight is jN , with w jN ≥ 1/N. For
any W ∈Hn(N), note that we show in Lemma E1 nR∗n(W )≥C∑Mm=1∑Ml=1 wmwl min{km,kl}; hence, nR∗n(W )≥
C∑Mm=1 w2mkm ≥ CN2 k jN . It follows that, for any given weight vector, we have for (1.31),
n−1|e′n(P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W ))µn|
R∗n(W )
=
n−1|e′n(P∗(Wj1, j2..., jN )− Pˆ∗(Wj1, j2..., jN ))µn|
R∗n(Wj1, j2..., jN )
≤C
jN
∑
m=1
wmUkmρ(Σ˜n−Σn)|µn|/nR∗n(Wj1, j2..., jN )
≤C
jN
∑
m=1
wmρ(Σ˜n−Σn)|µn|Op(1)/{nR∗n(Wj1, j2..., jN )}1/2
≤C
jN
∑
m=1
wmρ(Σ˜n−Σn)|µn|Op(1)/ξ1/2n
=C
M
∑
m=1
wmρ(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )|µn|Op(1)/ξ1/2n .
Applying again the proof from (1.27), the proof for (1.31) is complete. (1.32)-(1.34) can be proved similarly.
We still need to check that each of numerators in (1.31)-(1.34) is bounded by C∑Mm=1 wmUkmρ(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )|µn|.
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First, for (1.31), observe that
|e′n(P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W ))µn|=|e′n[
M
∑
m=1
wm{Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ−1n −Xm(X ′mΣ˜−1n Xm)−1n X ′mΣ˜−1n }]µn|
≤
M
∑
m=1
wm|e′n{Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ−1n −Xm(X ′mΣ˜−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ˜−1n }µn|.
It can be noticed that for any 1≤ m≤M,
|e′n{Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ−1n −Xm(X ′mΣ˜−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ˜−1n }µn|
≤|e′nXm{(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1− (X ′mΣ˜−1n Xm)−1}X ′mΣ˜−1n µn|+ |e′nXm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′m(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )µn|
=T1+T2.
For T1, we have
T1 = |e′nXm[(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1{(X ′m(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )Xm}(X ′mΣ˜−1n Xm)−1]X ′mΣ˜−1n µn|.
Therefore,
T1 ={e′nXm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′m(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )Xm(X ′mΣ˜−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ˜−1n µn
µ′nΣ˜
−1
n Xm(X
′
mΣ˜
−1
n Xm)
−1X ′m(Σ˜
−1
n −Σ−1n )Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′men}1/2
=[tr{Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′mene′nXm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′m(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )Xm(X ′mΣ˜−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ˜−1n µn
µ′nΣ˜
−1
n Xm(X
′
mΣ˜
−1
n Xm)
−1X ′m(Σ˜
−1
n −Σ−1n )}]1/2
≤[tr{Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′mene′nXm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′m}]1/2
[tr{(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )Xm(X ′mΣ˜−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ˜−1n µnµ′nΣ˜−1n Xm(X ′mΣ˜−1n Xm)−1X ′m(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )}]1/2
≤{tr(T11)}1/2{tr(T12)}1/2
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Observe that for tr(T11),
tr(T11) =e′nXm(X
′
mΣ
−1
n Xm)
−1X ′mXm(X
′
mΣ
−1
n Xm)
−1X ′men
≤e′nΣ1/2n Σ−1/2n Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ−1/2n ΣnΣ−1/2n Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ−1/2n Σ1/2n en
≤ρ(Σn)e′nΣ1/2n Σ−1/2n Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ−1/2n Σ−1/2n Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ−1/2n Σ1/2n en
=ρ(Σn){ 1√ne
′
nXm(
1
n
X ′mΣ
−1
n Xm)
−1 1√
n
X ′men}
≤ρ(Σn)| 1√ne
′
nXm|ρ{(
1
n
X ′mΣ
−1
n Xm)
−1}| 1√
n
X ′men|
=Op(
√
km)Op(1)Op(
√
km) = Op(km).
To show that ρ{( 1n X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1} = Op(1), we observe the fact ρ{( 1n X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1} = λ−1min( 1n X ′mΣ−1n Xm) and
the following inequality, for any v ∈ Rkm such that |v|2 = 1,
v′(
1
n
X ′mΣ
−1
n Xm)v≥λmin(Σ−1n )v′
1
n
X ′mXmv
≥λmin(Σ−1n )λmin(
1
n
X ′mXm).
Since the relationship above holds for any v ∈ Rkm such that |v|2 = 1, it can be applied to λ−1min( 1n X ′mΣ−1n Xm).
It follows that ρ{( 1n X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1} ≤ λ−1min(Σ−1n )λ−1min( 1n X ′mXm) = ρ(Σn)ρ{( 1n X ′mXm)−1}, which is bounded in
probability, uniformly in m by assumption. We then conclude that tr(T11) = Op(k
1/2
m ).
For T12 notice that
tr(T12) =|(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )Xm(X ′mΣ˜−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ˜−1n µn|2
≤ρ2(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )|Xm(X ′mΣ˜−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ˜−1n µn|2
≤ρ2(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )|Σ˜1/2n Σ˜−1/2n Xm(X ′mΣ˜−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ˜−1/2n Σ˜−1/2n µn|2
≤ρ2(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )ρ2(Σ˜1/2n )|Σ˜−1/2n µn|2
≤ρ2(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )ρ2(Σ˜1/2n )ρ2(Σ˜−1/2n )|µn|2.
The next-to-last inequality holds since Σ˜−1/2n Xm(X ′mΣ˜−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ˜
−1/2
n is an orthogonal projection matrix.
Summing up, we have tr(T1) = U
(1)
km ρ(Σ˜
−1
n − Σ−1n )|µn|, where U (1)km /k
1/2
m = Op(1), uniformly bounded in
1≤ m≤M.
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For T2, we have
T2 ={e′nXm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′m(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )µnµ′n(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′men}1/2
=[tr{Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′mene′nXm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′m(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )µnµ′n(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )}]1/2
≤[tr{Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′mene′nXm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′m}]1/2[tr{(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )µnµ′n(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )}]1/2
≤{tr(T21)}1/2{tr(T22)}1/2
Since T11 = T21, we can tackle the bound for T21 by applying the argument above.
For tr(T22), observe that
tr(T22) =|(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )µn|2 ≤ ρ(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )2|µn|2.
Hence, tr(T2) =U
(2)
km ρ(Σ˜
−1
n −Σ−1n )|µn|, where U (2)km /k
1/2
m = Op(1), uniformly bounded in 1≤ m≤M.
Therefore, we show that
|e′n(P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W ))µn| ≤C
M
∑
m=1
wmUkmρ(Σ˜
−1
n −Σ−1n )|µn|.
The proof for (1.32) is similar to (1.31) by |en|= Op(n1/2).
For (1.33), notice that
|e′nP∗(W )′(P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W ))µn|
=|e′nwl
M
∑
l=1
P∗
′
l [
M
∑
m=1
wm{Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ−1n −Xm(X ′mΣ˜−1n Xm)−1n X ′mΣ˜−1n }]µn|
≤
M
∑
l=1
M
∑
m=1
wlwm|e′nP∗
′
l {Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ−1n −Xm(X ′mΣ˜−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ˜−1n }µn|.
For any 1≤ l,m≤M,
|e′nP∗
′
l {Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ−1n −Xm(X ′mΣ˜−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ˜−1n }µn|
≤|e′nP∗
′
l Xm{(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1− (X ′mΣ˜−1n Xm)−1}X ′mΣ˜−1n µn|+ |e′nP∗
′
l Xm(X
′
mΣ
−1
n Xm)
−1X ′m(Σ˜
−1
n −Σ−1n )µn|
=T1+T2.
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Notice that
T1 ={e′nP∗
′
l Xm(X
′
mΣ
−1
n Xm)
−1X ′m(Σ˜
−1
n −Σ−1n )Xm(X ′mΣ˜−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ˜−1n µn
µ′nΣ˜
−1
n Xm(X
′
mΣ˜
−1
n Xm)
−1X ′m(Σ˜
−1
n −Σ−1n )Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′mP∗l en}1/2
=[tr{Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′mP∗l ene′nP∗
′
l Xm(X
′
mΣ
−1
n Xm)
−1X ′m(Σ˜
−1
n −Σ−1n )Xm(X ′mΣ˜−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ˜−1n µn
µ′nΣ˜
−1
n Xm(X
′
mΣ˜
−1
n Xm)
−1X ′m(Σ˜
−1
n −Σ−1n )}]1/2
≤[tr{Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′mP∗l ene′nP∗
′
l Xm(X
′
mΣ
−1
n Xm)
−1X ′m}]1/2
[tr{(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )Xm(X ′mΣ˜−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ˜−1n µnµ′nΣ˜−1n Xm(X ′mΣ˜−1n Xm)−1X ′m(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )}]1/2
≤{tr(T11)}1/2{tr(T12)}1/2
For tr(T11), observe that
tr(T11) =tr{P∗l ene′nP∗
′
l Xm(X
′
mΣ
−1
n Xm)
−1X ′mXm(X
′
mΣ
−1
n Xm)
−1X ′m}
≤λmax{Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′mXm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′m}tr(P∗l ene′nP∗
′
l )
≤λmax{ΣnΣ−1/2n Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ−1/2n ΣnΣ−1/2n Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ−1/2n }tr(P∗l ene′nP∗
′
l )
≤Ctr(P∗l ene′nP∗
′
l )
=Ctr{Xl(X ′lΣ−1n Xl)−1X ′lΣ−1n ene′nΣ−1n Xl(X ′lΣ−1n Xl)−1X ′l }
=Ctr{ΣnΣ−1/2n Xl(X ′lΣ−1n Xl)−1X ′lΣ−1n ene′nΣ−1n Xl(X ′lΣ−1n Xl)−1X ′lΣ−1/2n }
≤Ctr{e′nΣ−1n Xl(X ′lΣ−1n Xl)−1X ′lΣ−1n en}
≤C[tr[{ΣnΣ−1n Xl(X ′lΣ−1n Xl)−1X ′lΣ−1n Σ−1n Xl(X ′lΣ−1n Xl)−1X ′lΣ−1n Σn}1/2
+ tr{Σ−1n Xl(X ′lΣ−1n Xl)−1X ′lΣ−1n Σn}]
≤Ckl .
The next-to-last inequality follows from the First Moment Bound Theorem. In addition, we have from previous
discussion that {tr(T12)}1/2 ≤ Cρ(Σ˜−1n − Σ−1n )|µn|. Thus, we know that T1 ≤ U (3)kl ρ(Σ˜−1n − Σ−1n )|µn|, where
U (3)kl /k
1/2
l = Op(1), uniformly in 1≤ l ≤M.
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For T2, we have
T2 ={e′nP∗
′
l Xm(X
′
mΣ
−1
n Xm)
−1X ′m(Σ˜
−1
n −Σ−1n )µnµ′n(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′mP∗l en}1/2
=[tr{Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′mP∗l ene′nP∗
′
l Xm(X
′
mΣ
−1
n Xm)
−1X ′m(Σ˜
−1
n −Σ−1n )µnµ′n(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )}]1/2
≤[tr{Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′mP∗l ene′nP∗
′
l Xm(X
′
mΣ
−1
n Xm)
−1X ′m}]1/2[tr{(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )µnµ′n(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )}]1/2
≤{tr(T21)}1/2{tr(T22)}1/2
Since T11 = T21, we can tackle the bound for T21 by applying the argument above.
For tr(T22), observe that
tr(T22) =|(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )µn|2 ≤ ρ(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )2|µn|2.
Hence, tr(T2) =Ukmρ(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )|µn|.
The proof for (1.34) is similar to (1.33), and by observing that |en|= Op(n1/2).
For (iv), it is enough to show that for any 1 ≤ m ≤ M, |tr(Pˆ∗mΣ˜n)− tr(P∗mΣn)| = Ukmρ{(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n ), where
Ukm/km = Op(1) bounded uniformly in m. Observe that
tr(Pˆ∗mΣ˜n) = tr(Xm(X
′
mΣ˜
−1
n Xm)
−1X ′mΣ˜
−1
n Σ˜n) = tr(Xm(X
′
mΣ˜
−1
n Xm)
−1X ′m).
Likewise, tr(P∗mΣn) = tr(Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′m).
We then have
|tr(Pˆ∗mΣ˜n)− tr(P∗mΣn)|=|tr{Xm(X ′mΣ˜−1n Xm)−1X ′m−Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1X ′m}|
=|tr[Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1{X ′m(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )Xm}(X ′mΣ˜−1n Xm)−1X ′m]|
=|tr[ΣnΣ−1/2n Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1{X ′m(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )Xm}(X ′mΣ˜−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ−1/2n ]|.
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Hence, the above is bounded by
λmax(Σn)|tr[Σ−1/2n Xm(X ′mΣ−1n Xm)−1{X ′m(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )Xm}(X ′mΣ˜−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ−1/2n ]|
=λmax(Σn)|tr[{X ′m(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )Xm}(X ′mΣ˜−1n Xm)−1]|
≤λmax(Σn)[λmax{(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )2}]1/2tr(Σ˜nΣ˜−1/2n Xm(X ′mΣ˜−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ˜−1/2n )
≤λmax(Σn)ρ{(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )}λmax(Σ˜n)tr(Σ˜−1/2n Xm(X ′mΣ˜−1n Xm)−1X ′mΣ˜−1/2n )
=Ukmρ{(Σ˜−1n −Σ−1n )},
where it is obvious to see that Ukm/km = Op(1) bounded uniformly in m.
(b) Rewrite |Lˆ∗n(W )−L∗n(W )| by the definition of Lˆ∗n(W ) and L∗n(W ) as follows.
|Lˆ∗n(W )−L∗n(W )|= |Yn{(I− Pˆ∗)′(I− Pˆ∗)− (I−P∗)′(I−P∗)}Yn|,
which have been tackled in (1.25) and (1.26), along with the observation
(I− Pˆ∗)′(I− Pˆ∗)− (I−P∗)′(I−P∗)
=(I− Pˆ∗)′(I− Pˆ∗)− (I− Pˆ∗)′(I−P∗)+(I− Pˆ∗)′(I−P∗)− (I−P∗)′(I−P∗)
=(I− Pˆ∗)′(P∗− Pˆ∗)+(P∗− Pˆ∗)′(I−P∗).
Also note that I− Pˆ∗ = I−P∗+P∗− Pˆ∗.
Proof of Theorem 2. The approach we adopt here is similar in spirit to that established for Theorem 1. By definition,
note first that nRn(P∗(W ),Ψn) =µ′n(I−P∗(W ))′Ψn(I−P∗(W ))µn+ tr(P∗(W )′Ψ′nP∗(W )Σn) = |(I−P∗(W ))µn|2Ψn +
tr(P∗(W )′Ψ′nP∗(W )Σn). It follows immediately that, by walking through the reasoning of Lemma E1, there exists
some natural number N such that, given the assumption that ξn(Ψn)→ ∞ almost surely as n tends to infinity,
∑
W∈Hn
(nRn(P∗(W ),Ψn))−(N+1)→ 0 almost surely. (1.35)
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It then suffices to show the following statements valid to complete the proof.
sup
W∈Hn(N)
n−1|e′nΨn(I−P∗(W ))µn|
Rn(P∗(W ),Ψn)
= op(1), (1.36)
sup
W∈Hn(N)
n−1|e′nΨnP∗(W )en− tr(ΨnP∗(W )Σn)|
Rn(P∗(W ),Ψn)
= op(1), (1.37)
sup
W∈Hn(N)
|Ln(P∗(W ),Ψn)/Rn(P∗(W ),Ψn)−1|= op(1), (1.38)
sup
W∈Hn(N)
|CGCp(Pˆ∗(W ),Ψˆn)−CGCp(P∗(W ),Ψn)|
Rn(P∗(W ),Ψn)
= op(1), (1.39)
sup
W∈Hn(N)
|Ln(Pˆ∗(W ),Ψˆn)−Ln(P∗(W ),Ψn)|/Rn(P∗(W ),Ψn) = op(1), (1.40)
where nCGCp(P∗(W ),Ψn) = (Yn − P∗(W )Yn)′Ψn(Yn − P∗(W )Yn) + 2tr(ΨnP∗(W )Σn), and, correspondingly,
nCGCp(Pˆ∗(W ),Ψˆn) = (Yn− Pˆ∗(W )Yn)′Ψˆn(Yn− Pˆ∗(W )Yn)+2tr(ΨˆnPˆ∗(W )Σˆn).
Lemma 2 suggests that the CGCp(P∗(W ),Ψn) and Ln(P∗(W ),Ψn) are asymptotically equivalent if (1.36) and
(1.37) hold, by the independence of e′nΨnen and weight choices. (1.38) establishes equivalence between Ln(Mn,Ψn)
and Rn(Mn,Ψn) in the asymptotic sense. Following a similar line of logic, (1.39) serves the same purpose for the
empirical and population criterion CGCp. (1.40) pins down the asymptotic efficiency of empirical loss. All statements
sufficient for the theorem are proved in Lemma E4.
Lemma E4. Let Ln(P∗(W ),Ψn) = (µˆn(W )−µn)′Ψn(µˆn(W )−µn)/n and Rn(P∗(W ),Ψn) = Ex(L∗n(W )). Assume that
ξn(Ψn) = infW∈Hn nRn(P
∗(W ),Ψn)→ ∞ almost surely. Suppose, in addition, Assumptions 1, 2, 5, and 7 hold. Then
we have following results.
(a)
sup
W∈Hn(N)
n−1|e′nΨn(I−P∗(W ))µn|
Rn(P∗(W ),Ψn)
= op(1).
(b)
sup
W∈Hn(N)
n−1|e′nΨnP∗(W )en− tr(ΨnP∗(W )Σn)|
Rn(P∗(W ),Ψn)
= op(1).
(c)
sup
W∈Hn(N)
|Ln(P∗(W ),Ψn)/Rn(P∗(W ),Ψn)−1|= op(1).
(d)
sup
W∈Hn(N)
|CGCp(Pˆ∗(W ),Ψˆn)−CGCp(P∗(W ),Ψn)|
Rn(P∗(W ),Ψn)
= op(1).
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(e)
sup
W∈Hn(N)
|Ln(Pˆ∗(W ),Ψˆn)−Ln(P∗(W ),Ψn)|/Rn(P∗(W ),Ψn) = op(1).
Proof of Lemma E4. (a) The proof is identical to that of Lemma E2 (a) in which An(W ) = I−P∗(W ) is replaced
with An(W ) = Ψn(I−P∗(W )). Additionally, (1.35) is employed in place of Lemma E1. Along with similar
argument in Lemma E2 (a), we have
Ex|e′nΨn(I−P∗(W ))µn|2(N+1) =Ex|e′nBn(W )en|(N+1)
≤CNtr{Bn(W )}(N+1).
where Bn(W ) = An(W )µnµ′nAn(W )′ with An(W ) redefined above. It is sufficient to verify that tr{Bn(W )} is
bounded by Rn(P∗(W ),Ψn) for any given W ∈Hn(N), which can be easily seen as follows:
tr{Bn(W )}= tr{Ψn(I−P∗(W ))µnµ′n(I−P∗(W ))′Ψn} ≤ λmax(Ψn)|(I−P∗(W ))µn|2Ψn .
Therefore, the required bound holds by Assumption 7 and the definition of Rn(P∗(W ),Ψn).
(b) Likewise, the proof for (b) is analogous to that of Lemma E2 (b). The First Moment Bound Theorem and
Assumption 7 gives
Ex|e′nΨnP∗(W )en− tr(ΨnP∗(W )Σn)|2(N+1) ≤CN{tr(ΣnΨnP∗(W )P∗(W )′Ψ′nΣn)}(N+1)
≤CN{tr(P∗(W )′Ψ′nP∗(W )Σn)}(N+1),
for some constant CN , depending on N only. The fact that tr(P∗(W )′Ψ′nP∗(W )Σn) is bounded by Rn(P∗(W ),Ψn)
for any given W ∈Hn(N), together with (1.35), suffice to prove the desired result.
(c) By construction of Ln(P∗(W ),Ψn) and Rn(P∗(W ),Ψn), we need only show that their difference tends asymptoti-
cally to zero, relative to the risk over the whole discrete set of weights, similar to that given in Lemma E2 (c).
Thus, it remains to prove that
(v)
sup
W∈Hn(N)
|e′nP∗(W )′Ψn(I−P∗(W ))µn|/nRn(P∗(W ),Ψn) = op(1).
(vi)
sup
W∈Hn(N)
|e′nP∗(W )′P∗(W )en− tr(P∗(W )′P∗(W )Σn)|/nRn(P∗(W ),Ψn) = op(1).
We prove claims by applying the algebraic details in Lemma E2 (c), with An(W ) substituted into B2,n(W ),
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where An(W ) is as redefined in (a). The above results follows when Assumption 7 is further imposed and
(1.35) holds.
(d)
|CGCp(Pˆ∗(W ),Ψˆn)−CGCp(P∗(W ),Ψn)|
≤|CGCp(Pˆ∗(W ),Ψˆn)−CGCp(Pˆ∗(W ),Ψn)|+ |CGCp(Pˆ∗(W ),Ψn)−CGCp(P∗(W ),Ψn)|
We begin the proof by observing that, from Assumption 7,
1
λmax(Ψn)
≤ R
∗
n(W )
Rn(P∗(W ),Ψn)
=
Ex{(µˆn(W )−µn)′(µˆn(W )−µn)}
Ex{(µˆn(W )−µn)′Ψn(µˆn(W )−µn)} ≤
1
λmin(Ψn)
.
This implies that ξn(Ψn)→ ∞ if and only if ξn → ∞ as n tends to infinity. Hence, it is straightforward to
recognize that
sup
W∈Hn(N)
|CGCp(Pˆ∗(W ),Ψˆn)−CGCp(Pˆ∗(W ),Ψn)|/nRn(P∗(W ),Ψn) = op(1),
by Assumption 7, and the following observations.
First,
|Y ′n(I− Pˆ∗(W ))′Ψˆn(I− Pˆ∗(W ))Yn−Y ′n(I− Pˆ∗(W ))′Ψn(I− Pˆ∗(W ))Yn|
=|Y ′n(I− Pˆ∗(W ))′(Ψˆn−Ψn)(I− Pˆ∗(W ))Yn|
≤ρ(Ψˆn−Ψn)|Y ′n(I− Pˆ∗(W ))′(I− Pˆ∗(W ))Yn|,
where |Y ′n(I− Pˆ∗(W ))′(I− Pˆ∗(W ))Yn| can be further decomposed and bounded by
|Y ′n(I−P∗(W ))′(I−P∗(W ))Yn|+2|Y ′n(I−P∗(W ))′(P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W ))Yn|
+|Y ′n(P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W ))′(P∗(W )− Pˆ∗(W ))Yn|= T3+T4+T5.
Note that T3 is bounded by |Yn|2. Combined with ρ(Ψˆn−Ψn), it can be tackled using similar reasoning for
(1.26) and Assumption 7. On the other hand, bounds for T4 and T5 are dealt with in (iii) of Lemma E3.
Additionally, we have |tr(ΨˆnPˆ∗(W )Σ˜n)− tr(ΨnPˆ∗(W )Σ˜n)| ≤ |ρ{(Ψˆn−Ψn)}tr(Pˆ∗(W )Σ˜n)|.
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Likewise, it follows as an immediate consequence of Lemma E3 that
sup
W∈Hn(N)
|CGCp(Pˆ∗(W ),Ψn)−CGCp(P∗(W ),Ψn)|/nRn(P∗(W ),Ψn) = op(1),
by observing
|Y ′n(I− Pˆ∗(W ))′Ψn(I− Pˆ∗(W ))Yn−Y ′n(I−P∗(W ))′Ψn(I−P∗(W ))Yn|
≤C|Y ′n(I− Pˆ∗(W ))′(I− Pˆ∗(W ))Yn−Y ′n(I−P∗(W ))′(I−P∗(W ))Yn|,
and
|tr(ΨnPˆ∗(W )Σ˜n)− tr(ΨnP∗(W )Σn)| ≤ |λmax(Ψn)tr(Pˆ∗(W )Σ˜n)−λmin(Ψn)tr(P∗(W )Σn)|
≤C|tr(Pˆ∗(W )Σ˜n)− tr(P∗(W )Σn)|.
Recall that the bounds of the above are exactly as those established in the (iii) and (iv) of Lemma E3.
(e) Observe that |Ln(Pˆ∗(W ),Ψˆn) − Ln(P∗(W ),Ψn)| ≤ |Ln(Pˆ∗(W ),Ψˆn) − Ln(Pˆ∗(W ),Ψn)| + |Ln(Pˆ∗(W ),Ψn) −
Ln(P∗(W ),Ψn)|. We can rearrange this to see that
|Ln(Pˆ∗(W ),Ψˆn)−Ln(Pˆ∗(W ),Ψn)|= |Y ′n(I− Pˆ∗(W ))′Ψˆn(I− Pˆ∗(W ))Yn−Y ′n(I− Pˆ∗(W ))′Ψn(I− Pˆ∗(W ))Yn|,
and
|Ln(Pˆ∗(W ),Ψn)−Ln(P∗(W ),Ψn)|= |Y ′n(I− Pˆ∗(W ))′Ψn(I− Pˆ∗(W ))Yn−Y ′n(I−P∗(W ))′Ψn(I−P∗(W ))Yn|,
which have been dealt with in (d).
Proof of Lemma 3. Without loss of generality, we only consider in proofs the case that 0 ≤ κl(.) ≤ 1. Notice that
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Σˆκ,l−Σn is symmetric, then by Problem 21, p.313 in Horn and Johnson (1990) we know
ρ(Σˆκ,l−Σn)≤ max
1≤ j≤n
n
∑
i=1
|κl(|i− j|)γˆi− j− γi− j|
≤
n−1
∑
i=1−n
|κl(i)γˆi− γi|
≤ 2
l
∑
i=0
|γˆi− γi|+2
bcκlc
∑
i=l+1
|κl(i)γˆi− γi|+2
n
∑
i=bcκlc+1
|γi|
= T1+T2+T3
For T1, we apply the First Moment Bound Theorem
‖γˆi− γi‖q ≤‖γˆi−E(γˆi)‖q+ in |γi|
≤Cn−1/2+ i
n
|γi|.
Thus,
‖T1‖q ≤C(l+1)n−1/2+ 2n
l
∑
i=1
i|γi|.
For T2,
T2 ≤ 2
bcκlc
∑
i=l+1
κl(i)|γˆi− γi|+2
bcκlc
∑
i=l+1
|κl(i)−1||γi|.
Thus,
‖T2‖q ≤C(bcκlc− l)n−1/2+ 2n
bcκlc
∑
i=l+1
i|γi|+2
bcκlc
∑
i=l+1
|γi|.
Proof of Theorem 3. (a) It is easy to see that
ρ(Σ˜εκ,l−Σn)≤ ρ(Σ˜εκ,l− Σ˜κ,l)+ρ(Σ˜κ,l− Σˆκ,l)+ρ(Σˆκ,l−Σn). (1.41)
We shall give the bounds for these three terms in the reverse order. First, the bound of ρ(Σˆκ,l −Σn) is yielded
directly by Lemma 3. Next, notice that Σ˜κ,l − Σˆκ,l is symmetric, hence again by Problem 21, p. 313 in Horn
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and Johnson (1990) we know
ρ(Σ˜κ,l− Σˆκ,l)≤ max
1≤ j≤n
n
∑
i=1
|κl(|i− j|)γ˜i− j−κl(|i− j|)γˆi− j|
≤
n−1
∑
i=1−n
κl(i)|γ˜i− γˆi|
≤ 2
bcκlc
∑
i=0
|γ˜i− γˆi|. (1.42)
Through tedious algebra, we can see that for i = 0, ...,bcκlc ,
|γ˜i− γˆi|=1n |
n−i
∑
t=1
eˆt eˆt+i−
n−i
∑
t=1
etet+i|
≤1
n
|
n−i
∑
t=1
(eˆt eˆt+i− etet+i)|
≤1
n
{|
n−i
∑
t=1
(eˆt − et)(eˆt+i− et+i)|+ |
n−i
∑
t=1
(eˆt − et)et+i|+ |
n−i
∑
t=1
et(eˆt+i− et+i)|}
≤1
n
{
|
n−i
∑
t=1
{xt(kM)′(ΘM− ΘˆM)+bMt}{xt+i(kM)′(ΘM− ΘˆM)+bMt+i}|
+ |
n−i
∑
t=1
{xt(kM)′(ΘM− ΘˆM)+bMt}et+i|+ |
n−i
∑
t=1
et{xt+i(kM)′(ΘM− ΘˆM)+bMt+i}|
}
=|1
n
n−i
∑
t=1
(xt(kM)′(ΘM− ΘˆM))(xt+i(kM)′(ΘM− ΘˆM))|+ |(ΘM− ΘˆM)′ 1n
n−i
∑
t=1
xt(kM)et+i|
+ |1
n
n−i
∑
t=1
etxt+i(kM)′(ΘM− ΘˆM)|+ |1n
n−i
∑
t=1
bMtxt+i(kM)′(ΘM− ΘˆM)|
+ |1
n
n−i
∑
t=1
xt(kM)′(ΘM− ΘˆM)bMt+i|+ |1n
n−i
∑
t=1
bMtbMt+i|+ |1n
n−i
∑
t=1
bMtet+i|+ |1n
n−i
∑
t=1
etbMt+i|
≤T1+T2+T3+T4+T5+T6+T7+T8.
The third inequality uses the fact that yt =∑kMj=1 θ jx jt +bMt +et =xt(kM)
′ΘM+bMt +et . For reasons of clarity,
below we present claims on which we proceed to to derive bounds for T1-T8 with formal proofs deferred. We
further establish the bound of ρ(Σ˜εκ,l− Σ˜κ,l) to finish the proof, ended by the proofs of claims.
Remark E2. Let Vn(kM) = E{xt(kM)xt(kM)′}, and Vˆn(kM) = 1n ∑n−it=1xt+k(kM)xt+k(kM)′ for all i =
0, ...,bcκlc, and 0≤ k ≤ i. Then ρ{Vˆn(kM)}= Op(1).
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Remark E3. For any 1≤ m≤M, we have
|1
n
n−i
∑
t=1
x′t(km)et+i|= Op(
√
km
n
), and |1
n
n−i
∑
t=1
etx′t+i(km)|= Op(
√
km
n
).
Remark E4. Let V−1n (kM) = [E{xt(kM)xt(kM)′}]−1, and Vˆ−1n (kM) = { 1n ∑n−it=1xt+k(kM)xt+k(kM)′}−1 for
all i= 0, ...,bcκlc, and 0≤ k≤ i. If ρ{Vˆn(kM)−Vn(kM)}= op(1), then ρ{Vˆ−1n (kM)−V−1n (kM)}= op(1).
After some tedious but straightforward algebra, we have
T1 ≤|1n
n−i
∑
t=1
{xt(kM)
′(ΘM− ΘˆM)+xt+i(kM)′(ΘM− ΘˆM)
2
}2|
≤| 1
2n
n−i
∑
t=1
(ΘM− ΘˆM)′xt(kM)xt(kM)′(ΘM− ΘˆM)|+ | 12n
n−i
∑
t=1
(ΘM− ΘˆM)′xt+i(kM)xt+i(kM)′(ΘM− ΘˆM)|.
≤1
2
|ΘM− ΘˆM|2|1n
n−i
∑
t=1
xt(kM)xt(kM)′|+ 12 |ΘM− ΘˆM|
2|1
n
n−i
∑
t=1
xt+i(kM)xt+i(kM)′|,
where
|ΘM− ΘˆM|=|(1n
n
∑
t=1
xt(kM)xt(kM)′)−1
1
n
n
∑
t=1
xt(kM)et |
≤ρ{(1
n
n
∑
t=1
xt(kM)xt(kM)′)−1}|1n
n
∑
t=1
xt(kM)et |.
Note that Assumption 3 and Remark E4 altogether imply that ρ{(n−1X ′MXM)−1} = Op(1). Moreover, by
Remark E3, we know |ΘM− ΘˆM|= Op{(kM/n) 12 }. It follows that T1 = Op(kM/n) by Remark E2.
Next, it can be easily seen that T2 and T3 are of the order Op(kM/n) since
T2 ≤ |ΘM− ΘˆM||1n
n−i
∑
t=1
xt(kM)′et+i| and T3 ≤ |1n
n−i
∑
t=1
etx′t+i(kM)||ΘM− ΘˆM|.
T4 = Op(k
1/2−r
M /n) since
T4 = |1n
n−i
∑
t=1
bMtxt+i(kM)′(ΘM− ΘˆM)| ≤ sup
t
|bMt ||1n
n−i
∑
t=1
xt+i(kM)′||(ΘM− ΘˆM)|.
By Assumption 8 we have supt |bMt | = Op(k−rM ), and it can be demonstrated that | 1n ∑n−it=1xt+i(kM)′| =
Op(n−1/2) by Assumption 2 and 4. Likewise, T5 = | 1n ∑n−it=1xt(kM)′(ΘM − ΘˆM)bMt+i| = Op(k
1/2−r
M /n). Ob-
serve that T6 = | 1n ∑n−it=1 bMtbMt+i| = Op(k−2rM ) as a result of Assumption 8. For T7, we have it of the order
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Op( 1√
nk2rM
) by Assumptions 2, 4, 8, and
|1
n
n−i
∑
t=1
bMtet+i| ≤ sup
t
|bMt ||1n
n−i
∑
t=1
et+i|= Op( 1√
nk2rM
).
Lastly, T8 = Op( 1√
nk2rM
) along similar lines as above.
Summing up, |γ˜i− γˆi|= Op(max{ kMn , 1k2rM ,
1√
nk2rM
}). We thus have from (1.42)
ρ(Σ˜κ,l− Σˆκ,l)≤ 2C(bcκlc+1)(max{kMn ,
1
k2rM
,
1√
nk2rM
}). (1.43)
Finally, it remains to calculate the bound of ρ(Σ˜εκ,l − Σ˜k,l). Since it is symmetric and positive semi-definite,
we have Σ˜εκ,l − Σ˜k,l = QnΛ−Q′n, where Λ− = diag(max{λ1,εγ˜0/nβ}−λ1, ...,max{λn,εγ˜0/nβ}−λn). We thus
apply the same argument in McMurry and Politis (2010) to obtain
ρ(Σ˜εκ,l− Σ˜k,l) =max{0,εγ˜0/nβ−λn}
≤max{0,εγ˜0/nβ+ρ(Σn− Σ˜k,l)}
≤εγ˜0/nβ+ρ(Σn− Σ˜k,l)
≤εγ˜0/nβ+ρ(Σn− Σˆk,l)+ρ(Σˆk,l− Σ˜k,l). (1.44)
Combining (1.41), (1.44), we conclude that ρ(Σ˜εκ,l − Σn) ≤ 2ρ(Σ˜κ,l − Σˆκ,l) + 2ρ(Σˆκ,l − Σn) + εγ0/nβ +
Op{n−β(max{ kMn , 1k2rM ,
1√
nk2rM
})}+Op{n−β−1/2}. Since it holds for any qth moment, together with (1.43) and
Lemma 3, the proof is complete by observing for any q > 0,
ρ(Σ˜εκ,l−Σn)q = Op([Cq(bcκlc+1)max{
kM
n
,
1
k2rM
,
1√
nk2rM
,
1√
n
}+ 4
n
bcκlc
∑
i=1
i|γi|+4
n
∑
i=l+1
|γi|+ εγ0nβ ]
q).
We complete this proof by giving the formal proofs of Remark E2, E3, and E4.
Proof of Remark E2. The argument is mainly based on the Lemma 2 in Ing and Wei (2003). We first claim that
under Assumptions 2 and 4, we have for some q > 0,
E
[
ρ{Vˆn(kM)−Vn(kM)}q
]
≤C(k
2
M
n
)q/2.
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Notice that it is sufficient to prove the case when q≥ 2, and by convexity of q≥ 2,
E
[
ρ{Vˆn(kM)−Vn(kM)}q
]
≤ k
q
M
k2M
kM
∑
i′=1
kM
∑
j′=1
E|rˆi′, j′ − ri′, j′ |q,
where rˆi′, j′ and ri′, j′ denote the (i′, j′)th component of Vˆn(kM) and Vn(km).
We can rewrite equation above as
E|rˆi′, j′ − ri′, j′ |q = n−qE{|
n−i
∑
s=1
n−i
∑
t=1
q(s, t)(xi′sx j′t − ri′, j′)|q},
where q(s, t) = 1 if s = t, and 0 otherwise. By First Moment Bound Theorem, we know the above is bounded
by
Cn−q(
n−i
∑
u=1
n−i
∑
v=1
γi′(u− v)γ j′(u− v))q/2 ≤Cn−q/2{
n−i−1
∑
k=−n+i+1
(1−| k
n− i |)γi′(k)γ j′(k)}
q/2 ≤Cn−q/2,
where γi′(u− v) = E(xi′uxi′v), i′ = 1, ...,kM.
By the foregoing result and together with Assumption 3, we have the desired moment bound.
Proof of Remark E3. Notice that
|1
n
n−i
∑
t=1
xt(km)′et+i|2 = 1n2
km
∑
j=1
(
n−i
∑
t=1
x jtet+i)2.
Since {x jt ,et ; j = 1, ...,km} satisfy Assumption 2, applying the First Moment Bound Theorem we have
E(
n−i
∑
t=1
x jtet+i)2 ≤Ctr{Σ(x j)n BiB′iΣn} ≤C(n− i),
where Σ(x j)n is the autocovariance matrix of x j and
Bi =
 0i×i In−i×n−i
0n−i×i 0i×i
 ,
so we can write ∑n−it=1 x jtet+i = (x j1, ...,x jn)Bi(ei, ...,en)
′. Thus, we show that
|1
n
n−i
∑
t=1
xt(km)′et+i|2 = Op(km/n).
Alternatively, we can use Assumption 1 (et is independent of x) to compute the bound.
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Proof of Remark E4. It suffices to show that for any δ > 0, P
[
ρ{Vˆ−1n (kM)−V−1n (kM)} > δ
]
tends to zero as
sample number goes to infinity.
Observe that
P
[
ρ{Vˆ−1n (kM)−V−1n (kM)}> δ
]≤P[ρ{Vˆ−1n (kM)−V−1n (kM)}> δ,ρ{Vˆn(kM)−Vn(kM)} ≤ δ′]
+P
[
ρ{Vˆ−1n (kM)−V−1n (kM)}> δ,ρ{Vˆn(kM)−Vn(kM)}> δ′
]
Since
ρ{Vˆ−1n (kM)−V−1n (kM)} ≤ρ{Vˆ−1n (kM)}ρ{Vˆn(kM)−Vn(kM)}ρ{V−1n (kM)}
≤[ρ{Vˆ−1n (kM)−V−1n (kM)}+ρ{V−1n (kM)}]ρ{Vˆn(kM)−Vn(kM)}ρ{V−1n (kM)}.
Hence, ρ{Vˆ−1n (kM)−V−1n (kM)} ≤ ρ{Vˆn(kM)−Vn(kM)}ρ{V
−1
n (kM)}2
1−ρ{Vˆn(kM)−Vn(kM)}ρ{V−1n (kM)}
.
Choosing sufficiently small δ′ such that δ′ < δ
ρ{V−1n (kM)}2+δρ{V−1n (kM)}
, we have ρ{Vˆ−1n (kM)−V−1n (kM)} ≤
δ for any given δ. To see how the foregoing argument works, just note that ρ{Vˆn(kM)−Vn(kM)} <
δ
ρ{V−1n (kM)}2+δρ{V−1n (kM)}
leads to the desired result. Therefore, P
[
ρ{Vˆ−1n (kM)−V−1n (kM)} > δ,ρ{Vˆn(kM)−
Vn(kM)} ≤ δ′
]
= 0 and
P
[
ρ{Vˆ−1n (kM)−V−1n (kM)}> δ
]≤P[ρ{Vˆ−1n (kM)−V−1n (kM)}> δ,ρ{Vˆn(kM)−Vn(kM)}> δ′]
≤P[ρ{Vˆn(kM)−Vn(kM)}> δ′]
≤C k
2
M
nδ′
→ 0.
(b) By Section 5.2 of Grenander and Szego¨ (1958) and Assumption 4, all eigenvalues of Σn are bounded in the interval
of [2pic1,2pic2]. The result holds by observing that ((Σ˜εκ,l)
−1−Σ−1n ) = (Σ˜εκ,l)−1(Σ˜εκ,l−Σn)Σ−1n and Lemma 5.
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Figure 1.1: NORMALIZED RISK UNDER AR(1)
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
n=50
R2
R
is
k
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
n=150
R2
R
is
k
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
n=300
R2
R
is
k
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
n=700
R2
R
is
k
 
 
AIC
S−AIC
S−BIC
Mallows
MAC−Mallows
MMA
MAC
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Figure 1.2: NORMALIZED RISK UNDER MA(1)
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(a) φ=−0.3, α= 1.5
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Figure 1.3: NORMALIZED RISK UNDER ARMA(1, 1)
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(a) ψ= φ=−0.3, α= 1.5
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Figure 1.4: NORMALIZED RISK UNDER AR(2)
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Figure 1.4–Continued
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Chapter 2
VOTE-BUYING IN TAIWAN: EVIDENCE
FROM JUDICIAL JUDGMENTS
“A few packs of cigarettes or some bath towels and soap may be all that is needed to secure someone’s vote. One
villager said, “you can only accept a gift from one candidate, and then you are obligated to vote for him.” (Hsin Hsing
Village, Changhua, Taiwan, 1957-1958) — Gallin (1966, p. 22)
2.1. Introduction
Contemporary democracies infer aggregate preferences from voting mechanisms, upon which social choices are de-
termined. This feature notably distinguishes them from other regimes. Voting systems in many democratic politics,
however, seem to stumble with numerous election frauds along the way. Among them, vote-buying is a common prac-
tice frequently identified worldwide.1 Nascent democracies, where vote-buying is rampant, provide good contexts for
empirical research to explore this phenomenon; for instance, nineteenth-century Britain and United States (Seymour,
1915; Gist, 1961; Cox and Kousser, 1981; Bensel, 2004; Lehoucq, 2007); for contemporary emerging democracies,
see Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes (2004), Wang and Kurzman (2007a,b), Finan and Schechter (2012), Vicente (2014),
among others. On the other hand, even a mature democracy such as today’s United States has recently documented
the appearances of vote-buying; see Karlan (1994), Stokes (2005), and Nichter (2008) for details.
At least two direct consequences of vote-buying are notable: the loss or even inversion of political accountability
and the distortion of public choices (Stokes, 2005, 2007). Political accountability is of little interest to politicians when
vote-buying is a sufficient strategy to secure a seat. Furthermore, if vote-buying is effective and widely practiced,
then all public policies made by the elected government or legislature would incur concerns since the aggregate
preference has been misrepresented by vote-buying. The distorted policies could subsequently lead to misallocation
of public goods. These consequences thus motivate a large body of empirical research aiming to understand under
what circumstances vote-buying is favored and how effective it could be in winning elections.
Consider, though illegal, a market for votes exists. The voting market is characterized by both demand and sup-
ply. However, among those drawing inferences based upon quantitative methodology, empirical vote-buying studies
1The vote-buying in this context specifically refers to the trading of money, goods, or services for votes (Schaffer, 2007b). Furthermore, the
exchange is performed prior to the election; hence any contract contingent upon the electoral realization is excluded (Vicente, 2014).
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primarily resort to two classes of data sources focusing on the supply side of voting market: observational data (Br-
usco, Nazareno, and Stokes, 2004; Stokes, 2005; Nichter, 2008), and field experiments (Vicente, 2014). In the cohort
of observational studies, a well-designed sampling strategy ensures representative data. However, the endogeneity
problem has been well recognized along this stream of research, and more importantly, a systematic identification
strategy may not be possible (Vicente and Wantchekon, 2009). Furthermore, given the illicit nature of vote-buying,
respondents may not be truthful. Consequently, biases incurred in this scenario could contaminate prior studies built
on the observational data. Gonzalez-Ocantos, de Jonge, Mele´ndez, Osorio, and Nickerson (2011) proposed the use of
list experiments to correct the potential bias.
Experimental methodology, on the other hand, achieves identification with random design. It has accordingly led to
a burgeoning literature on redistributive politics employing field experiments in developing democracies (Wantchekon,
2003; Vicente, 2014; Fujiwara and Wantchekon, 2014). See, for a detailed review, Vicente and Wantchekon (2009)
and Gallego and Wantchekon (2012). Recently, Finan and Schechter (2012) incorporated a laboratory experimental
measure into survey-based analyses. This hybrid methodology sheds new light on empirical research.
As the supply side, it is exactly the illegal nature of vote-buying such that limits our knowledge on the demand
side of voting market as well. Few candidates would admit committing vote-buying in any case; this immediately
suggests an even more severe demand-side bias than the one appearing on the supply side. The resultant scarcity of
reliable demand-side data sources in turn restricts the scope to be explored in research; factors driving incentives of
vote-buying from the perspective of candidates, for example, is necessarily excluded from the empirical investigation.
One access to understanding the demand side of voting market is through criminal records. Drawing from news-
paper reports, Cox and Kousser (1981) examined vote-buying in rural New York State from 1879 to 1908. Another
possible source for the criminal records is via judicial documents. There has seen a surge of interest in the use of
criminal records in a variety of academic fields. A long but incomplete list includes bankruptcy studies related to fi-
nance (Bris, Welch, and Zhu, 2006; Chang and Schoar, 2013; Iverson, 2014); studies on incentives and consequences
of political corruption (Peters and Welch, 1980; Golden and Chang, 2001; Chang, 2005; Chang, Golden, and Hill,
2010). Recently, Wu (2012) studied the vote-buying in the context of Taiwanese congressional elections with a col-
lection of judicial judgments, where information regarding the charged politicians is documented. In this paper, I
follow Wu (2012) by applying a set of hand-collected judicial judgments from district courts to investigate the extent
of vote-buying campaigns in the 2010 municipal elections in Taiwan.
Judicial data could reveal detailed information that better characterizes the vote-buying scheme. The depositions
from the collected judicial judgments describe the timing, the location, and the interactions among the principal, the
accessories, and the accomplices in this specific form of organized crime. As an example, none of evidence in my
collection indicates that the vote-buying in this context took the form of negative vote-buying, i.e., paying to abstain
57
(Cox and Kousser, 1981). This could be an important feature of theoretical interest from the perspective of model-
building. Moreover, judicial data also provides anecdotal evidence helping us further understand the economics of
vote-buying campaigns. The pricing for a single vote suggested from my finding, for instance, is NT$ 500 per vote;
occasionally, NT$ 300, NT$ 600, NT$ 1000, NT$ 2000 and even higher price are observed as well.2 The reliability
of judicial data, however, hinges upon the judicial independence and prosecution bias.3 There was indeed a concern
that KMT nominees enjoyed the judicial favoritism for the vote-buying campaigns, while the favoritism has been
constrained by the democratization from the mid-1990s, and became less of an issue when the DPP, the biggest
opposition party since its founding in 1986 until 2000, won the presidential election in 2000 (Wang and Kurzman,
2007b; Schaffer, 2007a; Wu, 2012).
In this paper, I examine the causality between winning odds and vote-buying. Specifically, I ask the question:
are candidates driven to adopt vote-buy strategies when prospects of winning elections deteriorate? The causality
questions cast above involve endogeneity concern, hence precluding the identification.4 To illustrate the potential
endogeneity, note that for each candidate, the final election result is correlated with some factors that could be related
to the vote-buying decision but unobserved to econometricians. A candidate, for example, might evaluate the odds
of winning while taking into consideration the vote-buying strategy before announcing to run for a seat. To retrieve
the identification, the difference-in-differences method is exploited upon the group of incumbents to capture how the
vote-buying incentives vary with the changes in city council seats across five major cities in Taiwan. Furthermore,
observing that the impact from the seat changes exogenously shifted the odds to win a seat for each candidate, I
thus take advantage of this convenient instrumental variable to investigate whether the vote-buying practices could
be driven by the variation of winning chances over the whole population of candidates. However, some caution is
required in interpreting estimates in this setup, as challengers may choose not to run for elections with little cost
incurred after learning the seat variation, shifted exogenously though.
In Taiwan in 2010, eight cities and counties accounting for 60 percent of the entire population were merged and
upgraded to five special municipalities. Along with the merger event, the number of district seats was changed,
exogenously shifting the winning chances of candidates in the 2010 municipal elections. This policy intervention
thus allows us to investigate whether a candidate is incentivized to adopt vote-buying strategy when winning odds
deteriorate. The difference-in-differences estimate suggests that approximately 4 percent of incumbents seeking re-
election were driven to buy votes for every additional seat cut in a district. Since the same variation in district seats
exogenously shifted the winning odds for candidates in the given district, it further varied the effectiveness of vote-
2In 2010, the minimum wage in Taiwan is NT$ 95 per hour.
3Prosecutions capture the amount of vote buying with bias. As this paper focuses on the behavioral changes measured in terms of prosecutions,
the justice system following a consistent regime is necessary for identification, although prosecution bias is allowed.
4A similar identification issue has also been recognized in the context of campaign expenditures and electoral outcomes, as discussed in Giertz
and Sullivan (1977).
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buying. I then use it as the proxy for winning likelihood in order to capture the association between winning odds and
vote-buying. My estimate indicates that an individual candidate is 0.6 to 0.76 percent more likely to run a vote-buying
campaign for every 1 percent less confident he/she is about the chances of a win.
Results concerning the vote-buying incentive in this context relate to a broad literature on analyses of electoral
institutions, under which intraparty competition develops, which further contribute to candidates incentive on personal
vote cultivation accordingly (Katz, 1986; Cain, ferejohn, and Fiorina, 1987; Carey and Shugart, 1995; Myerson, 1993).
Where the intraparty competition is intense, the campaign for personal votes could be equally expensive (Cox and
Thies, 1998). Hence, under electoral systems in which intraparty competition is necessarily confronted, access to
finance is the key to building a successful campaign for the purpose of personal votes. This in turn greatly motivates
candidates to raise funds, possibly via illegal channels (Golden and Chang, 2001).
Single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system is identified as a typical candidate-centered electoral system, since
candidates under this electoral rule are likely to encounter intraparty competition; SNTV implemented in Taiwanese
municipal elections thus motivates candidates to compete for personal votes in electorates (Katz, 1985; Carey and
Shugart, 1995; Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen, 2005; Hicken, 2007, among others). Vote-buying, if feasible, could
be an attractive option for this purpose (Cox and Thies, 1998, p. 273). The evidence on the vote-buying driven by
the variation in district seats therefore complements the finding in Chang (2005), where he found that candidates were
induced to corruption when faced with uncertain prospects for victory, in order to finance campaigns for personal
votes.
The evidence on the vote-buying driven by seat variation implicitly points to the effectiveness of this practice,
under which the observed vote-buying is rationalized as an appealing strategy for candidates to secure the victory.
In this vein, this paper is closely related to Wu (2012). Also employing judicial data as the proxy for vote-buying
evidence, Wu (2012) estimated the effect of vote-buying campaigns on the performance of Congress candidates in
Taiwan, before and after the adoption of the new electoral rule, first-past-the-post system (FPTP), replacing the original
SNTV system. A significant statistical association between vote-buying and winning chances presented under SNTV
has been found to vanish in the case of FPTP. However, in the absence of appropriate identification strategy, the
causality between vote-buying and electoral results is not established in this context.
In addition to main findings, I also explore a question of policy implications: is it possible to locate the group of
candidates incentivized to adopt vote-buying most? To answer this question, I use the sample of incumbents seeking
re-election in 2010 with logit models that fit the vote-buying and election outcomes. A striking randomness in the
probability of winning elections is observed from the sharply rising sigmoid curve at margin. On the other hand,
my finding suggests that the vote-buying probability is peaked at the group of incumbents with within the range -0.5
percent to the margin, measured by the adjusted vote share proposed in this context. This piece of evidence points out
59
that the incumbents who were jostled out of, but not too far away from, the safe list by seat variation were the group
motivated most to win with the ride of illegal strategy. It is therefore somewhat surprising that the most incentivized
candidates are not those exactly at margin.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the historical background of the policy
intervention, the city (county) council electoral system, and vote-buying campaigns in Taiwan. Section 3 describes
data and sample selection. Section 4 lays out hypotheses and empirical strategies. All results are reported in Section
5 and discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2.2. Background
2.2.1. The Birth of Special Municipalities: the 2010 City-County Merger
The current system of administrative divisions in Taiwan consists of two parallel branches headed by the province
and the special municipality, both directly subject to the central government’s administration. Figure 2.1 displays the
administrative structure in Taiwan, where the two parallel branches of division are clearly illustrated. Before 2010,
there were only two special municipalities, Taipei City and Kaohsiung City, in existence. The City of Taipei was
granted as the special municipality by the central government in 1967, and Kaohsiung City was approved to become
the special municipality in 1979.
Over the past decades, economic development have greatly reshaped economic and demographic landscapes.
Several regional cities gradually developed to integrate the surrounding counties to form metropolises in northern,
central and southern Taiwan, which rendered the administrative divisions at the time inappropriate. Facing the growing
complexities in administrative governance, the city-county merger proposal had been voiced and widely debated
between political parties since the late twentieth century. However, there was no consensus reached upon the timing
and qualification threshold of the mergers until April 2009, the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, hereafter, KMT),
which just acquired the majority of seats in the Congress and won the presidency in the 2008 general election, pushed
through the amendments of the Local Government Act in the Congress, providing a legal guideline for the terms and
qualifications of forthcoming mergers.5
Accordingly, the majority government appointed an advisory committee in June 2009, reviewing the qualifications
of all seven merger applications from across eleven cities and counties, including two special municipalities. In
August 2009, five special municipalities involving eight cities and counties were approved. In the end, in northern
Taiwan, Taipei City remained as the special municipality, while its neighboring county, Taipei County, was upgraded
as another; in central Taiwan, Taichung City merged with Taichung County; in southern Taiwan, Tainan City merged
5Taiwan was ruled under the dictatorship of KMT until 1987. In 1986, the main opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was founded.
Since then, Taiwan has gradually developed to a two-party system.
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with Tainan County; Kaohsiung City and Kaohsiung County were consolidated. Figure 2.2 shows graphically how
the cities annexed the counties after the merger in 2010.
The municipal elections for the first batch of council members, the mayors and the village chiefs of all five special
municipalities were held altogether on November 27, 2010. The merger was effective on December 25, 2010. This
policy intervention marked an important milestone in the reforms of Taiwan’s administrative divisions; about 60
percent of the entire population lived in the five special municipalities.6
2.2.2. Electoral System
Single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system has been adopted in Taiwan to elect council members of special mu-
nicipalities, cities and counties. Under SNTV, each voter casts a single non-transferable vote for one’s first-choice
candidate in a multi-member district. SNTV is identified as a typical candidate-centered electoral system, since candi-
dates under this electoral rule are likely to encounter intraparty competition; candidates are thus motivated to cultivate
personal vote independent of party affiliations (Katz, 1985; Carey and Shugart, 1995; Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen,
2005; Hicken, 2007, among others).7 Vote-buying, if feasible, could be an attractive option for this purpose (Cox and
Thies, 1998, p. 273).
In Taiwan, the number of seats in a special municipality is prescribed by the Local Government Act, based on the
whole population and then apportioned in proportion to individual populations over electoral districts within it.8 This
rule applies to all cites and counties. Table 2.1 shows the seat changes before and after the 2010 city-county merger.
There were significant decreases of offices in central and southern Taiwan, while the offices in two northern cities,
where no merger was in effect, received only minor adjustments from the merger policy. Prior to the merger, the cities
and counties held elections in 2005; however, the existing special municipalities, Taipei City and Kaohsiung City, held
elections in 2006. Consequently, the terms of council members in counties and cities associated with mergers were
extended to 2010 such that the elections for all five special municipalities could be synchronized on the same date.9
It has been acknowledged in the literature that vote-buying incentives vary with district size. Cox (1987) noted that
the increase of district size as a result of reform bills in the nineteenth century eventually contributed to the fall of vote-
buying in Britain since it became costly and less effective. While the connection between vote-buying and district size
6In December 2010, the resident population in the five special municipalities was 13,811,835 as opposed to 23,162,123, the whole population
in Taiwan, based on the Monthly Bulletin of Interior Statistics, Department of Statistics, Ministry of the Interior, Taiwan.
7Cain, ferejohn, and Fiorina (1987, p. 9) defined the personal vote as the “portion of a candidate’s electoral support which originates in his or
her personal qualities, qualifications, activities, and record.”
8Chapter 3, Section 4, Subsection 1, Article 33. “The number of district councilors: The total number shall not exceed fifty-five (55) in special
municipalities where the total population minus the indigenous population is not more than two million (2,000,000); if the population exceeds two
million (2,000,000), the total number of district councilors shall not exceed sixty-two (62).” The apportionment algorithm employed in Taiwan is
essentially the Hamilton’s Apportionment Method.
9Chapter 5, Article 87-1. “Where a county/city is changed into a special municipality or where a county/city is merged with other special
municipalities or counties/cities into a special municipality, the change shall take effect on the day on which the term of the incumbent mayor of the
said special municipality expires. The terms of county/city councilors, county magistrates/mayors, townships /cities council members, township/city
mayors, and chief of villages shall be adjusted to expire on the day the change is to take effect, and no re-election shall take place.”
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cannot be characterized by a simple linear relationship, ceteris paribus, the principal-agent problem between buyers
and sellers deteriorates as the cost of monitoring voters’ choices rises with the increase of district size, thus rendering
it a less attractive option (Rigger, 2002; Lehoucq, 2007; Hicken, 2007; Stokes, 2007). Fortunately, the redistricting
was not involved in the 2010 merger event, which allows the analyses to focus on the change of vote-buying incentive
purely driven by the seat variation.
2.2.3. Vote-Buying in Taiwan
Vote-buying in Taiwan has been documented as early as 1950s in the ethnographic literature. In the field research
conducted in a village of central Taiwan in 1957-1958, Gallin (1966) put: “In general, the villagers consider elections
unimportant, and candidates on all levels often buy votes. A few packs of cigarettes or some bath towels and soap
may be all that is needed to secure someone’s vote.” Along this line of research, vote-buying has also been reported
as an integral part of Taiwanese politics in the subsequent field studies; see Crissman (1981) for the fieldwork during
1967-1968, Jacobs (1980) in 1972, Bosco (1992) in 1985, and Wang and Kurzman (2007a,b) in 1993.
Moreover, surveys conducted in the 1990s suggest that at least a quarter to a half of respondents residing in major
cities have sold their votes in the most recent election (Wang and Kurzman, 2007b). According to the collected judicial
documents, the proportions of candidates who were prosecuted by justice system are 9.4 percent in 2005, 12.1 percent
in 2006, and 12 percent in 2010, respectively. These estimates are nevertheless likely to be underestimated, a common
problem in most crime data.
There is a long and amusing list of material inducements offered by candidates in election campaigns. From my
data, a commonly observed but not exhaustive list includes blankets, clothes, food, free raffle tickets, luncheon or
dinner parties, soaps, tea, tourist trips, and wine. Regarding the cash priced for a single vote, the finding suggests NT$
500 per vote is the widely practiced pricing in campaigns; occasionally, NT$ 300, NT$ 600, NT$ 1000, NT$ 2000
and even higher prices are observed as well. By contrast, prices documented in the literature are as follows: NT$ 10
to NT$ 100 per vote up to the competitiveness of elections in the context of Crissman (1981), NT$ 30 to NT$ 100 in
Jacobs (1980), NT$ 200 to NT$ 600 during 1985-1990 indicated in Bosco (1992), and NT$ 300 to NT$ 500 in Wang
and Kurzman (2007b).10 It seems that the price has reached an equilibrium over years for the most part.11
Since the ultimate goal of vote-buying is to win elections, a natural question to ask is how much a well-organized
vote-buying campaign shall spend in order to secure a seat? In a township Wang and Kurzman (2007a,b) conducted
field works, a KMT campaign bought about 67 percent of eligible voters (14,090 votes) for NT$ 300 per vote in
10A convenient reference is the yearly exchange rate. From 1961 to 1970, the average yearly exchange rate is 1 U.S. dollar to 40 Taiwanese
dollar, 37.92 from 1971 to 1980, 34.71 from 1981 to 1990, 28.44 from 1991 to 2000, and 33 from 2001 to 2010. As another useful reference, the
minimum wage is NT$ 20 per day in 1968, NT$ 80 per day in 1978, NT$ 271 per day in 1988, NT$ 64 per hour in 1998, and NT$ 95 per hour in
2008.
11Bosco (1992) mentioned the price for a last minute vote could rise to NT$ 1,000.
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the 1993 county mayor election. Taking into consideration the 10% commission for vote brokers and performance
bonuses rewarding campaign staffs, Schaffer (2007a) estimated the total vote-buying expenditure spent in a single
township to be about NT$ 5.2 million in this case. The vote-buying spending differs in the level of elections; running
for a seat in Congress, for example, might easily cost a candidate NT$ 100 million (Schaffer, 2007b).
Under the secret ballot, the effectiveness of vote-buying is severely weakened since it is difficult, if not impossible,
to monitor voters’ decisions in this scenario. Hence, the commitment problem arising from the secret ballot would
arguably drive vote-buying away. Nevertheless, it is empirically observed that vote-buying thrives with the secret
ballot, such as the case of Taiwan. Stokes (2005) suggested that, taking the Argentine Peronist party as the example,
parties could resolve this issue by inserting into voters’ social networks, and vote-buying is most effective by targeting
weakly opposed voters. As another plausible explanation, Nichter (2008) proposed the “turnout buying”, which targets
nonvoting supporters and only requires monitoring voters’ turnout but not decisions. However different in terms of
underlying mechanisms, both hypotheses rely on the assumption that a vote-buying campaign is knowledgeable about
the targeted voters, particularly their standing on the political spectrum. This point has also been addressed in the
context of Finan and Schechter (2012).
In Taiwan, the local factions serve this purpose well. The connection between local factions and vote-buying
has been established in a strand of field research (Jacobs, 1980; Crissman, 1981; Bosco, 1992; Wang and Kurzman,
2007a,b). Bosco (1992) described the local factions in Taiwan as groups “held together not by common ideology
or class but by social ties (kin, patron-client, friend, etc.) forming a chain of dyadic relationships linking leaders
to voters.” The local factions develop at the county and township level, and continue to exist after the deaths of
leaders (Bosco, 1992). In a detailed account of the implementation of a vote-buying campaign, Wang and Kurzman
(2007a,b) mentioned brokers as an essential role to vote-buying. First, as the intermediary between campaigns and
voters, brokers must be reliable to avoid risks of crime investigations and principal-agent problem. Hence, a strong
social ties linking the vote-buying campaign to brokers is necessary. Second, the relations between brokers and voters
are the key to the success of vote-buying mobilization. In general, drawing from their conclusion, a successful vote-
buying campaign shall be equipped with a strong social relations smoothly stretching over from campaigns to voters
via brokers, and local factions are good sources for credible brokers.
2.3. Data and Sample Selection
2.3.1. Data and Variable Construction
The data collected for the empirical investigation come from two sources: the Central Election Commission of Taiwan
and the Laws and Regulations Retrieving System (2013). The standard candidate profiles including age, gender,
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incumbency status, the nominee’s party affiliation, as well as municipal election results in the election year 2005,
2006, and 2010, are available from the database of Central Election Commission of Taiwan. The education levels of
candidates, however, are not documented in the database. I then resorted to the electoral bulletin of each election,
where the self-reported education levels of candidates are published. Missing self-reported levels of education are
an issue. I thus categorize the education levels by considering three binary variables according to the self-reported
data as follows: missing values, below or equal to secondary education, post-secondary education, respectively. There
are 1,342 observations in the sample collection.12 Since the same candidate might seek re-election in 2010, the
sample consists of 950 individual candidates. Table 2.2 lists summary statistics of variables used for the empirical
investigation.
The variable that connects the vote-buying evidence to candidates was constructed based on the district prosecu-
tors’ decisions on whether to charge or not. It is important to understand the criteria upon which investigations relied,
whereas it is not clearly defined by law. Legally, the act of vote-buying is loosely defined to include a broad class of
typical electoral activities which can be suspected violations of law.13 While the law aims to deter vote-buying, this
design comes at the expense of efficiency by scattering investigation force unduly. It also raises concerns about the
inconsistency of law enforcement across jurisdictions. To avoid the undesirable consequences, practically, therefore,
the justice system follows the NT$ 30 per vote (roughly, $1 U.S.) threshold to draw the line on whether or not to
launch an investigation.14
Records of the criminal prosecution are by no means public information, but all cases, once prosecuted, shall
be proceeded to district courts and filed after trials. Therefore, I could trace back all prosecution records from the
judgment documents of district courts, available in the Laws and Regulations Retrieving System (2013), an open
source archive of court files. To recover the identity of candidates, I read exhaustively all judgments related to vote-
buying charges. When candidates’ identities were not disclosed in the documents, I cross-referenced key words
associated with the candidates to infer the identities.15 Specifically, the district number, candidate number assigned
on the ballot, the address of campaign headquarter, etc., were used whenever disclosed in the judgments. In the end, I
was able to successfully identify all candidates with this strategy. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the construction
of vote-buyer in this manner would include the scenario in which vote-buying was conducted by others on behalf of
candidates.
12One candidate who participated both elections before and after the merger switched to another district after failing to be elected in 2005
municipal election. I drop this candidate from the sample since it causes difficulty in measuring the impact of seat changes on the vote-buying
incentive of this candidate.
13Criminal code. Part 2, Chapter 6, Article 143. “A qualified voter who demands, agrees to accept, or accepts a bribe or other improper benefits
for refraining from exercising his right to vote or for exercising such right in a particular manner shall be sentenced to imprisonment....”
Article 144. “A person who promises, offers, or gives a bribe or other improper benefits to a qualified voter for refraining from exercising the
right to vote or for exercising such right in a particular manner shall be sentenced to imprisonment....”
14As documented in the newspaper Taipei Times, “The justice ministry plans to investigate any politician who gives away campaign paraphernalia
worth more than NT$30-saying such gifts could constitute vote buying.”(Chuang, 2001, October 6)
15The name of natural person are required to be disclosed since November 26, 2010 in accordance with the Court Organic Act, while it is not
retroactive.
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Grouping the sample year 2005 and 2006 together as the prior to merger observations and the sample year 2010
as the post merger ones, Figure 2.3 displays the vote-buying charges as opposed to the number of candidates in each
city or county before and after the merger. It is of interest to observe that the candidate number dropped dramatically
in all merged cities and counties after the merger, while the number of vote-buying charges largely stayed flat; the two
cities in northern Taiwan, upgraded as the special municipalities without the merger in play, both experienced a slight
decline in the number candidates and charges.
A caveat on the interpretation of vote-buying variable in this context deserves a discussion. Essentially, the vote-
buying behaviors were revealed by the criminal charges, and this way of constructing the vote-buying variable im-
plicitly assumes that the prosecution mechanism performed the criminal investigations with, if any, random errors,
an assumption that may not be innocuous. It hence assumes away the sample selection generated from the justice
system. Arguably, it is plausible that incumbents are more likely to avoid criminal probes because they are shielded
by their political connections. Nevertheless, if this is the case, then the estimate from difference-in-differences exam-
ining incumbents’ vote-buying decisions is likely to be underestimated. Hence, a significant difference-in-differences
estimate is evident to suggest the incentives of vote-buying was indeed driven by the seat variation.
There was indeed a concern that KMT nominees enjoyed the judicial favoritism for the vote-buying campaigns,
while the favoritism has been constrained by the democratization from the mid-1990s, and became less of an issue
when the DPP, the biggest opposition party since its founding in 1986 until 2000, won the presidential election in 2000
(Wang and Kurzman, 2007b; Schaffer, 2007a; Wu, 2012).
2.3.2. Sample Selection Issue
Even though the change of seats is plausibly exogenous, it does not necessarily expel the endogeneity that complicates
the data. In Figure 2.4, the sample is divided into two groups: treatment 1, in which candidates were in the districts
where seats increased or remained unchanged after the merger, and treatment 2 otherwise. It can be observed that the
tendency of vote-buying for candidates in treatment 1 declined on average and candidates in treatment 2 behaved in
the opposite direction, while the 95 percent confidence intervals in both treatment groups fails to reject that candidates
behaved similarly in two elections separated by the merger. This evidence could point toward the sign of endogeneity.
Especially, the challengers took into consideration the number of offices when making the entry decision.
An ideal research design would compare groups of all things being equal but receiving treatments varying exoge-
nously. By treatment, I mean the change of seats in a candidate’s electoral district as a result of the mergers. I then
turn the focus to those candidates seeking to run for re-election. It is tempting to dismiss the possibility that candidates
seeking re-election consists of a sample exempted from endogeneity, as the decision to re-elect the office, again, is a
decision after careful calculations. Particularly, the underlying incentive leading to dropouts is of the major concern.
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The dropout rate in the sample is about 16 percent, or in other words, 84 percent of incumbents continued to seek
new terms: there were 334 council members seeking re-election in 2010, out of 397 winners in 2005 or 2006; hence,
there were 63 councilors who withdrew from re-election race in 2010, which introduces the potential sample selection
problem.
Table 2.4 lists the dropout ratios of three municipal elections in the data. There were 80 percent of incumbents
seeking re-elections in 2005, and 87 percent in 2006, comparable to the ratio in 2010. To be rigorous, a data analysis is
performed to probe what could cause dropouts in 2010. I use OLS models to examine all 397 elected council members’
participation decisions on 2010 re-election. The estimates in Table 2.5 indicate that senior candidates are more likely
to re-elect, whereas this inclination decreases as age increases. Thus, the age of candidates could discourage them
from extending political career as councilors. In addition, the adjusted candidates’ vote share in 2005 or 2006 is
suggested to play a critical role in dropouts. For each candidate in a given district, to construct the adjusted vote share,
I first pin down the district’s council member seats in 2010, say n. I then compute each candidate’s adjusted vote share
by taking the difference between vote shares of any given candidate and that of the nth candidate ranked by the vote
share of the district in 2005 or 2006. A negative adjusted vote share implies both that there will be a reduction of seats
in a district in 2010 and that the candidate would be likely to fall below the threshold to win a seat using the previous
election result as the baseline. The negative and significant coefficient relating adjusted vote share to dropouts seems
reasonable to draw a conclusion that candidates less likely to win chose to withdraw in 2010. Consistent with the
discussion, the panel (a) of Figure 2.5 shows that about 70 percent of dropouts have adjusted vote share below zero.
On the other hand, excluding the 64 dropouts, the candidates seeking re-election in 2010 and the whole population of
397 elected council members remains largely to share a similar distribution in adjusted vote share, suggested from the
panel (b) of Figure 2.5.
As the sample selection problem has been pointed out, it is necessary to see the extent to which it could bias the
inference. I further explore the detailed causes of dropouts. A survey over the press reporting the details of candidates’
withdrawal has been conducted. Among the 63 dropouts, 5 were attributed to death due to accidents or diseases; 7
changed career to public-service positions or ran for Congress office; 12 were disqualified from office by law after
criminal convictions;16 16 failed the primaries during party’s nomination process; 6 sent family members to run for
election; 17 withdrew with no explanations specified.17
The empirical findings suggest the association between the age and the strength of candidates and the dropouts,
including those candidates whose motivations I could not identify. Since this paper aims to investigate how candidates
were incentivized to adopt vote-buying strategy in response to the shift of election odds resulting from seats variation,
165 dropouts were related to the vote-buying charges for the election held in 2005 or 2006.
17There was either no news report covered or the press only reported the candidate’s announcement not to seek a new term with no further reason
mentioned. I instead found that some of them called upon supporters to cast votes to specific candidates while announcing not to re-elect in 2010.
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a concern would arise if the selecting-out mechanism works against the direction of exogenous treatment. It is unlikely
to fit evidence in this context, however. The survey attributes about 20 percent of the dropouts to exogenous reasons.
Furthermore, at least one-fourth of the dropouts who lost party’s nomination were replaced by their parties with
equally capable nominees, if not better, in terms of the strength to win elections, especially in districts where seats
decrease. It should be noted that the change in winning odds due to the seat reduction may have differentially affected
the decisions of incumbents and challengers to stand for re-election.
2.4. Hypotheses and Estimation strategies
This section first presents the hypotheses. I then discuss the identification strategies for the estimates of interest built
on the hypotheses.
2.4.1. Hypotheses
Consider an incomplete information game as follows. A district d has nd candidates running for sd seats. Let Nd =
{1, . . . ,nd} represent the set of candidates. To simplify notation, the district subscript d will be suppressed unless
necessary for clarity. The candidates who are elected receive a benefit u from holding a seat, assumed to be the same
for all candidates. The cost of running the election is negligible. Each candidate i∈N has a type θi which is his private
information. The types are drawn from an atomless distribution function F on [θ, θ¯]n. It is possible, although illegal,
to pay people to vote for a candidate. The cost of doing so is relatively small and hence ignored. Let si be an indicator
function equal to 1 if candidate i buys votes, and 0 otherwise. I define another indicator function w(si,s−i,θ) equal to
1 if candidate i is elected and 0 otherwise, where s−i = (s1, . . . ,si−1,si+1, . . . ,sn) and θ = (θ1, . . . ,θn). Assume that
buying votes does not reduce the number of votes a candidate receives and, consequently, w(1,s−i,θ) ≥ w(0,s−i,θ)
for all s−i and for every θ. The effect of vote-buying on the outcome of the election depends on the type of the
candidate who uses this expedient. Formally, the following condition holds for the function w(si,s−i,θ):
Assumption 9. The indicator function w(si,s−i,θ) satisfies increasing differences in (si,θi) for every s−i and θ−i.
I.e. for any θ,θ′ ∈ [θ, θ¯] with θ′ > θ we have
w(1,s−i,θ′,θ)−w(0,s−i,θ′,θ)≥ w(1,s−i,θ,θ)−w(0,s−i,θ,θ).
Notice that given the strategy s−i of the other candidates and types (θi,θ−i) the difference w(1,s−i,θi,θ)−
w(0,s−i,θi,θ) is either equal to 0, if vote-buying cannot change the outcome of the election for candidate i, or 1
if vote-buying gets elected candidate i who otherwise would lose. Assumption 9 implies that if candidate i with type
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θi is elected with the aid of vote-buying while he would not have been elected without it, then (i) without vote-buying
a higher type of candidate i would not be elected, but (ii) vote-buying causes a higher type candidate to be elected.
Hence, both the necessity and the effectiveness of vote-buying are non-decreasing in the type of the candidate.
For each candidate, there is a chance of being prosecuted for vote-buying; assume for convenience that a candidate
will receive zero utility in case of conviction. The probability of being convicted for vote-buying as a function of the
candidate’s type, ρ, satisfies the conditions in Assumption 10.18
Assumption 10. The function ρ(·) is continuous with ρ(θ)→ 1 as θ→ θ, ρ(θ)→ 0 as θ→ θ¯, and ρ′(θ)< 0, ρ′′(θ)> 0
for all θ.
A strategy for candidate i in the election is a decision rule si, function of θi, that determines whether candidate
i will buy votes. The probability of candidate i winning the election, given a profile of strategies s−i(·) of the other
candidates, is
W (si,θi;s−i(·)) =
∫
θ−i
w(si,s−i(θ−i),θ) f (θ−i|θi)dθ−i.
Assume that the expectation above exists and is finite for any increasing strategy s−i. Note that an increasing
strategy in this case can be described by a cutoff such that the candidate buys votes if and only if his type is greater
than the cutoff. Assumption 9 implies W (si,θi;s−i(·)) satisfies increasing differences for a given profile of strategies
s−i of the other candidates. This result is stated as the following lemma.
Lemma D5. The probability of candidate i∈N being elected given the profile of strategies s−i of the other candidates,
W (si,θi;s−i(·)), satisfies increasing differences in (si,θi).
The solution concept used here is the Bayes-Nash equilibrium and I focus on symmetric equilibria. The expected
payoff to candidate i is
U(si,θi;s−i(·)) = u(1− siρ(θi))W (si,θi;s−i(·)).
Next I state and prove a proposition describing a symmetric equilibrium in which the candidates adopt a cutoff to
determine whether they will buy votes.
Proposition 1. Assume that W (0,θi;s−i(·)) is bounded away from zero for all types θi ∈ [θ, θ¯] and for every profile of
strategies s−i of the other candidates. There exists a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which the candidates use
a cutoff θ∗ ∈ [θ, θ¯] such that candidate i buys votes if and only if θi ≥ θ∗.
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that the cutoff in a given district might differ with variation of the effectiveness of vote-buying and the
probability of prosecution. Given the prosecution probability, an upward (downward) shift of the effectiveness of
18The conviction rate is the product of conditional probability of conviction on being prosecuted and the prosecution rate.
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vote-buying shall reduce (increase) the cutoff type θ∗. Thus, as the electoral competition has been (less) intensified
by the seat changes from an exogenous intervention, vote-buying becomes an (less) attractive strategy to capture the
marginal votes for victory. On the other hand, given the effectiveness of vote-buying, the variation of prosecution
probability will affect the cutoff in the opposite direction. By examining the election outcomes of candidates whose
vote-buying decisions were driven by the variation of prosecution probability, it then allows us to trace the effectiveness
of vote-buying strategy. As a result, two testable hypotheses are then stated as follows:
H1: Candidates’ vote-buying incentives vary when district seats are shifted by exogenous intervention. Specifi-
cally, candidates are driven to buy votes as the number of seats in their districts has been reduced.
H2: Vote-buying is an effective election campaign. Namely, for candidates adopting vote-buying strategies, vote-
buying does enhance their chances of winning.
Note, however, that in the absence of exogenous shifter of prosecution probability, H2 is not identified and tested
in this paper.
2.4.2. Estimation Strategies
I now discuss the identification strategies employed to conduct the empirical investigations. The difference-in-
differences method is exploited to capture how the vote-buying incentives vary with the changes in city council seats
across five major cities in Taiwan. Furthermore, observing that the impact from the seat changes exogenously shifted
the odds to win a seat for each candidate, I thus take advantage of this convenient instrumental variable to investigate
to what extent the vote-buying practices is driven by the variation of chances of winning.
Identification Strategy: Difference-in-Differences Estimator
I first consider the difference-in-differences strategy to capture the changes of candidates’ vote-buying incentive among
districts subject to various levels of seat changes, before and after the city-county merger. As discussed in Section 2,
prior to the policy intervention, the cities/counties and the two existing special municipalities held elections in 2005
and 2006, respectively. I then refer to both 2005 city/county elections and 2006 special municipality elections as the
“pre-merger” events and refer to the 2010 special municipalities elections as the “post-merger” events. The model
specification is given as follows:
Vbidt =β∆Seat ×∆Seatd +βPM×PostMergert +βCN×CandidateNumberdt
+δ×∆Seatd×PostMergert +X ′idt × γ+αd + ε1idt , (2.1)
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where i indexes candidates, d indexes electoral districts, t indexes election years 2005, 2006 and 2010; Vbidt is a binary
variable denoting the candidate i who ran for a seat in electoral district d in year t and was associated with any charge
of vote-buying, in which i was not necessarily involved. To be more specific, any other person who was charged with
buying votes on behalf of candidate i is considered sufficient evidence pointing towards i’s intent, under which the
value of Vbidt is treated as one in this paper; ∆Seatd computes the difference in seats in the electoral district d from the
pre- to post-merger elections, that is, Seatdt−1−Seatdt ; PostMergert is the indicator variable which classifies the year
t elections into pre- or post-merger event. Specifically, PostMergert takes the value one for the 2010 municipalities
elections and zero otherwise; CandidateNumberdt denotes the total number of candidates running for seats in electoral
district d in year t; Xidt includes all relevant controls at the individual and district levels; αd denotes district fixed
effects; ε1idt is the idiosyncratic error.
The main parameter of interest in this context is δ, the difference-in-differences estimate, which gauges the differ-
ences in vote-buying decisions incentivized by seat changes across districts between two consecutive elections. It is
straightforward to see that the difference-in-differences estimate can be written as, for any integer k,
δ={E(Vbidt |∆Seatd = k,PostMergert = 1)−E(Vbidt |∆Seatd = k,PostMergert = 0)}
−{E(Vbidt |∆Seatd = k−1,PostMergert = 1)−E(Vbidt |∆Seatd = k−1,PostMergert = 0)}.
Hence, δ estimates the changes of vote-buying behaviors driven by the marginal differential in seats.
Instrumental Variables Strategies
Notice that the CandidateNumberdt in the specification (2.1) is potentially endogenous, since the number of candidates
in a given district and the individual decision on whether to adopt the vote-buying strategy might be both linked to
some common unobserved factor.
To retrieve the identification, Seatdt , the number of seats in the electoral district d in the election year t, is then
applied as the instrumental variable. There are two good reasons justifying the use of the number of seats for the
identification strategy. Determined exogenously by the administrative agency, the number of seats is not among the
choice variables of any candidate. Moreover, varied by the city-county merger, Seatdt serves as an exogenous shifter
on the winning odds across districts, which affects individuals’ decisions on the entry of elections.
Along this line of reasoning, I also examine whether the chance of being elected could contribute to the vote-buying
incentives with similar identification strategy. Formally, I specify the model as:
Vbidt = βElected×Electedidt +X ′idt × γ+αd +µt + ε2idt , (2.2)
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where Electedidt is the indicator variable with the value one if the candidate i won the election of electoral district d in
year t, and zero otherwise; all individual relevant, district relevant, or individual-district relevant controls are included
in Xidt ; district fixed effects are denoted by αd ; year fixed effects are denoted as µt ; ε2idt is the idiosyncratic error.
For each candidate, the final election result is not surprisingly correlated with some factors that could be potentially
related to the vote-buying decision but unobserved to econometricians. A candidate, for example, might evaluate
the odds of winning while taking into consideration the vote-buying strategy before announcing to run for a seat. I
therefore consider two variables to instrument Electedidt . First, the winning odds shifter, ∆Seatdt , is used. Additionally,
to account for the heterogeneity across individual winning odds, the interaction term between adjusted vote share and
∆Seatdt is employed for incumbents, while zero is assigned to entrants.
2.5. Findings
2.5.1. Difference-in-Differences Estimates
I first conduct the difference-in-differences estimation to examine the hypothesis H1 by exploiting the exogenous city-
county merger. The first two columns of Table 2.6 present two-stage least squares estimates of equation (2.1), where
the sample consisting of 334 incumbent council members seeking re-election in 2010 are used for the estimation. Of
the particular interest is the coefficient on ∆Seatd ×PostMergert , measuring the extent to which candidates were in-
centivized to adopt vote-buying by seat variation. The estimates suggest that the proportion of vote-buying candidates
grow by 4.4 percent for every cut of district seat. The results are robust across all specifications where location, city,
or district fixed effects are included.
In an unreported result, I increase observations by joining candidates who were not incumbents but participated
consecutive elections. There were 59 candidates in the sample who lost the election in 2005 or 2006, but moved on
to seek office in 2010.19 It is justified to think of their participation in 2010 race as sensibly irrelevant to the seat
variation, judging from the fact that above 80 percent of them fell within 5 percent range below zero in adjusted
vote share, signaling that they were on the verge of winning the 2005 or 2006 election. It implies that vote shares of
these candidates could be even closer to the threshold in the previous election for those in districts later experienced
seat cuts in 2010, as the adjusted vote share is computed by incorporating the information of seat variation. Hence,
their decisions on running 2010 election were most likely driven by the previous election results, rather than the seat
changes. The two-stage least squares estimation yields similar results in terms of magnitude and statistical significance
of coefficients.
19One candidate is dropped from the estimation since the candidate switched to another district in the 2010 election.
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2.5.2. The Effect of Winning Chances on Vote-Buying
The left panel of Table 2.7 reports the ordinary least squares estimates of equation (2.2). The coefficient on the
indicator variable for winning election is not statistically significant, suggesting the endogeneity concerning the link
between winning odds and vote-buying. Alternatively, the same exogenous variation can be employed to estimate the
extent to which vote-buying hinges on the odds of winning. The change in seats is used to serve as the proxy for an
objective winning odds evaluation. The two-stage least squares estimation results of equation (2.2) are presented in
the right panel of Table 2.7. The coefficient on the instrumented indicator variable for winning election, serving as
the proxy of winning chances driven by the seat variation, is negative and statistically significant. Columns (1) and
(2) show results using specifications with no year fixed effects. The estimate in column (1) indicates that candidates
were about 0.68 percentage point more willing to take a risk of vote-buying for every 1 percent decrease of chances
to win, while a higher estimate, about 0.76 percentage point, is reported in column (2) when the district dummies
are included. The suggested tradeoff between vote-buying and the winning chances shows that candidates took into
consideration the risk of vote-buying while making decisions. Columns (3) and (4) present the estimates when models
control for year dummies. Estimates are observed consistent with results in the first two columns, while the magnitude
of coefficients slightly shrinks.
Lastly, I now turn to ask a question of policy implications: is it possible to locate the group of candidates incen-
tivized to adopt vote-buying the most? To answer this question, I use the sample of incumbents seeking re-election
in 2010 with logit models to fit the vote-buying and election outcomes given the specification (2.2) and a similar
model where indicator variables for vote-buying and winning election are reversed20, while the instrumental variable
strategies are not applied since the primary objective is the fit, instead of identification, of the vote-buying and election
outcomes . I also control for the adjusted vote share along with its square and cube, variables incorporating infor-
mation of exogenous seat variation. Panel (a) of Figure 2.6 plots the predicted probability of being elected against
the adjusted vote share, where the red line is connected from the locally linear regression estimates at each point of
the adjusted vote share. A striking randomness in the probability of winning elections is observed from the sharply
rising sigmoid curve around the value of zero in adjusted vote share. On the other hand, the plot of the predicted
vote-buying against the adjusted vote share is shown in Panel (b), where the locally linear regression line suggests
that the vote-buying practice is peaked at the group of incumbents with the adjusted vote share within the range -0.5
percent to zero. This piece of evidence points out that the incumbents who were just jostled out of the “safe list” by
seat variation were the group motivated most to win with the ride of illegal strategy. It is therefore somewhat surprising
20That is, I consider the following specification to model the electoral results.
Electedidt = βV b×Vbidt +X ′idt × γ+µt + ε3idt , (2.3)
where all variables are defined as in equation (2.2).
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that the most incentivized candidates are not those exactly at margin.
2.6. Discussion
Thus far, this paper has examined the hypothesis H1 stated in Section 2.4. It hence establishes the causal link between
winning chances and vote-buying. To identify the causality from winning chances to vote-buying, the difference-
in-differences estimates in Table 2.6 measure the change of an incumbent’s vote-buying decision in response to the
exogenous variation of district seats. For every cut of seat in a district, I find that an incumbent is 4.4 to 4.7 percent
more likely to practice vote-buying. Since the same variation in district seats exogenously shifted the winning odds for
candidates in the given district, it further varied the effectiveness of vote-buying. I then exploit it as the instrumental
variable for winning likelihood in order to capture the causality between winning odds and vote-buying. The estimate
in Table 2.7 indicates that a candidate is more likely by 0.6 to 0.76 percent to launch a vote-buying campaign for every
1 percent less confident about the chances to win. This result is consistent with the hypothesis H1, where it is argued
that the equilibrium vote-buying decision rule differs with the effectiveness of vote-buying. As the effectiveness of
vote-buying increases (decreases) in terms of winning elections, a lower (higher) cutoff decision rule for vote-buying
responds correspondingly. Therefore, the results could be interpreted as the estimates of the cutoff varied with respect
to the shift of effectiveness of vote-buying.
Results concerning the vote-buying incentive in this context relate to a broad literature on electoral institutions
under which voters, candidates and parties interact strategically in accordance. Katz (1986) argued that intraparty
competition arises in electoral systems where intraparty preference voting plays a role. In this case, candidates are
motivated to compete with copartisans for preference votes through which intraparty preference is revealed. He
contrasted across democracies the electoral systems encouraging intraparty preference voting; examples provided are
open-list proportional representation (PR) in Italy, primaries in the United States, and SNTV in pre-1994 Japan, among
others. Cain, ferejohn, and Fiorina (1987) proposed the concept of personal votes, of which importance significantly
shapes the behavior of politicians interacting with parties and electorates. Along this line of reasoning, Carey and
Shugart (1995) suggested that incentives for candidates to pursue personal votes largely hinge upon institutional
structure where intraparty preference voting is designed, which further characterizes the intraparty competition. A
similar argument has been contended in Myerson (1993).
Where the intraparty competition is intense, the campaign for personal votes could be equally expensive. Exam-
ining pre-1994 Japan under SNTV, Cox and Thies (1998) established the link between intraparty competition and
campaign spending. Service-based differentiation, pointed out in the paper, could serve as one of feasible strategies
for candidates to fight against the intraparty competition. Delivered to electorate personally, it may take the form
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of pork-barrel programs or direct private benefits such as gifts or personal favors. The latter has been argued as the
primary reason that fuels the campaign spending as tensions of intraparty competition rise.
Hence, under electoral systems in which intraparty competition is necessarily confronted, access to finance is the
key to building a successful campaign for the purpose of personal votes. This in turn greatly motivates candidates to
raise funds, possibly via illegal channels. Golden and Chang (2001) examined the political corruption in postwar Italy
under open-list PR. They demonstrated the connection of political corruption and intraparty competition, arguing that
corruption driven by intraparty competition serves as an important illicit source for personal-vote campaign finance.
Following similar lines, Chang (2005) further investigated the linkage between corruption and uncertainty about the
winning odds, where they found that candidates were induced to commit corruption by the level of uncertainty about
the winning chances, in order to finance campaigns for personal votes. The validity of their argument lies in the
assumption that personal votes are critical to winning elections. The postwar Italy under open-list PR, employed
therein, fits into the framework.
As suggested by prior studies, SNTV implemented in Taiwanese municipal elections thus motivates candidates to
compete for personal votes in electorates. In addition, vote-buying as the personal votes seeking strategy has been
observed in pre-1994 Japan under SNTV system (Cox and Thies, 1998). The evidence on the vote-buying driven by
the variation in district seats therefore complements the finding in Chang (2005). Although analyses in this context
only consider the impact arising from the overall competitiveness as the result of exogenous variation, to some extent it
suggests the link between vote-buying and intraparty competition. Table 2.6 points out that DPP incumbents were less
reliant upon the vote-buying campaigns, while Table 2.7 shows that KMT nominees were significantly associated with
the vote-buying practices. Observe from Table 2.2 that, on average, KMT nominated more candidates than did DPP.
Together, it seems that a higher level of intraparty competition storming inside KMT links to vote-buying campaigns.
Still, this evidence might be driven from the fact that DPP candidates have relatively poor access to finance vote-
buying campaigns, a key concern that could deter candidates from developing candidate-centered strategies, even in
an electoral system fostering personal votes (Samuels, 1999).
In this context, evidence from the collection of judicial judgments linking vote-buying campaigns to candidates
suggests the causality leading from vote-buying to winning chances; that is, the effectiveness of vote-buying as a
strategy to secure votes from the perspective of candidates. The literature on the effectiveness of vote-buying has
largely focused on the mechanism under which the contract, offered by politicians in exchange for political support
from voters, is enforceable. In the redistributive democratic politics, the political exchange between politicians and
voters encounters two-sided commitment problem (Robinson and Verdier, 2013). To resolve this issue, they argued
that offers of employment in public sectors, performed as clientelism, would be a credible solution. Empirically, this
view is corroborated by Wantchekon (2003) with a randomized field experiment conducted in Benin. However, vote-
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buying, the political trading settled prior to the election and also a special case of redistribution, continues to carry
over the commitment issue arising from vote sellers under the secret ballot system.
An important body of theoretical research has thus been developed to study the mechanism that binds the political
exchange in the scenario of ballot secrecy (Stokes, 2005; Dal Bo´, 2007; Nichter, 2008; Morgan and Va´rdy, 2012). In
the attempt to assess the competing hypotheses, a related stream of empirical literature examines association between
vote-buying campaigns and the electoral feedbacks from targeted voters in the context of developing democracies.
Drawing from a set of observational data in the context of Argentina, a strand of literature reaches consensus on
the notable vote-buying practices (Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes, 2004; Stokes, 2005; Nichter, 2008), while views
proposed therein differ in the enforcement mechanism validating the credibility of exchange. Brusco, Nazareno, and
Stokes (2004) characterized the typical targets of vote-buying campaign as the class of voters with low income. They
then argued that the political machine could leverage the constructed social networks, penetrating the lower class
extensively, to accurately monitor the actual decisions of targeted voters. The social networks as the enforcement
mechanism has also been supported in Stokes (2005), who further suggested that vote-buying is most effective by
targeting weakly opposed voters. Alternatively, Nichter (2008) showed with evidence that, by targeting nonvoting
supporters, the political machine bypassed the commitment concern as this devise only requires monitoring turnout
but not decisions.
Nevertheless, given that vote-buying is a well acknowledged felony almost everywhere, respondents may not
reveal truth in the survey. Consequently, biases incurred in this scenario could contaminate prior studies built on the
observational data. Gonzalez-Ocantos, de Jonge, Mele´ndez, Osorio, and Nickerson (2011) proposed the use of list
experiments to correct the potential bias of concern. Their findings pointed toward Stokes (2005). On the other hand,
reciprocity has been argued to serve as the institution that binds the contract of vote-buying. Incorporating laboratory
experimental data into survey-based analysis, Finan and Schechter (2012) suggested that it is exactly the reciprocal
voters targeted by vote-buying campaigns in Paraguay. This is achieved relying upon brokers’ knowledge.
Quantitatively, to capture the effectiveness of vote-buying campaigns with respect to electoral performance, in a
field experiment implemented in Sao Tome and Principe, Vicente (2014) randomized the anti-vote-buying campaign
across census areas. The finding suggests that voter turnout was decreased by 3 to 6 percentage points by the anti-vote-
buying campaign. This evidence therefore implicitly infers how vote-buying shifted the electoral outcomes in terms of
magnitude, using the anti-vote-buying campaign as the exogenous variation. Note, however, that the aforementioned
studies interpret the effectiveness of vote-buying as the shift of electoral behavior, for example turnout, driven by the
vote-buying campaign, whereas studies employing data from the collection of judicial judgments differs in this regard
by exploring, from the perspective of candidates, the extent to which winning chances would be improved once the
campaign is exploited. Using judicial data to capture vote-buying, Wu (2012) estimated the effect of vote-buying cam-
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paigns on the performance of Congress candidates in Taiwan, before and after the adoption of the new electoral rule,
first-past-the-post system (FPTP), replacing the original SNTV system. A significant statistical association between
vote-buying and winning chances presented under SNTV has been found to vanish in the case of FPTP.
In this vein, it is of substantial importance to measure the effectiveness of vote-buying in the current context. In
the absence of an appropriate identification strategy, the causality analysis is not achieved however and left for future
research.
2.7. Conclusion
This paper examines the causality between the odds of winning an election and vote-buying. In Taiwan, eight cities
and counties accounting for 60% of the entire population were merged and upgraded to five special municipalities
in 2010. Along with the merger event, the number of district seats was changed, exogenously shifting the winning
chances of candidates in the 2010 municipal elections. This policy intervention allows us to investigate whether a
candidate is incentivized to buy votes when winning odds deteriorate. For every additional seat cut in a district, the
difference-in-differences estimate suggests that approximately 4% additional incumbents seeking re-election decided
to buy votes.
Furthermore, the estimate indicates that an individual candidate is 0.6 to 0.76 percent more likely to run a vote-
buying campaign for every 1 percent less confident he/she is about the chances of a win. Finally, the evidence on
the vote-buying driven by seat variation implicitly points to this practice as an effective strategy for candidates to win
elections, while in the absence of an appropriate identification strategy, the causality analysis is left open for future
research.
The local factions serving as credible brokers has been an important theme of vote-buying while very little is
known. With the democratization in Taiwan in the mid-1990s, the impact of local factions is waning (Wang and
Kurzman, 2007a). However, both local factions and vote-buying are still significant components of present Taiwanese
politics. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, the interaction between local factions and vote-buying in
Taiwan merits extensive research.
Vote-buying is a mutual contract. The complete understanding of voting market therefore necessitates the analysis
on both sides of demand and supply. Along this line, models that account for interactions among buyers, sellers,
and brokers altogether, could advance our knowledge by generating testable hypotheses that fully capture vote-buying
enforcement mechanism (Stokes, 2005; Nichter, 2008). Taking these structural models into data analyses would then
be a promising avenue for future research.
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Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. 21
For all i ∈ N, let si(θi; ti) be define by
si(θi; ti) =
 1, if θi ≥ ti0, otherwise
Abusing notation we write W (si,θi;s−i(·)) ≡W (si,θi;t−i(·)). Given t−i, it is a best response of candidate i to buy
votes if
u(1−ρ(θi))W (1,θi;t−i(·))≥ uW (0,θi;t−i(·)),
or
W (1,θi;t−i(·))
W (0,θi;t−i(·)) ≥
1
1−ρ(θi) .
Assumption 10 implies that 1/(1−ρ(θi)) is continuous and convex with respect to the origin, with
1
1−ρ(θi) → ∞ (respectively, 1)
as θi→ θ (respectively, θi→ θ¯). Lemma D5 implies that the ratio W (1,θi;t−i(·))/W (0,θi;t−i(·)) is increasing in θi.
Since W (0,θi;t−i) is bounded away from zero, the ratio W (1,θi;t−i(·))/W (0,θi;t−i(·)) is bounded from below by
1. Therefore, W (1,θi;t−i(·))/W (0,θi;t−i(·)) intersects 1/(1−ρ(θ)) once from below in [θ, θ¯]. This implies that if
U(1,θi,s−i(·))−U(0,θi,s−i(·))≥ 0 then
U(1,θ
′
i,s−i(·))−U(0,θ
′
i,s−i(·))≥ 0
for all θ′i > θi. In other words, U(si,θi,s−i) satisfies the single crossing condition for any increasing strategy s−i of
the other candidates. The existence of the equilibrium then follows from Athey (2001) and symmetry of the problem
with respect to the candidates implies that the equilibrium is symmetric.
Tables and Figures
21I would like to thank Raul Antonio Cristovao Dos Santos for helpful comments upon this proof. All errors are my own.
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Table 2.1
CHANGES OF THE DISTRICT SEATS AFTER THE MERGER
Before Mergers After Mergers Net Change Range of Change
City/County Name District Numbers District Seats City Name District Numbers District Seats in Seats (District Level)
Taipei City* 6 51 Taipei 6 60 9 (1, 2)
Taipei County 10 62 New Taipei 10 62 0 (-1, 1)
Taichung City 6 45
Taichung 14 61 -39 (-4, -2)
Taichung County 8 55
Tainan City 6 41
Tainan 16 55 -36 (-4, -1)
Tainan County 10 50
Kaohsiung City* 5 43
Kaohsiung 11 62 -31 (-6, -1)
Kaohsiung County 6 50
Notes: * denotes the city which was already granted as the special municipality before the merger. Nearly but not necessarily all values within the range
of the seats change took place in districts of the given city.
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Table 2.2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE SAMPLE
2005 2006 2010 Total
Variable Mean Standard Mean Standard Mean Standard Mean StandardDeviation Deviation Deviation Deviation
Vote-buying charges 0.094 0.292 0.121 0.327 0.119 0.324 0.109 0.311
CandidateNumber* 12.457 6.432 15.818 3.573 10.439 4.932 11.772 5.687
Male 0.738 0.440 0.690 0.464 0.708 0.455 0.718 0.450
Age 48.087 8.504 46.287 8.994 50.605 8.927 48.970 8.890
KMT nominee 0.332 0.471 0.247 0.433 0.311 0.463 0.311 0.463
DPP nominee 0.223 0.417 0.230 0.422 0.262 0.440 0.241 0.428
Incumbent 0.424 0.495 0.471 0.501 0.560 0.497 0.490 0.500
Education (missing) 0.037 0.188 0.023 0.150 0.017 0.129 0.026 0.159
High school or less 0.373 0.484 0.126 0.333 0.291 0.454 0.305 0.460
Above high school 0.590 0.492 0.851 0.358 0.692 0.462 0.669 0.471
Adjusted vote share** 0.007 0.035
Number of observations 573 174 595 1342
Notes: *The number of observations of CandidateNumber is the number of districts in each election year, which amounts to 114 in total. **The number
of observations of adjusted vote share is 391.
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Table 2.3
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION
Cadidate Characteristics Variable Definition
Vote-buying charges A dummy variable equal 1 if a candidate was charged by a prosecutor for vote-buying
Gender A dummy variable equal 1 if a candidate is male
Age The age of candidate (in integers)
KMT nominee The democracy in Taiwan runs a two-party system, led by KMT and DPP. The KMT nominee is an indicator variable
assigning 1 to a candidate nominated by KMT
DPP nominee A dummy variable equal 1 if a candidate is nominated by DPP
Incumbent A dummy variable equals 1 if a candidate is incumbent
Education (Missing) A dummy variable equals 1 if a candidate did not reveal education level in the electoral bulletin
High school or less A dummy variable equals 1 if a candidate reported education level less or equal to secondary education
Above high school A dummy variable equals 1 if a candidate reported education level higher than secondary education
Local faction affiliation A dummy variable equals 1 if a candidate is affiliated with a local faction
PostMerger A dummy variable equals 1 to the 2010 election, and 0 otherwise
Adjusted vote share To construct the adjusted vote share, I first pin down the districts council member seats in 2010, say n. I then
compute each candidate’s adjusted vote share by taking the difference between vote shares of any given
candidate and that of the nth candidate ranked by the vote share of the district in 2005 or 2006
District Characteristics
District seats A positive integer variable to denote the number of seats given in the candidate’s electoral district
∆Seat The difference in seats in the electoral district d from the pre- to post-merger elections; i.e., Seatdt−1−Seatdt
CandidateNumber The number of candidates in a district
Fixed-effects
Urban area A set of dummy variables which assign the value of 1 to the cities and 0 to the counties according to the divisions
before the merger
Location A set of dummy variables which consist of three dummies: Northern, Central, and Southern. Northern assigns
1 to a candidate in Taipei (city and county); Center assigns 1 to a candidate in Taichung (city and county);
Southern assigns 1 to a candidate in Tainan (city and county) or Kaohsiung (city and county)
City A set of dummy variables which consist of dummies for five special municipalities after the merger
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Table 2.4
DROPOUT RATIO
Election Year
2005 2006 2010
Number of challengers 330 92 261
Number of incumbents 242 82 334
Number of seats this term 303 94 300
Number of seats previous term 303 94 397
Percentage of re-election seekers 0.80 0.87 0.84
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Table 2.5
DROPOUT REGRESSION
Dropout of Re-election in 2010
Variable (1) (2)
Male 0.044 0.046
(0.043) (0.042)
Age -0.045* -0.047*
(0.025) (0.024)
Age squared 0.001** 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000)
KMT -0.048 -0.003
(0.050) (0.048)
DPP -0.013 0.021
(0.057) (0.058)
Incumbent -0.076 -0.056
(0.052) (0.051)
High school or less -0.013 -0.035
(0.177) (0.185)
Above high school 0.037 0.028
(0.185) (0.191)
Adjusted vote share in 2005/2006 -2.216**
by 2010 district threshold (0.892)
District dummies included? Yes Yes
Number of observations 397 397
Notes: OLS models are used in columns (1) and (2), respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses with ***, **, * representing
estimates significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The robust standard errors of the regressions are clustered at the district level.
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Table 2.6
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATE
Dependent Variable: Vote-Buying Charges
Variable (1) (2) (3)
CandidateNumber 0.004 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
Male -0.012 -0.009 -0.006
(0.029) (0.029) (0.031)
Age 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
KMT nominee -0.004 -0.013 -0.017
(0.028) (0.026) (0.029)
DPP nominee -0.073** -0.080*** -0.074**
(0.030) (0.029) (0.034)
Incumbent -0.025 -0.019 -0.028
(0.036) (0.036) (0.037)
High school or less -0.062 -0.049 -0.080
(0.093) (0.093) (0.136)
Above high school -0.094 -0.089 -0.113
(0.091) (0.088) (0.135)
∆Seat -0.033** -0.024
(0.013) (0.014)
PostMerger -0.015 -0.028 -0.019
(0.031) (0.032) (0.033)
∆Seat×PostMerger 0.047*** 0.044*** 0.045***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
Urban area -0.047* -0.061**
(0.025) (0.026)
Location dummies included? Yes No No
City dummies included? No Yes No
District dummies included? No No Yes
First-stage F-statistic 327.49 334.74
Number of observations 668 668 668
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report the two-stage least squares estimates that take the specification of equation (2.1), where the instrument is district
seat. Robust standard errors are in parentheses with ***, **, * representing estimates significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The robust
standard errors in all columns are clustered at the candidate level.
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Table 2.7
THE EFFECT OF WINNING LIKELIHOOD ON VOTE-BUYING DECISION
OLS 2SLS
Dependent variable Vote-Buying Charges Vote-Buying Charges
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Elected -0.017 -0.018 -0.013 -0.011 -0.679** -0.756*** -0.603** -0.654**
(0.028) (0.029) (0.027) (0.028) (0.265) (0.283) (0.234) (0.280)
Male 0.040** 0.037* 0.041** 0.039** 0.039* 0.036 0.039* 0.037*
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.021) (0.023) (0.020) (0.022)
Age 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
KMT nominee 0.010 0.009 0.013 0.012 0.141** 0.161** 0.129** 0.142**
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.060) (0.066) (0.054) (0.063)
DPP nominee -0.061*** -0.064*** -0.061*** -0.065*** 0.116* 0.136* 0.097 0.109
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.068) (0.074) (0.062) (0.075)
Incumbent 0.019 0.016 0.015 0.012 -0.093* -0.110* -0.081* -0.093*
(0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.052) (0.055) (0.048) (0.055)
High school or less -0.121** -0.139** -0.126** -0.145*** -0.135* -0.152* -0.135** -0.152**
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.070) (0.078) (0.067) (0.073)
Above high school -0.111** -0.127** -0.119** -0.137*** -0.117* -0.135* -0.119* -0.136**
(0.050) (0.050) (0.052) (0.051) (0.065) (0.072) (0.063) (0.067)
Elected in 2005 or 2006 0.013 0.021 0.016 0.019 0.504** 0.564*** 0.448** 0.489**
(0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.195) (0.207) (0.171) (0.202)
Urban area -0.048** -0.060*** -0.040* -0.049**
(0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022)
Year dummies included? No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
City dummies included? Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
District dummies included? No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of observations 1340 1340 1340 1340 1340 1340 1340 1340
First-stage F-statistic 33.11 26.72 30.85 16.12
Adjusted R2 0.043 -0.028 0.046 -0.021 -0.453 -0.708 -0.346 -0.533
Notes: Two-stage least squares estimations are used for equation (2.2), where the instruments are ∆Seat and an interaction term between adjusted vote share and ∆Seat assigned to incumbents
but zero to entrants. Robust standard errors are in parentheses with ***, **, * representing estimates significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The robust standard errors of the regressions
in all columns are clustered at the district level.
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Figure 2.1: HIERARCHY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS
Central Government
Special Municipality
District
Village
Neighborhood
Province
City
District
Village
Neighborhood
County
Township (urban)
Village
Neighborhood
Township (rural)
Village
Neighborhood
County-administered city
Village
Neighborhood
Notes: The order of hierarchy is listed from central government on down. Observe from the chart the parallel inde-
pendence in hierarchy between the special municipality and province. The city-county merger can be understood as
the merging of city and county and then upgrading it as the special municipalities independent of the province it used
to belong to.
Source: The Local Government Act of 1999 (amended 2010).
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Figure 2.2: ADMINISTRATIVE MAP OF TAIWAN
The top figure shows before; the bottom one shows after. Notice that before merger, the cities resided in the surroundings of the
counties.
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Figure 2.3: VOTE-BUYING CHARGES BEFORE AND AFTER THE MERGER
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Figure 2.4: CHANGES IN VOTE-BUYING CHARGES BEFORE AND AFTER THE MERGER
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Notes: The sample is divided into two groups: treatment 1, in which candidates were in the districts where seats
increased or remained unchanged after the merger, and treatment 2 otherwise.
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Figure 2.5: QUANTILE PLOT OF ADJUSTED VOTE SHARE
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(a) left: dropouts; right: re-election seekers
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(b) left: re-election seekers; right: whole population
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Figure 2.6: LOGIT ESTIMATES OF WINNING ODDS AND VOTE-BUYING PROBABILITY
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(a) Logit estimate of winning odds against adjusted vote share
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Chapter 3
THE DETERMINANTS OF ADOLESCENT
ROMANTIC MATCHING: EVIDENCE FROM
ADD HEALTH
3.1. Introduction
Marriage is a classic example of two-sided matching problems. One notable feature in marriage markets is of cen-
tral interest to scholarly investigation: assortativity. Across various dimensions, this assortative pattern has been
documented by a growing body of empirical research (Choo and Siow, 2006; Hitsch, Hortac¸su, and Ariely, 2010;
Arcidiacono, Beauchamp, and McElroy, 2014). Becker (1973) modeled marriage from the perspective of joint pro-
duction that accommodated assortativity as an implication. In addition to the marriage market, patterns of assortative
matching pervade a large class of economic activities. Traces of sorting patterns are revealed among specialization
and integration in production ranging from brand alliances (Yang, Shi, and Goldfarb, 2009), upstream and downstream
supply chains (Fox, 2010a), firm-bank loans (Chen and Song, 2013), and mergers and acquisitions (Akkus, Cookson,
and Hortac¸su, 2014).
However, identifying and measuring determinants of matching games presents the following challenges. First,
identification requires detailed information on choice sets faced by agents and their corresponding equilibrium se-
lections, while typically observed data only reveal relationships formed in equilibrium. Furthermore, the curse of
dimensionality renders typical parametric estimation strategies intractable. At least two sources causing this problem
are well recognized. In matching games, identifying all preference lists necessitates estimating preference parameters
which outnumber the sample size (Choo and Siow, 2006). Moreover, the number of potential matching outcomes
grows exponentially with the size of choice sets. Even games with only a moderate number of players would pose a
too huge computational challenge for state-of-the-art technology to hurdle (Fox, 2010a).
In this paper, adolescent romantic matching is modeled as a one-to-one transferable utility matching game. The
equilibrium notion is pairwise stability. As an empirical investigation, the Add Health data is employed in this context.
I focus on opposite-sex matches among adolescents in grades 9 through 12 who attended the same schools. Since only
equilibrium matches are observed from the data, endogeneity arising from interactions among agents is the primary
concern. To deal with this, the maximum score estimator is employed as the empirical strategy. Maximum score
estimation was first proposed by Fox (2010a) for two-sided matching problems. Sidestepping evaluations over all
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possible matching outcomes, it achieves identification by maximizing an objective function that is consistent with the
equilibrium notion. Importantly, it is computationally feasible. As the maximum score estimator is not asymptoti-
cally normally distributed, a subsampling method proposed by Politis, Romano, and Wolf (1999) is implemented for
inference.
An adolescent romantic relationship usually accompanies sexual behavior, with which sexual transmitted diseases
(STD) and unintended pregnancy are the main concerns. Understanding the formation of adolescent romantic relation-
ship is therefore of substantial interest to public health policy-making. The key toward this goal relies upon identifying
the match value function. Accurate prediction of the path via which STD proceeds and its scale is allowed through
counterfactual analyses inferred from the match value function.
Findings from the baseline model suggest that matches are sorted by physical features. In terms of the match
value, although boy-girl pairs with taller girls are not significantly different from those of the same height, pairs with
taller boys are valued. Additionally, adolescents prefer to form romantic relationships with partners sharing similar
BMI, whereas girls with higher BMI than boys are much more likely avoided. Same-grade preference is also revealed.
Most agents seem to search partners within their own grade. In particular, pairs of senior-graded girls matched to
younger boys are rare due to low match values generated from the partnerships formed, whereas relationships the
other way around are less discounted. In the context of teen romantic relationships, race is suggested as the most
important determinant of match value. Matches are sorted by past sexual experience and attitude about having sex
during relationships. Finally, positive assortativity is found with regard to the academic performance in English but
not mathematics.
A specification incorporating a general health index and a physical development index is also estimated. The
evidence indicates that matching along the general health index sorts into two cases. First, agents with above average
general health index prefer to match with healthy agents of the same type. Nevertheless, the evidence also shows that
pairs who possess complementary health conditions, that is, pairs standing at the extreme ends of health index, could
as well achieve the same level of the match value as the previous case. An opposite pattern of matching is revealed
regarding the physical development index, a measure of physical maturity. The result suggests adolescents’ preference
toward the average on physical maturity.
Results on the determinants of romantic matching in this context are consistent with prior studies. Choo and Siow
(2006) found assortativity in marriage by age, where females are attracted to slightly older males, and males to slightly
younger females. The suggested asymmetric preferences could be, though weakly, related to the aforementioned
same-grade preference in the current study. For physical characteristics, moreover, Hitsch, Hortac¸su, and Ariely
(2010) showed that males prefer short females, but females find tall males more attractive. Also, while high-scored
BMI males are appreciated in the market, the opposite occurs in the case of females.
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This paper is most closely related to Arcidiacono, Beauchamp, and McElroy (2014), which also employed Add
Health data using a search and matching model. The main advantage of their structural approach is identification
of agent-specific preferences separately from the perspectives of male and female. However, only match-specific
parameters are identified in this context. Although strategic entry decision is accounted for in their model, agents of
the same types in a given market expect to form matches with the same probability, and hence the interactions during
match formation is not addressed. Findings in both papers are aligned with each other in general, but determinants
of match value have been studied in detail in this paper. On the face of it, it only requires mutual agreement to
form romantic relationships. However, it is the interactions among agents in the choice sets that give rise to the final
matches. This paper deals with this mechanism and differs from Arcidiacono, Beauchamp, and McElroy (2014) in
this regard.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 presents the model
and estimation strategy. Section 4 describes the data and specifications. Findings are discussed in Section 5, followed
by a discussion in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
3.2. Related Literature
This section discusses the literature on empirical methodologies for matching problems. Conditions allowing single-
agent discrete choice estimation to be directly applied are discussed first. In the scenario where only equilibrium
matches are observed, revealed-preference analysis provides useful implications for identification when endogeneity
arising from interactions among agents must be addressed. Finally, the partial identification strategy sheds light on the
most complicated but also the most general situation under which multiple equilibria occur.
When choice sets faced by agents and the equilibrium selections from both sides of the market are revealed,
matching estimation is then reduced to a single-agent discrete choice problem. With a rich dataset from an online
dating service, Hitsch, Hortac¸su, and Ariely (2010) estimated preference parameters by a logit estimator.
In many cases, however, empiricists only observe equilibrium matches, and hence interactions among agents
in matching games must be incorporated into estimation. Choo and Siow (2006) considered a structural approach
where a transferable utility model with a logit-distributed idiosyncratic error was used to derive the gain to marriage.
Implications from the model for aggregate matching patterns were then taken to the estimation. In the individual level
framework, Arcidiacono, Beauchamp, and McElroy (2014) proposed a search and matching model for adolescent
romantic matching. Their approach allowed preferences to be separately identified by gender.
One the other hand, there has been an increasing empirical literature using inequalities implied by revealed pref-
erence arguments. Fox (2010b,a) applied maximum score estimation to obtain estimates in accordance with the
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equilibrium notion suggested by pairwise stability. A strand of recent literature uses this methodology to study match-
ing problems across various dimensions of human activities (Yang, Shi, and Goldfarb, 2009; Chen and Song, 2013;
Akkus, Cookson, and Hortac¸su, 2014). Also exploiting the notion of pairwise stability, Sørensen (2007) considered
a one-to-many, non-transferable utility matching model, where a Bayesian approach was employed to account for the
interactions among agents.
In the most general scenario, multiple equilibria may coexist in the matching games, in which case aforementioned
strategies usually fail to obtain identification. A partial identification strategy serves as a promising solution instead
(Romano and Shaikh, 2010).
3.3. Model and Estimation
This section considers a one-to-one matching model with transferable utility. Pairwise stability is employed as the
equilibrium notion, upon which the necessary inequality is derived for the purpose of estimation. Following Fox
(2010b,a), maximum score estimation is applied to estimate the specified match value function. The empirical speci-
fication of the match value function is presented at the end of this section.
3.3.1. Model
Consider a two-sided matching market s ∈ {1, ...,S} defined by schools, in which two disjoint sets, male agents
Ms = {m1, ...,mNs} and female agents Ws = {w1, ...,wNs} reside. A matching µs in any given market s is stable if it is
individually rational and there is no blocking pair. Note that it is assumed, for simplicity but without loss of generality,
sets Ms and Ws are of equal size and hence there exists Ns observed matched pairs characterized by a stable matching
µs.
Under the regularity assumptions, Gale and Shapley (1962) proved the existence of stable matching. In the one-
to-one matching model under the transferable utility assumption, stable matching achieves efficiency in the sense that
it maximizes the sum of match values over all pairs (Koopmans and Beckmann, 1957; Shapley and Shubik, 1972;
Becker, 1973). See also Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for details. This would ensure identification of the match value
function. To derive the inequality taken to estimation, along the same line of reasoning in Fox (2010a), I first define
the match value function. Let (mi,w j) denote the matched pair between the male agent mi and the female agent w j.
For any given market s, assume that the utility of agents mi and w j generated from the matched pair (mi,w j) are
Vmi(mi,w j)+ tmi(mi,w j) and Vw j(mi,w j)+ tw j(mi,w j), respectively, where Vmi(mi,w j) is the utility component before
the transfer tmi(mi,w j), similarly for Vw j(mi,w j) and tw j(mi,w j). Note that transfers enter the utilities in an additively
separable format.
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In reality, transfers are not observed to econometricians. However, define the match value function of any given
matched pair (mi,w j) by summing over utilities of agents mi and w j. The match value function takes the following
form, where transfers are canceled out and thus the value is not dependent upon transfers.
f (mi,w j) =Vmi(mi,w j)+Vw j(mi,w j).
For any given matched pairs (mi,w j),(mk,wl) ∈ µs, where i 6= k and j 6= l in any given market s, some simple
algebra gives the inequality implied by pairwise stability:
f (mi,w j)+ f (mk,wl)≥ f (mi,wl)+ f (mk,w j).
3.3.2. Point Estimates and Confidence Interval
Empirically, for the purpose of estimation, the parametric specification of the match value function is formulated as
follows.
f (mi,w j|β) = Xmiw jβ+ εmiw j , (3.1)
where Xmiw j is a vector of match-specific characteristics and εmiw j denotes the match-specific random error. Note that
only pair-specific parameters are identifiable in this approach.1
Fox (2010a) suggests the use of a maximum score estimator that maximizes the following objective function,
Q(β) =
S
∑
s=1
∑
(mi,w j),(mk,wl)∈µs
1[ f (mi,w j)+ f (mk,wl)≥ f (mi,wl)+ f (mk,w j)].
For maximum score estimation in matching games, sufficient assumptions for consistency are characterized in
Fox (2010a). The maximum score estimator is known to converge to a non-normal distribution at the cube-root-n rate
(Kim and Pollard, 1990). Subsampling proposed by Politis, Romano, and Wolf (1999) is thus implemented to conduct
inference. In this paper, the confidence intervals are constructed based on 100 replications, each with the subsample
size chosen to be approximately 1/3 of the sample size.
1One exception is Akkus, Cookson, and Hortac¸su (2014) where they showed agent-specific parameters could be identified when realized
transfers are available.
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3.4. Data and Empirical Specifications
3.4.1. Add Health Data
The data come from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health (Add Health). Add Health
is a longitudinal survey that begins with a nationally representative sample of adolescents. Wave I of Add Health
conducted during the 1994-1995 school year has been employed in this paper.
Wave I consists of an in-school questionnaire and in-home interview. The in-school questionnaire was first imple-
mented upon a cohort of 90,118 high-school students from across 80 communities selected to form a representative
sample. A detailed follow-up in-home survey was then performed based on the random sample drawn from the in-
school cohort. The in-home interview collects information on 20,745 adolescents in grades 7 through 12. There are
1,170 matching pairs in the Wave I collection. I focus on the opposite-sex matches among adolescents in grades
9 through 12 within the same schools. Information regarding adolescents’ romantic partners with whom they were
matched outside of schools are not reported in the sample. Finally, schools containing less than 5 romantic matches
were dropped. The remaining sample consists of 818 pairs of romantic matches.
3.4.2. Characteristics of Matched Pairs
Individual and contextual attributes concerning the development of adolescents on the path toward adulthood are
provided in the in-home interview. Of particular interest is the information on respondents’ romantic relationship.
Demographic variables considered in the estimation include height, body mass index (BMI), past sexual experience,
ideal romantic relationship, academic performance in English (language arts) and mathematics, grade, general health
(index), physical development (index), and part-time job earnings. Table 3.2 reports the descriptive statistics for the
romantic matched pairs. The sample is composed primarily of white Americans. Among pairs, males are on average
5.6 inches taller and have a slightly higher BMI than female partners. Figure 3.1 displays the relationship of height
between pairs, where the height of each agent is transformed into the z-score using a reference group of the same
school and gender. Matching pattern seems to follow a preference of the same height. As for BMI, romantic matches
in Figure 3.2 are shown to cluster within the healthy range (18.5-24.9). Past sexual experience reported by respondents
suggests that 38.9% of males are sexually experienced as opposed to 25.9% of females. For the description of ideal
romantic relationship, males are more likely than females (68.5% vs. 45.4%) to identify sexual intercourse as the
desired element during the development of relationship.
Questions regarding respondents’ general health and physical development are also surveyed in the data. To
measure the status of general health, I average a set of questions informing the scale of general health status. I then
transform the averaged scale into the z-score using a reference group of the same school and gender. Figure 3.3 shows
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that the majority of matches center at zero while scattering toward the first quadrant. However, it is also observed
that males of high general health index match with females of low general health index, and vice versa. The physical
development index is computed in a similar fashion, based on scales of physical maturity. Figure 3.4 reveals mating
preference along average maturity. Finally, the part-time job earnings for each agent is computed by converting the
reported annual income from all jobs combined into weekly income. It is noted from Table 3.2 that on average male
earnings is higher than female counterpart, whereas a significant fraction of agents did not hold any part-time jobs.
Paired t-tests for characteristics between males and females are performed, reported in the right-most column of
Table 3.2. Males and females systematically differ across characteristics except for the general health index and race.
To examine the potential selection bias, Table 3.3 presents the descriptive statistics of the whole sample, which reveals
a similar pattern to the post-selected sample. Notice, however, that the set of matched pairs could be intrinsically
different from the unmatched agents.
Since only parameters on match-specific characteristics are identifiable, all variables are measured between
matched pairs. The next subsection discusses details of the construction of match-specific covariates for specifica-
tions.
3.4.3. Empirical Specifications
The match value function takes the specification as equation (1). Four categories of match-specific covariates are
constructed2. First, the product of paired characteristics has been used to examine the matching assortativity (Fox,
2010a). This is then applied to estimate interactions of academic performance between pairs in this context. Addi-
tionally, the absolute value of attribute product is employed for characteristics standardized as z-scores, general health
index and physical development index in this context, in order to capture the tendency of matching toward average
agents. Thirdly, the quadratic difference between male and female characteristics is used to proxy the disutility of
deviating from same-type matches, such as height, BMI, and grade level. I then decompose the quadratic difference
into the positive part and negative part of which to account for the asymmetry of disutility from deviation. Finally, to
examine the importance of same-type utility components to the match value function, I also use dummies for same-
type pairs. Specifically, the dummy equals 1 if matched pairs are of same type along some attribute. In this context,
covariates on past sexual experience, ideal romantic relationship, and race are constructed as aforementioned.
As the scale of the match value function is not identifiable (Fox, 2010a), the coefficient of part-time job is chosen to
be scale-normalized to be one. This allows the estimates an interpretation in the value of U.S. dollar, whereas no con-
fidence interval on the normalized point estimate is conducted due to superconsistency. In the baseline specification,
I only control for height, BMI, past sexual experience, ideal romantic relationship, race, academic performance, and
2Ideally, construction of covariates should be flexible. In this paper, I only consider four categories of match-specific covariates without
exhausting all possible specifications.
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grade. Alternatively, to address the concern that height and BMI might be highly correlated with general health index
and physical development index, I consider another specification that controls for general health index and physical
development index but not height and BMI. Finally, as the full model, general health index and physical development
index are incorporated into the baseline model for empirical investigations.
3.5. Findings
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 present the estimation results for both specifications, respectively. Two approaches are considered
to build the confidence intervals in each specification. First, while subsampling, I allow the initial value in the search
of estimates to be randomly drawn from an interval centered at the maximum score estimates obtained from the
estimation stage using full sample, and plus and minus 100. The 95 percent confidence intervals are then reported in
the column 2 of both tables. Alternatively, the initial value is randomly drawn from an interval bounded above and
below by plus and minus 100. It seems that local maxima generated from the non-smooth objective function preclude
a valid inference, and all 95 percent confidence intervals for estimates are too wide to be informative. I instead report
the 70 percent confidence intervals in the column 3 of both tables. Discussions in this section are therefore based on
the first approach.
About 73.9 percent of inequalities are explained by the baseline model, whereas there is little increase in explana-
tory power (74.4 percent) after controlling for general health index and physical development index. Findings from
the baseline model, as in Table 3.4, suggest that matches are sorted by physical features. In terms of the match value,
although boy-girl pairs with taller girls are not significantly different from those of the same height, pairs with taller
boys are valued. Additionally, adolescents prefer to form romantic relationships with others sharing similar BMI, and
girls with higher BMI than boys are much more likely avoided. Same-grade preference has been revealed from the
estimation. Most agents seem to search partners within their own grade, but this is sex-biased. In particular, pairs of
senior-graded girls matched to younger boys are rare due to low match values generated from the partnerships formed,
whereas relationships the other way around are less discounted. In the context of teen romantic relationship, race is
suggested to be the most important determinant of match value. Matches are sorted by past sexual experience and
attitude about having sex during relationships. Finally, positive assortativity is found along academic performance in
English but not mathematics.
Table 3.5 reports estimation results from the full specification. The evidence indicates that matching along general
indexed health sorts into two cases. First, agents with an above-average general health index prefer to match with
healthy agents of the same type. Nevertheless, the positive coefficient on the general health index implies that pairs
who possess complementary health conditions–that is, pairs standing at the extreme ends of health index–could also
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achieve the same level of the match value as the previous case. An opposite pattern of matching is revealed regarding
the physical development index. The negative coefficient on the physical development index suggests adolescents’
preference toward the average on physical maturity. Coefficients on height and BMI are consistent among the three
specifications. Race has the most significant effect on matching, while past sexual experience loses statistical signifi-
cance.
Table 3.6 shows the estimation result from an alternative baseline model, where height and BMI are replaced by
general health index and physical development index. It is observed that similar but slightly lower percentage of
inequalities are explained by this specification. Furthermore, signs and magnitudes of coefficients are comparable to
those from the full model.
3.6. Discussion
Results on the determinants of romantic matching in this context are consistent with prior studies. Choo and Siow
(2006) found assortativity in marriage by age, where females are attracted to slightly older males, and males to slightly
younger females. The suggested asymmetric preferences could be, though weakly, related to aforementioned same-
grade preference in the current study. For physical characteristics, moreover, Hitsch, Hortac¸su, and Ariely (2010)
showed that males prefer short females, but females find tall males more attractive. Also, while high-scored BMI
males are appreciated in the market, the opposite occurs in the case of females.
This paper is most closely related to Arcidiacono, Beauchamp, and McElroy (2014), which also employed Add
Health data with a search and matching model proposed. The main advantage of their structural approach is being
able to identify agent-specific preferences separately from the perspectives of male and female, but only match-specific
parameters are identified in this context. However, although strategic entry decision is accounted for in their model,
agents of same types in a given market expect to form matches with the same probability, and hence the interactions
during match formation is not tackled. Findings in both papers are aligned with each other in general, but determinants
of match value have been studied in detail in this paper.
Implications from this study also confirm facets where adolescent romantic relationship is intrinsically different
from the adult counterpart. In the frictionless online dating marketplace, agents with divorce experiences are kept
away by single ones (Hitsch, Hortac¸su, and Ariely, 2010). This rule applies irrespective of gender. In the context
of adolescent matching, a significant part of romantic matches are pleasure-driven, where agents value past sexual
experiences. This point has also been documented by Arcidiacono, Beauchamp, and McElroy (2014).
One caveat on the interpretation of estimates deserves some attention. Limited by the data, many potential compo-
nents of match value function cannot be explored. For example, the underlying implication of adolescents same-grade
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preferences during the formation of matches may be attributed to the friendship network. Hence, the preference esti-
mates are likely biased by search frictions that are not controlled for. This issue has also been pointed out by Kalmijn
(1998) and Hitsch, Hortac¸su, and Ariely (2010).
3.7. Conclusion
This paper estimates determinants of adolescent romantic matching using a maximum score estimator. Sorting patterns
are suggested from the results. The findings are consistent with the literature, but more detailed results are revealed.
In general, in line with the literature, I find evidence of positive assortative matching on height, BMI, and past sexual
experiences. Among all, race is suggested as the most important determinant of match value in the context of teen
romantic relationship. Although adolescent matching seems pleasure-driven wherein past sexual experience plays an
active role, agents place greater emphasis on the consensus of perceived ideal romantic relationship.
The estimated match value can be used to infer the path via which STD proceeds and its scale through counterfac-
tual analyses. Nevertheless, the maximum score estimator employed in this paper can only identify the match-specific
determinants of the match value function, from which only pairwise components of match value function is revealed,
but the share of the match value within pairs remains unclear. This significantly restricts the scope of investigation.
Developing methods on matching games along this direction merits future research.
Tables and Figures
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Table 3.1
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION
Characteristic Variable Definition
Part-time job earnings (in US$) Weekly income that an agent earns from all jobs combined
General health index Average of a set of questions in Wave 1 informing the scale of general health status. I then
transform the averaged scale into the z-score using a reference group of the same school and
gender. Higher index indicates better health
Physical development index Average of a set of questions in Wave 1 informing the scale of physical development status.
I then transform the averaged scale into the z-score using a reference group of the same
school and gender. The index increases with higher maturity achieved
Height-quadratic positive difference (in inches) Quadratic value of the positive part of male-minus-female difference in height
Height-quadratic negative difference (in inches) Quadratic value of the negative part of male-minus-female difference in height
BMI-quadratic positive difference Quadratic value of the positive part of male-minus-female difference in BMI
BMI-quadratic negative difference Quadratic value of the negative part of male-minus-female difference in BMI
Past sexual experience Dummy equals 1 if the agent had sexual intercourse
Ideal romantic relationship Dummy equals 1 if sexual intercourse is identified as the ideal romantic relationship
Grade in English or language arts (1-4 scale) Grade in English or language arts for the most recent grading period
Grade in mathematics (1-4 scale) Grade in mathematics for the most recent grading period
Same grade-quadratic positive difference Quadratic value of the positive part of male-minus-female difference in grade
Same grade-quadratic negative difference Quadratic value of the negative part of male-minus-female difference in grade
Same race Dummy equals 1 if the matched male and female are of the same race
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Table 3.2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE SAMPLE
Male Female
Variable Mean Standard Min Max Mean Standard Min Max t-valueDeviation Deviation
Part-time job earnings 73.391 77.002 0.000 800.000 45.694 67.292 0.000 615.385 7.83***
General health index -0.061 1.000 -4.772 2.049 -0.018 0.933 -3.753 2.248 -0.90
Physical development index 0.183 0.958 -2.949 2.774 0.040 0.915 -3.849 1.879 3.25***
Height 69.891 3.082 59.000 81.000 64.269 2.680 57.000 79.000 44.39***
Height (z-score) 0.139 0.948 -3.090 3.132 -0.024 0.951 -2.350 4.494 3.80***
BMI 23.034 3.611 16.053 41.910 21.789 3.498 13.824 44.134 8.11***
Past sexual experience 0.389 0.488 0.000 1.000 0.259 0.438 0.000 1.000 5.60***
Ideal romantic relationship 0.685 0.465 0.000 1.000 0.454 0.498 0.000 1.000 9.44***
Grade in English or language arts 2.438 0.942 1.000 4.000 1.971 0.921 1.000 4.000 11.15***
Grade in mathematics 2.451 1.044 1.000 4.000 2.318 1.005 1.000 4.000 2.84***
Grade 9 0.319 0.319 -5.47***
Grade 10 0.306 0.306 -0.38
Grade 11 0.244 0.244 3.03***
Grade 12 0.131 0.131 3.30***
White 0.578 0.584 0.15
Black 0.167 0.141 1.30
Hispanic 0.139 0.150 -0.77
Asian 0.066 0.069 -0.39
Other 0.049 0.056 -0.77
Number of observations 818 818
Notes: ***p < .01, two-tailed, paired sample t-test. **p < .05, two-tailed, paired sample t-test.
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Table 3.3
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE FULL SAMPLE
Male Female
Variable Mean Standard Min Max Mean Standard Min Max t-valueDeviation Deviation
Part-time job earnings 62.055 72.264 0.000 800.000 38.459 60.372 0.000 615.385 8.91***
General health index -0.060 1.008 -4.772 2.049 -0.014 0.940 -3.853 2.248 -1.15
Physical development index 0.172 0.973 -2.949 2.901 0.066 0.912 -3.849 1.893 2.84***
Height 69.036 3.694 53.000 81.000 64.037 2.702 56.000 79.000 42.68***
Height (z-score) 0.085 0.956 -3.090 3.132 -0.056 0.934 -2.508 4.494 3.97***
BMI 22.657 3.767 14.253 42.002 21.559 3.632 13.824 49.823 8.33***
Past sexual experience 0.359 0.480 0.000 1.000 0.227 0.419 0.000 1.000 6.99***
Ideal romantic relationship 0.615 0.487 0.000 1.000 0.377 0.485 0.000 1.000 11.49***
Grade in English or language arts 2.374 0.948 1.000 4.000 1.951 0.895 1.000 4.000 12.43***
Grade in mathematics 2.399 1.046 1.000 4.000 2.250 1.002 1.000 4.000 3.88***
Grade 7 0.089 0.100 -0.92
Grade 8 0.123 0.133 -0.74
Grade 9 0.174 0.254 -4.74***
Grade 10 0.230 0.226 0.20
Grade 11 0.240 0.189 3.02***
Grade 12 0.144 0.097 3.49***
White 0.584 0.590 -0.29
Black 0.185 0.156 1.87
Hispanic 0.132 0.146 -0.96
Asian 0.047 0.050 -0.38
Other 0.052 0.058 -0.63
Number of observations 1170 1170
Notes: ***p < .01, two-tailed, paired sample t-test. **p < .05, two-tailed, paired sample t-test.
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Table 3.4
MAXIMUM SCORE ESTIMATES OF THE ROMANTIC MATCH VALUE FUNCTION-BASELINE MODEL (1)
Romantic Match Value Function Estimate
Variable Point Estimate 95 Percent Confidence Interval 70 Percent Confidence Interval
Part-time job earnings 1.00 Superconsistent Superconsistent
Height-quadratic positive difference 6,714.14 (5,205.78, 8,800.34) (4,623.82, 9,814.94)
Height-quadratic negative difference 473.56 (-1,127.23, 2,212.79) (-1,523.12, 1,574.72)
BMI-quadratic positive difference -340.50 (-501.25, -75.49) (-485.11, -103.34)
BMI-quadratic negative difference -1,386.58 (-1,923.40, -810.98) (-1,971.13, -198.14)
Past sexual experience 15,074.01 (10,612.02, 16,708.17) (-329.50, 18,440.42)
Ideal romantic relationship 30,379.61 (25,732.69, 39,251.99) (19,759.79, 41,348.80)
Same race 260,323.57 (252,427.76, 263,813.48) (14,922.96, 336,113.90)
Grade in English or language arts 4,464.72 (1,453.65, 5,485.04) (1,839.89, 5,838.42)
Grade in mathematics 22.85 (-4,913.46, 825.49) (-3,020.94, 500.16)
Grade level-quadratic positive difference -19,567.38 (-25,656.93, -17,417.29) (-25,097.72, -3,840.58)
Grade level-quadratic negative difference -55,912.35 (-63,592.54, -51,730.17) (-81,037.60, -24,109.36)
Number of inequalities 42,019.00
Percent of inequalities satisfied 0.739
Notes: Point estimates are estimated using the differential evolution algorithm (Storn and Price, 1997). Confidence intervals are constructed following
the subsampling method proposed by Politis, Romano, and Wolf (1999). The subsample size is set to be approximately 1/3 of the total sample, and 100
replications are generated accordingly to construct confidence intervals.
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Table 3.5
MAXIMUM SCORE ESTIMATES OF THE ROMANTIC MATCH VALUE FUNCTION-FULL MODEL
Romantic Match Value Function Estimate
Variable Point Estimate 95 Percent Confidence Interval 70 Percent Confidence Interval
Part-time job earnings 1.00 Superconsistent Superconsistent
General health index 16,215.01 (4,664.55, 20,432.89) (6,833.00, 20,681.97)
Physical development index -23,426.64 (-26,112.43, -16,000.79) (-31,897.89, -17,436.31)
Height-quadratic positive difference 7,040.71 (4,366.90, 11,066.87) (2,756.56, 9,934.11)
Height-quadratic negative difference -224.74 (-1,687.38, 1,790.69) (-1,456.05, 1,458.85)
BMI-quadratic positive difference -275.75 (-441.79, -8.81) (-349.54, 25.53)
BMI-quadratic negative difference -2,270.62 (-2,921.56, -567.24) (-3,154.19, -1,132.95)
Past sexual experience 15,637.60 (-24,661.05, 20,037.80) (-7,929.65, 17,494.07)
Ideal romantic relationship 36,273.44 (32,863.77, 51,767.69) (16,548.54, 47,214.61)
Same race 459,061.05 (440,821.05, 491,085.67) (133,007.59, 586,318.29)
Grade in English or language arts 4,795.14 (1,614.41, 6,822.96) (1,976.94, 6,236.00)
Grade in mathematics -1,212.15 (-6,747.49, -700.69) (-4,840.53, -1,042.02)
Grade level-quadratic positive difference -19,950.05 (-23,655.09, -14,302.06) (-23,839.74, 2,507.10)
Grade level-quadratic negative difference -110,623.24 (-132,131.09, -99,259.66) (-168,070.52, -71,483.26)
Number of inequalities 42,019.00
Percent of inequalities satisfied 0.744
Notes: Point estimates are estimated using the differential evolution algorithm (Storn and Price, 1997). Confidence intervals are constructed following
the subsampling method proposed by Politis, Romano, and Wolf (1999). The subsample size is set to be approximately 1/3 of the total sample, and 100
replications are generated accordingly to construct confidence intervals.
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Table 3.6
MAXIMUM SCORE ESTIMATES OF THE ROMANTIC MATCH VALUE FUNCTION-BASELINE MODEL (2)
Romantic Match Value Function Estimate
Variable Point Estimate 95 Percent Confidence Interval 70 Percent Confidence Interval
Part-time job earnings 1.00 Superconsistent Superconsistent
General health index 9,650.27 (1,737.86, 11,259.73) (-777.75, 12,918.52)
Physical development index -15,554.15 (-26,301.08, -13,226.40) (-22,032.80, -11,626.68)
Past sexual experience 26,806.71 (26,217.48, 28,901.87) (17,207.60, 37,223.94)
Ideal romantic relationship 30,188.99 (28,176.52, 30,907.24) (20,887.10, 41,660.23)
Same race 472,912.04 (469,370.46, 483,008.23) (366,068.55, 643,664.64)
Grade in English or language arts 2,209.42 (-1,041.15, 3,144.73) (-874.93, 2,980.51)
Grade in mathematics -889.15 (-2,173.27, -673.26) (-2,129.41, -724.19)
Grade level-quadratic positive difference -26,697.54 (-29,916.99, -22,584.05) (-37,244.53, -11,070.47)
Grade level-quadratic negative difference -47,233.71 (-59,162.93, -43,167.16) (-73,169.11, -20,682.10)
Number of inequalities 42,019.00
Percent of inequalities satisfied 0.734
Notes: Point estimates are estimated using the differential evolution algorithm (Storn and Price, 1997). Confidence intervals are constructed following
the subsampling method proposed by Politis, Romano, and Wolf (1999). The subsample size is set to be approximately 1/3 of the total sample, and 100
replications are generated accordingly to construct confidence intervals.
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Figure 3.1: SCATTERPLOT OF HEIGHT BETWEEN PAIRS
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Figure 3.2: SCATTER PLOT OF BMI BETWEEN PAIRS
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Figure 3.3: SCATTER PLOT OF GENERAL HEALTH INDEX BETWEEN PAIRS
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Figure 3.4: SCATTER PLOT OF PHYSICAL DEVELOPMENT INDEX BETWEEN PAIRS
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